Ten days in and it seems the government's post-Brexit economic policy is to ignore reality, priority and choice, and just claim with no evidence that everything is going to be great. This, needless to say, is dangerous territory. Exhibit 1... 1/
Right now they don't. Big talk, little reality. Tough world. 12/ end
No US deal yet, instead we have the usual warm words about being deep in talks, and the CPTPP. But for what? If we get deals with Australia and NZ we'll have deals with 10 of 12 CPTPP countries. How will joining then help goods trade? And why goods, not services? 7/ pic.twitter.com/NaiUXr1y4f
— David Henig (@DavidHenigUK) January 12, 2021
More from David Henig
We need to talk about UK politics. More specifically we need to talk about the absence of opposition to a no-deal Brexit risking Scottish independence, Northern Irish peace, the end of the mass market car industry, more expensive food, and damaged relations with US and EU 1/n
Project fear and the red wall. The first meaning that every serious threat, such as that of Nissan that their plant will be unsustainable, is dismissed with little discussion. The red wall, apparently so angry with Labour about the EU they are afraid to have a position. 2/
Because 'sovereignty' apparently. But a particularly nefarious form of sovereignty in which the normal kind of things you discuss in a Free Trade Agreement - shared rules, access to waters - become when discussed with the EU unacceptable infringements and threats. 3/
You note in the UK we aren't having a discussion on what level playing field rules or access to fishing waters might be acceptable. Or normal. Or even what we might want, like shared increased commitments on climate change. No, all rumours. Evil EU. Worse French. 4/
Those who follow closely see incredible briefings in the papers, like today claiming the EU demand for raising minimum shared standards was only raised on Thursday, treated as fact. This was known months ago. But the media too often just reports the spin as fact. 5/
UK cabinet to back Johnson over no-deal Brexit - The Times https://t.co/uCuOTsNdJL pic.twitter.com/88x5Tw2g53
— Reuters (@Reuters) December 6, 2020
Project fear and the red wall. The first meaning that every serious threat, such as that of Nissan that their plant will be unsustainable, is dismissed with little discussion. The red wall, apparently so angry with Labour about the EU they are afraid to have a position. 2/
Because 'sovereignty' apparently. But a particularly nefarious form of sovereignty in which the normal kind of things you discuss in a Free Trade Agreement - shared rules, access to waters - become when discussed with the EU unacceptable infringements and threats. 3/
You note in the UK we aren't having a discussion on what level playing field rules or access to fishing waters might be acceptable. Or normal. Or even what we might want, like shared increased commitments on climate change. No, all rumours. Evil EU. Worse French. 4/
Those who follow closely see incredible briefings in the papers, like today claiming the EU demand for raising minimum shared standards was only raised on Thursday, treated as fact. This was known months ago. But the media too often just reports the spin as fact. 5/
More from Brexit
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
