1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI …

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,

6/ nor how China will provide equal access to standards setting; that this keeps coming up in intl discussions/domestic policy pledges means it’s a longstanding issue, and it’s unclear how the CAI addresses structural issues underpinning that (eg forced IP localization). The lang

7/ around SOEs/subsidy disclosure is disappointing, considering how important an ask this was for the EU. W/o more detail on dispute resolution, unclear how SOEs can be forced to change here, especially bc things like procurement are conducted via back channels that disadvantage

8/ MNCs, or in the case of ICT, are swayed by domestic policy pledges (eg 安全可控) that come from political/diplomatic problems, not commercial issue. Tied to this, the fact that subsidy disclosure doesn’t *touch* the industrial sector avoids a huge problem area that now

9/ underpins a lot of retaliatory trade policy/pushback against globalization. Finally, if we look at the commitments on labour and environ, benchmark is again not backsliding—but what about *existing* issues around forced labour/XJ? Pledging to not allow labour standards

10/ to deteriorate further is from a very low base. Commitment towards working to ratify ILO conventions is also very different from being forced to do so. Finally, on enforcement and dispute resolution—the most key parts of any deal!!—the commitments seem similarly disappointing

11/ but we still need details on how this will work. Precedent w/ the US shows that China sees any framework for regular monitoring (and, potentially, punitive action) as a violation of sovereignty. Suggesting that enforcement might lack teeth. Overall, CAI looks like it slightly

12/ moves the needle on some issues, while leaving many others untouched. We still need to wait for final text to be released in order to do deeper analysis, but this suggests CAI will have a hard time going through European Parliament for ratification. (end)

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

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