Small business in particular struggling with new Brexit red tape. Entirely predictable, and a function of a world trade system distorted against smaller traders. Stay with me a short while as Brexit threadmeister and story author @pmdfoster may say... 1/

Brexit. UK-EU talks. Let's try to explain why we're in such a state, of increased risk of no deal, moving away from the fish and playing fields which are the detail but not the answer, to differing philosophies and divorce parallels that might just help... 1/

First, with apologies to those concerned, we need to go beyond those saying this is the inevitable path to deal / no-deal. Half of them will be right and I'll definitely be wrong (don't worry, I'm hedged in wine bets), but it wasn't inevitable, typical, or necessary. 2/

I'll also ignore the content of any deal, which has been clear for months, the UK compromises on level playing field, the EU on fish. Something so obvious really isn't the fundamental issue. Could, as some not noted for their perspicacity have said, be done in an afternoon. 3/

Some truth in the idea that flounces and playing the tough cop are a part of trade negotiations. But equally as we're in about the 5th pass of these, I think it has ceased to be helpful. Either side could already have cut the deal having shown their toughness. 4/

Some fundamentals then, that we've forgotten. First, the trade deal that will lead to much less free trade than before. The incentive structures, the ability to create a win-win, are inevitably going to be different to a normal deal. 5/

The first working day of the new UK-EU relationship. We're going to hear a lot this year from all sides (remain and Brexit in UK, EU, etc) using any possible scrap of evidence. But what we need to look for is trends, over time, so a few to think about in this thread... 1/

Obvious disruption or reduction to UK-EU trade flow. Here we may be thinking e.g. of a permanent 10% fall in traffic, or regular queues, or indeed no change. And apart from goods, the same with individual travel, for work, residence etc... 2/

As a reminder we're not expecting permanent scenes like those of the week before Christmas when borders were closed. But 5-10% reductions in UK-EU traffic would not seem to be out of line with economic forecasts of a hit to the UK economy. 3/

Then we'll need to look at whether UK-EU trade is being substituted by UK-non EU trade. This probably should happen to a degree, and in theory efficiencies could come this way. But its also possible that all UK trade falls, with the UK no longer an EU entry point. 4/

Inward investment is another key post-Brexit indicator. There isn't a single obvious data set here, but the impression of the last four years has been a fall off in manufacturing, but not in services, particularly tech. Continuation would suggest economy tilting to services. 5/

How to make sense of the increasing number of UK-EU trade disruption stories?

In short - outside of a single market product checks and people working restrictions are inevitable. And outside a customs union you will have tariffs and / or rules of origin.

Detail ---> 1/

The UK decided to leave a Customs Union. Within that Customs Union, no tariffs, just a common external tariff or preferential rates for bilateral deals or developing countries. Hence, distribution hubs in one country for all make a lot of sense. 2/

Outside a Customs Union our choice was tariffs under WTO rules or remove them subject to rules of origin with a deal. We chose the latter, but it means we can't just import from China, rebadge, and get zero tariffs from the EU. As we could until December 31. 3/

Net result of being outside of the Customs Union - it no longer makes sense for the UK to be a distribution hub for the whole of Europe. Particularly when so many neighbouring countries remain in it. No trade deal changes that. 4/

Now, product checks, of the sort causing problems for food exporters (see Scottish seafood). In the single market, we shared regulations, so a safe product in the UK was safe in France. No inspections. We chose to leave that system, as we want to change some regulations. 5/

There is a sense of disbelief about the new trade problems between Great Britain and the EU / Northern Ireland. Which we need to lose. This is the new normal. And we face a difficult period of adjustment - immediate paperwork needs, and to longer term uncompetitiveness.

As we trade folk might have mentioned before, outside of the single market and the customs union of the EU, problems at borders are normal. Delays common. Great job of the Brexit supporters to find supposed experts claiming otherwise, but now back to reality...

Such delays at borders were in fact part of the origin of the single market, in the days when the Conservatives didn't see a contradiction between free markets and sovereignty. Such delays weren't really compatible with a supposed common market. So, the single market...

The delays and individual issues will ebb and flow. There will be new regulatory requirements in EU and UK affecting different products. But for UK and EU business as a whole it will mean UK-EU trade is more costly and less predictable, and there will be economic adjustment.

To put it bluntly, some UK firms will go out of business due to new border barriers. Some EU firms will stop supplying the UK, at a cost increase to UK consumers but a possible new opportunity for firms. This adjustment will take some time though.

