1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,
3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider
4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in
5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,
6/ nor how China will provide equal access to standards setting; that this keeps coming up in intl discussions/domestic policy pledges means it’s a longstanding issue, and it’s unclear how the CAI addresses structural issues underpinning that (eg forced IP localization). The lang
7/ around SOEs/subsidy disclosure is disappointing, considering how important an ask this was for the EU. W/o more detail on dispute resolution, unclear how SOEs can be forced to change here, especially bc things like procurement are conducted via back channels that disadvantage
8/ MNCs, or in the case of ICT, are swayed by domestic policy pledges (eg 安全可控) that come from political/diplomatic problems, not commercial issue. Tied to this, the fact that subsidy disclosure doesn’t *touch* the industrial sector avoids a huge problem area that now
9/ underpins a lot of retaliatory trade policy/pushback against globalization. Finally, if we look at the commitments on labour and environ, benchmark is again not backsliding—but what about *existing* issues around forced labour/XJ? Pledging to not allow labour standards
10/ to deteriorate further is from a very low base. Commitment towards working to ratify ILO conventions is also very different from being forced to do so. Finally, on enforcement and dispute resolution—the most key parts of any deal!!—the commitments seem similarly disappointing
11/ but we still need details on how this will work. Precedent w/ the US shows that China sees any framework for regular monitoring (and, potentially, punitive action) as a violation of sovereignty. Suggesting that enforcement might lack teeth. Overall, CAI looks like it slightly
12/ moves the needle on some issues, while leaving many others untouched. We still need to wait for final text to be released in order to do deeper analysis, but this suggests CAI will have a hard time going through European Parliament for ratification. (end)

More from Brexit

Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:


1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:

A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;

3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;

5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
This very short article by Jeremy Cliffe is the best thing I have ever read on Brexit and the EU. It pivots on the contrast between Delors’ and Thatcher’s authentically provincial Christian visions and suggests the battle in Britain between the two is not over.


Thatcher: Protestant believer in the totally free market and absolutely sovereign centralised nation state. Delors: Catholic believer in third way personalism, corporatism and federalism. Individualism versus relational love. Heterodoxy versus Orthodoxy.

The article useful gives the lie to the idea that the Catholic vision of the EU has altogether vanished even though it is weakened. Delors wanted a social dimension to the free market and single currency and yet lexiteers laughably insist the EU is more neoliberal than the U.K.!

Subsidiary federalism is a doctrine of democracy and human fraternity. State sovereignty is a doctrine of naked power. It is a face of Antichrist. Leviathan.

Those combined that democracy can only be inside a single state fail to power just how much of private law and evermore so is necessarily international. Thus if political institutions don’t extend over borders there can be no democracy.

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“We don’t negotiate salaries” is a negotiation tactic.

Always. No, your company is not an exception.

A tactic I don’t appreciate at all because of how unfairly it penalizes low-leverage, junior employees, and those loyal enough not to question it, but that’s negotiation for you after all. Weaponized information asymmetry.

Listen to Aditya


And by the way, you should never be worried that an offer would be withdrawn if you politely negotiate.

I have seen this happen *extremely* rarely, mostly to women, and anyway is a giant red flag. It suggests you probably didn’t want to work there.

You wish there was no negotiating so it would all be more fair? I feel you, but it’s not happening.

Instead, negotiate hard, use your privilege, and then go and share numbers with your underrepresented and underpaid colleagues. […]
Trump is gonna let the Mueller investigation end all on it's own. It's obvious. All the hysteria of the past 2 weeks about his supposed impending firing of Mueller was a distraction. He was never going to fire Mueller and he's not going to


Mueller's officially end his investigation all on his own and he's gonna say he found no evidence of Trump campaign/Russian collusion during the 2016 election.

Democrats & DNC Media are going to LITERALLY have nothing coherent to say in response to that.

Mueller's team was 100% partisan.

That's why it's brilliant. NOBODY will be able to claim this team of partisan Democrats didn't go the EXTRA 20 MILES looking for ANY evidence they could find of Trump campaign/Russian collusion during the 2016 election

They looked high.

They looked low.

They looked underneath every rock, behind every tree, into every bush.

And they found...NOTHING.

Those saying Mueller will file obstruction charges against Trump: laughable.

What documents did Trump tell the Mueller team it couldn't have? What witnesses were withheld and never interviewed?

THERE WEREN'T ANY.

Mueller got full 100% cooperation as the record will show.