Today's UK-EU trade deal reflection - what is rarely stated in discussions about the deal's shortcomings is that they reflect UK government policy choices - in particular that control of immigration and a US trade deal are a higher priority than an EU deal.

Thus, why was it not a UK government priority to secure for UK musicians the rights to tour the EU? Because that would probably have required a reciprocal right to be given to those in the EU, which we didn't want to give. Choice.
Meanwhile why did the UK government not seek or secure a reduction in food inspections for GB products going to the EU? Because that would probably have required fixing food regulations in a way that might have been an obstacle to a US trade deal.
Works the other way as well. Why did the EU refuse UK requests on mutual recognition of industrial testing? In part at least because of UK lack of commitment on maintaining the previous EU system of standards and conformity assessment which might be a problem in a US deal.
One of the strangest opinions in the London politics bubble is that the UK government isn't that bothered about a US trade deal, as it so obviously goes against the evidence. There might be domestic opposition, but this was to be Brexit Dividend Number 1.
Perfectly reasonable of course for the UK government to have political priorities. Just particularly strange that we don't discuss them in this way. And those who want a stronger relationship with the EU have to tackle the immigration issue in particular.
Really we need to get better at discussing the UK's political choices. Because whether immigration, deregulation, food, data rules, all will affect our trade policy.

But it isn't a conversation the government wants and hence there is no obvious place for it to happen.
The EU negotiation abstract of pre-December 31 is becoming real, and now we start to learn the impact of choices, and the immigration and US trade deal priorities. Let's see if those priorities hold or change with circumstances. /end

More from David Henig

Morning. And its Groundhog Day today. https://t.co/gRs4Dc8RH2


Some useful threads will follow, first on the Northern Ireland protocol, where unfettered is still being defined...


And on fish and level playing field. The latter seems, has always seemed, the most problematic, because the UK has apparently ruled out any compromise on shared minumum levels even if not automatic. That would be a deal breaker, but seems... unnecessary.


Your reminder closing complex deals is never easy. But there are ways to facilitate and EU is good at doing this if you meet their red lines. But still the biggest concern that the UK never understood level playing field terms are fundamental to the EU.


In the UK, one man's decision. Allegedly backed by a Cabinet who in reality will be quite happy to blame the PM either way. The temptation to send Michael Gove to seal the deal and end his leadership ambitions must be there...
Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.


Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.

The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.

For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.

The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.

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