So, deal or no-deal? I'm afraid it looks gloomy. Too many outstanding issues, a political context that is not conducive to compromise, and a tunnel leaking like mad. Quite possibly forming between them a vicious cycle. So, is this it? I suspect not... 1/n

Recall, this UK-EU negotiation is attempting to put in place an agreement unusually extensive (haulage, aviation, security, as well as trade) in a record timescale (9 months start to implementation) at a time of pandemic. That was always optimistic. 2/

A process driven EU against a naive yet overconfident UK in a short timeframe was also never going to be easy. In particular the UK's sole evident negotiating strategy, to say we'll walk away, is still in overdrive, making compromise harder. 3/

On the up side the UK has been inching slowly away from the purist notions of sovereignty which would prevent any deal towards a more realistic haggle over details, but possibly too late to resolve them, barring unexpected deep late concessions from either side. 4/

Geography isn't changing, and trading more with neighbours isn't either. Virtually all countries in the world have deals with their neighbours. It is unrealistic for the UK to be the sole developed country exception. Even if it takes a while. 5/

1/ Brexit politics is built on fear. Frightened people tend to seek security in the tribe. Once that tribe might have been the Labour movement, but now in a fragmented post-industrial society it is the nation. Tribal identification is emotional, not rational.

2/ A tribe that feels under threat wants to control its borders, and who enters into its territory. It demands loyalty and solidarity, and its prime virtue is self-sacrifice - economic arguments won't persuade tribalists. Its members want to feel it is strong and powerful.

3/ Tribalism at a time of crisis is intolerant of dissent. The tribe must pull together against its enemies. Dissent and questioning cause division and disrupt the collective effort. Criticism is seen as treason. The Brexit right have ruthlessly exploited tribal psychology.

4/ To understand Brexit politics it is necessary to understand that the working and middle classes are dead as coherent political forces and that frightened and insecure people are now clinging to the only available powerful tribe, the nation-tribe.

5/ The Brexit right understands and ruthlessly exploits basic social emotions. In contrast the centre and centre-left mostly can see no further than the blinkered logic of rational individualism, from which perspective everything else is irrational and incomprehensible.

As the transition period ends, the #BrexitDeal applies from tomorrow. But there's also a parallel significant legal change - most of the rest of the withdrawal agreement starts to apply. A thread on the legal issues in the rest of that agreement.

The citizens' rights provisions of the withdrawal agreement (on EU citizens who moved to the UK, and UK citizens who moved to the EU, before the end of the transition period) start to apply.

Annotation and detailed analysis of those provisions here:

After today, UK citizens newly moving to the EU, or EU citizens newly moving to the UK, are in principle governed by national law (partly harmonised by the EU, on the EU side).

However, the #BrexitDeal contains some provisions on visas for service providers.

The #BrexitDeal also refers to the matching unilateral decisions of the EU and UK to waive a visa requirement for short tourist visits. Analysis of the EU law on that issue here:

UK citizens resident in the EU on the basis of the withdrawal agreement (or who move to EU in future) should be covered by the EU law on long-term resident non-EU citizens, which provides for a limited form of mobility between Member States. Analysis here:

Many bearish sentiments across the mortgage sector because they believe companies won't succeed as much when rate finally go back up (3 maybe 4 years from now). Which makes sense except for $GHIV and here's why. In 2016 Brexit came & rates went down which lead to huge success...

in mortgages. Business was great for many companies but then in ‘17 and ‘18, rates went up. What happened you might ask? A lot of people got compressed, margins got compressed, rates went down, & people struggled in the mortgage market...

Well UWM ( $GHIV ) compound annual growth rate, from ‘16 to ’18, was 28%. Companies that focused on refi struggled, so obviously a very successful company like Rocket or Quicken, they went down 14% in compound annual growth rate in those years...

$GHIV actually grew, and so did their profits, so the opportunity to continue to grow in all cycles is a big differentiator for UWM, and the broker channel versus a lot of our competitors. When rates rise, it's actually even better for $GHIV (UWM)..

If rates stay low, great UWM will continue to crush but when the rates rise, they will continue to steal even more market share because of how they operate in the mortgage sector. People also talk about the speed in closing a loan & that other competitors are faster...

WHAT'S MOST SUSPICIOUS ABOUT BREXIT? A tough competition... but here's my initial list... the two LEAVE CAMPAIGNS (see £££s from RUSSIAN DONORS + ISLE OF MAN), everything to do with VOTE LEAVE, everything to do with LEAVE EU, everything to do with CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA / SCL...

... The way so many leading REMAINERS have since become LEAVERS or accepted PEERAGES (see the HOUSE OF LORDS, RUSSIA REPORT), the way David CAMERON quit, the way Nick CLEGG went from leading the LIB DEMS to working for FACEBOOK (WTF???), George OSBORNE working for Evgeny LEBEDEV.

... the lack of criticism of BREXIT on the BBC (see manipulation by omission, PROPAGANDA, DISINFORMATION and MISINFORMATION), the lack of EXPERTS on the BBC, the super-abundance of Nigel FARAGE on the BBC (see QUESTION TIME)...

... the daily PROPAGANDA from our TABLOID PRESS and traditionally BROADSHEET NEWSPAPER... the mainstreaming of DUMBING DOWN across all media and formats...

... setting up of short-lived but potentially important CROSS-PARTY COALITIONS...

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,