Brexit. UK-EU talks. Let's try to explain why we're in such a state, of increased risk of no deal, moving away from the fish and playing fields which are the detail but not the answer, to differing philosophies and divorce parallels that might just help... 1/

First, with apologies to those concerned, we need to go beyond those saying this is the inevitable path to deal / no-deal. Half of them will be right and I'll definitely be wrong (don't worry, I'm hedged in wine bets), but it wasn't inevitable, typical, or necessary. 2/
I'll also ignore the content of any deal, which has been clear for months, the UK compromises on level playing field, the EU on fish. Something so obvious really isn't the fundamental issue. Could, as some not noted for their perspicacity have said, be done in an afternoon. 3/
Some truth in the idea that flounces and playing the tough cop are a part of trade negotiations. But equally as we're in about the 5th pass of these, I think it has ceased to be helpful. Either side could already have cut the deal having shown their toughness. 4/
Some fundamentals then, that we've forgotten. First, the trade deal that will lead to much less free trade than before. The incentive structures, the ability to create a win-win, are inevitably going to be different to a normal deal. 5/
Next, trade deals are a closer binding based on trust, they may not even seem to provide much greater access than WTO, but are a symbol of both sides intention to work together. Both parties accept the rules as part of the trust. To put it mildly, absent between UK and EU. 6/
Next, UK oscillation on preferred outcome (a mild preference for a deal) compared to the EU as a process driven trade negotiating machinery, which assumes both siudes want a deal that can be done. I think this contrast explains a lot of friction. 7/
Odd one, but UK treaty literalism versus EU agreement concepts. Not that the EU don't want good treaty text, but in operation it is the framework for what happens, not the last word. Whereas the UK seem to be concerned about exact text pinning us down. 8/
I'm afraid the approach of the UK government to the Northern Ireland protocol, leading to the Internal Market Bill, has shown the problem of the selective literal reading. Instead of assuming we can suitably fudge operations we are trying to pin down exact meanings. 9/
Perhaps most of all we need to be thinking of post divorce emotions. An EU wanting to go through a careful process to arrange all the details. The UK wanting it all over as quickly as possible, with as few future constraints as possible to show it really is all over. 10/
Yesterday's PM letter a classic emotional outburst you could imagine in a divorce situation, sort of "I have done everything you asked and you are still not being in any way fair so I am going to go my own way and I will be fine and I really don't need you" etc... 11/
The EU cannot I would suggest deal with such UK emotions except by reverting to process, which probably isn't very helpful. But the UK is so emotional that it is struggling to accept that the EU really does have the right to request some rules for the future. 12/
So should the UK and EU abandon the trade talks and go for intensive divorcing couples therapy instead? Given peacekeepers in international diplomacy tend to be associated with ending wars we probably don't want to go there. 13/
However if the problem is more about significant differences in philosophy that led to the divorce in the first place, then the answer probably isn't just to have another conversation about fish. Or another row. It is going to be something different. 14/
Last year we had Leo Varadkar sweet-talking Boris Johnson, the main difference to now being that there was only one real issue to resolve, and both parties had strong grounds for an agreement. Result, deal. Not sure it could work again. 15/
Ultimately what we seem to need is the UK to be reassured the EU doesn't want to set our rules, and the EU to be reassured that the UK isn't going to cheat. And that won't come in the text, it can't. Because these are the deep seated fears with truth in them. 16/
I don't know how you provide these levels of assurance in a couple of weeks, sufficient to overcome the not insignificant challenges of a UK government overturning planned legislation and the European Parliament approving a deal. But that is what is needed. 17/
Right now if the UK and EU signed a trade deal it wouldn't last. You couldn't insulate it against mutual suspicion. At the same time no deal increases the mutual suspicion and is costly for both sides, and let's not get into who bleeds more, pointless conversation. 18/
So as far as I can see it is 2 weeks for the UK and EU, or frankly someone else they trust if there is anyone, to find a new way to communicate. Actually Johnson was right, this is the end of the road without change. But wrong, as it needs both sides. Over to... someone? 19/ end

More from David Henig

This potential benefit list from CPTPP is not the longest and is still misleading. Those Malaysian whisky tariffs - emilimated over 15 years (if they don't seek any specific exemption for UK). Those rules of origin benefits? Only apply to import / export to CPTPP countries. https://t.co/9TbheOVhsR


Here's my more realistic take on CPTPP. Economic gains limited, but politically in terms of trade this makes some sort of sense, these are likely allies. DIT doesn't say this, presumably the idea of Australia or Canada as our equal upsets them.


As previously noted agriculture interests in Australia and New Zealand expect us to reach generous agreements in WTO talks and bilaterals before acceding to CPTPP. So this isn't a definite. Oh and Australia wants to know if we'll allow hormone treated beef

Ultimately trade deals are political, and the UK really wants CPTPP as part of the pivot to indo-pacific, and some adherents also hope it forces us to change food laws without having to do it in a US deal (isn't certain if this is the case or not).

If we can accede to CPTPP without having to make changes to domestic laws it is fine. Just shouldn't be our priority, as it does little for services, is geographically remote, and hardly cutting edge on issues like climate change or animal welfare.
Going to have to disagree with my learned friend here. If anyone moved on level playing field it was the UK, on the principle of a ratchet, or tariffs for divergence which was still being denied midweek. Changing the way in this might be achieved (many options) is insignificant.


It is the same "I move in principle you move in detail" shift we saw with the Northern Ireland protocol last year, when no PM could accept a border between GB and NI suddenly did, just as recently no PM would accept tariffs for divergence and seems to have done.

So, are we at deal yet? No, and it remains far from certain, but better than the gloom of Saturday. I still think the PM wants his ideal where everyone is happy, still hopes if only he can speak to Macron and Merkel he could get it, still to decide.


And even if there is a deal it is now too late for either business to adjust to it, or the EU to ratify it according to normal procedure. In both cases you'd think we'd need an extension, but there is a big shrug on this whole question. Nobody knows.

And so, yet again on Brexit, we wait. In particular, those who actually do the trade, the businesses we rely on, are forced to wait for a formal outcome while preparing as best they can. Let's see what happens.
We need to talk about UK politics. More specifically we need to talk about the absence of opposition to a no-deal Brexit risking Scottish independence, Northern Irish peace, the end of the mass market car industry, more expensive food, and damaged relations with US and EU 1/n


Project fear and the red wall. The first meaning that every serious threat, such as that of Nissan that their plant will be unsustainable, is dismissed with little discussion. The red wall, apparently so angry with Labour about the EU they are afraid to have a position. 2/

Because 'sovereignty' apparently. But a particularly nefarious form of sovereignty in which the normal kind of things you discuss in a Free Trade Agreement - shared rules, access to waters - become when discussed with the EU unacceptable infringements and threats. 3/

You note in the UK we aren't having a discussion on what level playing field rules or access to fishing waters might be acceptable. Or normal. Or even what we might want, like shared increased commitments on climate change. No, all rumours. Evil EU. Worse French. 4/

Those who follow closely see incredible briefings in the papers, like today claiming the EU demand for raising minimum shared standards was only raised on Thursday, treated as fact. This was known months ago. But the media too often just reports the spin as fact. 5/

More from Brexit

Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:


1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:

A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;

3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;

5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;

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