I've been tweeting a lot about UK #OverseasTerritories not being part of the #Brexit deal and a bit more has emerged ...

The important difference between AstraZeneca's relationship with the UK and with the EU, and the reason it has fallen behind schedule on 50m vaccine doses promised to the EU, is that the UK agreed the deal with AZ a full three months before the EU did - which gave...

AZ an extra three months to sort out manufacturing and supply problems relating to the UK contract (there were plenty of problems). Here is the important timeline. In May AZ reached agreement with Oxford and the UK government to make and supply the vaccine. In fact Oxford...

had already started work on the supply chain. The following month AZ reached a preliminary agreement with Germany, the Netherlands, France and Italy, a group known as the Inclusive Vaccine Alliance, based on the agreement with the UK. The announcement was 13 June. BUT the EU...

insisted that the Inclusive Vaccine Alliance could not formalise the deal. The European Commission insisted it should take over the contract negotiations on behalf of the whole EU. So were another two months of talks and the contract was not signed till the end of August...

What is frustrating for AZ is that the extra talks with the European Commission led to no material changes to the contract, but wasted time on making arrangements to make the vaccine with partner sites. The yield at these partner sites has been lower than expected. The problem...

Just bringing together my various bits and pieces on the UK-EU. The first reactions - a significant agreement...

Winners and losers of the UK-EU deal.

Why this was always going to be a problem - regulatory soverignty v free trade involves trade offs...

Going back to mid-2019, why the deal the UK wanted from the EU, the same benefits with none of the costs, couldn't be available.

More recently, why the Brexit dream is dying - because it wasn't designed to deal with a situation where we had to choose between trade with the EU and freedom.

BREAKING: The EU’s chief negotiator has told MEPs that negotiations on a post-Brexit deal could continue until Wednesday but no further.

2/ According to sources present, Michel Barnier also warned the UK that a deal would not be approved by member states if it pressed ahead with passing the Internal Market and the Finance Bills into law.

3/ He told the European Parliament’s Brexit coordination committee this morning that US President Elect Joe Biden was also “sensitive” to any impact of UK law on the Good Friday Agreement.

4/ Mr Barnier told MEPs the talks were in the “endgame” and that there would have to be a decision on whether or not there was to be an agreement by Thursday.

5/ He said if there was no deal then the European Commission would be ready “to react immediately” with contingency plans, according to sources present.

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,

As we continue to recap our work for the #VIADUCT_EU project over the years, take a look below at our thirteen VIADUCT Newsletters!

These are where we kept our network and you up to date of all our activities

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Our first newsletter kicked off the #VIADUCT_EU project with an editorial from our project leaders @FundaTekin17 of @IEP_Berlin and Wolfgang Wessels of @UniCologne

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In this early newsletter, @tomas_weiss wrote a fascinating piece on relations between the EU and Turkey after PESCO

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Check out Meltem Müftüler Baç's editorial here on the future of the EU-Turkey partnership in the early days of the #VIADUCT_EU project

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"Arranging EU-Turkey cooperation in the era of transactional leadership" was the title of the @FIIA_fi Senior Research Fellow @ToniAlaranta's editorial in this #VIADUCT_EU Newsletter

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