But for others, the shift from a distributor model to importer/exporter has been a challenge. This hasn't been helped by certain IT system not working as planned.
1/ Quick thread. At the end of the third week of Brexit being "done", I can only say that I'm exhausted.
Immediate pressures on companies who have been trading goods have been on grappling with all of the new customs and regulatory requirements.
But for others, the shift from a distributor model to importer/exporter has been a challenge. This hasn't been helped by certain IT system not working as planned.
Some are, but many others aren't.
Worth noting that freight volumes are still below average. But stockpiles are running low, coming weeks are going to be interesting.
First, many businesses are facing the largest shift in their cost base in a generation.
This is something that is going to be something that will continue to play and play in the weeks and months ahead.
For many, the answer will be no. So what do they do as a result?
The other (worse) possibility is to stop trading.
https://t.co/IMDCu9g2mK
Supply chains are going to shift as a result and is deeply complex.
But that's just one example
Absolutely not.
One such example: due to the pandemic, business travel isn't happening. All the changes that are coming down the line in the activities which individuals can carry out while in the EU has changed.
More from Brexit
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
