Ten days in and it seems the government's post-Brexit economic policy is to ignore reality, priority and choice, and just claim with no evidence that everything is going to be great. This, needless to say, is dangerous territory. Exhibit 1... 1/

Just bringing together my various bits and pieces on the UK-EU. The first reactions - a significant agreement...

Winners and losers of the UK-EU deal.

Why this was always going to be a problem - regulatory soverignty v free trade involves trade offs...

Going back to mid-2019, why the deal the UK wanted from the EU, the same benefits with none of the costs, couldn't be available.

More recently, why the Brexit dream is dying - because it wasn't designed to deal with a situation where we had to choose between trade with the EU and freedom.

Brexit. UK-EU talks. Let's try to explain why we're in such a state, of increased risk of no deal, moving away from the fish and playing fields which are the detail but not the answer, to differing philosophies and divorce parallels that might just help... 1/

First, with apologies to those concerned, we need to go beyond those saying this is the inevitable path to deal / no-deal. Half of them will be right and I'll definitely be wrong (don't worry, I'm hedged in wine bets), but it wasn't inevitable, typical, or necessary. 2/

I'll also ignore the content of any deal, which has been clear for months, the UK compromises on level playing field, the EU on fish. Something so obvious really isn't the fundamental issue. Could, as some not noted for their perspicacity have said, be done in an afternoon. 3/

Some truth in the idea that flounces and playing the tough cop are a part of trade negotiations. But equally as we're in about the 5th pass of these, I think it has ceased to be helpful. Either side could already have cut the deal having shown their toughness. 4/

Some fundamentals then, that we've forgotten. First, the trade deal that will lead to much less free trade than before. The incentive structures, the ability to create a win-win, are inevitably going to be different to a normal deal. 5/

Delusional. And no way to run a country. Far higher barriers to trade with the EU from Friday. And still subject to EU influence on our laws. To deny this is also to deny the ability to tackle the problems we will face.

We ended up with particularly high level playing field conditions in the EU deal because the UK didn't take the subject seriously. We got a worse deal on fish than anyone thought possible, and got nothing in return. All because of cakeism. Or patriotism as they call it.

Now we face higher trade barriers to our nearest market, which means our businesses need to be even more competitive to overcome them and succeed. Is that acknowledged?

Our neighbours, the EU, use all manner of pressures to keep neighbours in line in terms of trade. That financial services equivalence, pity if you didn't get that. Data equivalence, have 6 months free if you don't change your laws while we make you sweat...

Northern Ireland, as we repeat endlessly, Johnson cakeism of no checks? Somehow no longer mentioned after the EU got what they wanted. See also, fish, level playing field. EU priorities, EU won. Johnson cake, all gone, not eaten.

1/7 My thoughts on what could happen within a decade after #Brexit with the formation of the #UnitedCelticNation as a new country:

2/7 After the #Brexit transition period ends on 31 Dec 2020, the Scottish Parliament will announce a new independent referendum (under a Section 30 order which the PM has to agree to - he won't - they will change their laws to enable them not to need his approval).

3/7 This new Scottish independent referendum will happen within the first 6/9 months of 2021 and result in the decision to leave the UK.

4/7 An application to rejoin the EU will happen immediately after the Scottish referendum result and within months the EU will accept Scotland back in (justified as 'the will of the people' plus how recent their exit was).

5/7 Within 3-5 years of #Brexit, Wales will also hold its own referendum on independence (fuelled by the decline in economy plus the example set by Scotland) and will also be successful. EU membership will also be sought and gained with an accelerated timescale within a year.

EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier has briefed Europe Ministers from EU member states that progress continues to be made in negotiations with the UK but not significantly when it comes to key sticking points: level playing field, fish, governance of deal /1

This briefing comes ahead of the EU leaders summit in Brussels end of this week, where Brexit will be discussed most likely I’m told on Friday morning. Both Michel Barnier and the PM once described this summit mid October as cut off point by which time a deal had to be agreed /2

This clearly will not be the case and each side predictably blames the other for that. Today a UK government source said: „The EU have been using the old playbook in which they thought running down the clock would work against the UK“ /3

„They have assumed that the UK would be more willing to compromise the longer the process ran, but in fact all these tactics have achieved is to get us to the middle of October with lots of work that could have been done left undone.“ /4

Both sides say they still want a deal and think it entirely possible to reach a deal this year, infact v soon, if only the OTHER side would just be „more realistic“ (ie make the big compromises) /5

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,

Small business in particular struggling with new Brexit red tape. Entirely predictable, and a function of a world trade system distorted against smaller traders. Stay with me a short while as Brexit threadmeister and story author @pmdfoster may say... 1/

The nub of the issue is the extra costs for most exports, whether this is paperwork or meeting different regulatory requirements. A fixed cost per exported load inevitably adds a higher percentage cost to small than larger business... and they may lack expertise. 2/

You'll note that in the EU, with virtually no paperwork or differing regulations, the costs of exports are similar for smaller and large companies - though even there there is a big company bias, because who can afford to lobby for friendly regulations? 3/

The same unfortunately typically applies to trade deals. If you are Nissan and threaten to leave the country without the right deal you have more clout than a small cheesemaker. As we see. But is it just the EU that is over-bureaucratic? Sadly not... 4/

One of the best UK business groups on trade policy @BritAmBusiness (and yes you can quote me @EmanueAdam) has a new report out on a UK-US trade deal and SMEs. It shows opportunities. But unfortunately problems unlikely to be solved. 5/