As is traditional for this time of year, and more in hope than expectation, my top ten trade / Brexit hopes for 2021...

1 - The UK Government ditches the unnecessary secrecy and engages much more openly with business, NGOs etc about their priorities, and reflects them

2 - Parliament steps up its game on government scrutiny beyond select committee reports and starts expecting answers on why priorities have been chosen, why trade agreements with which countries, what the content should be etc
3 - UK business do their best to keep on exporting and importing, innovating and partnering, to overcome the new barriers in their way, and also to keep shouting for government to remove barriers as they arise
4 - Brexiteers show even the vaguest hint of interest in the views of those who continue to want strong ties with the EU, rather then repeating over and over again, to even the vaguest hint of criticism, "you lost suckers, get over it"
5 - Remainers, rejoiners and the like stop talking quite so much about how the 2016 referendum was stolen from them, which is becoming both history and suggests that 17 odd million people were conned

(NB not confident on the last two)
6 - The Labour Party to develop a trade narrative, one that starts with trade being good of itself rather than an opportunity to talk about another issue. And which perhaps provides the government with an incentive to compete with their own realistic narrative.
7 - Moving wider, I'm hoping to see the EU emphasise more the "open" and "strategic" and less the "autonomy". There's a limited amount trade policy can do to encourage more manufacturing jobs, but there's a lot it can do to discourage them.
8 - For the US, far too much to hope that their trade policy moves beyond the priority of trying to force their food standards on the world. But why not? Really about time for a trade policy update, we're happy to eat the food as long as it is of high quality.
9 - I'm hoping trade twitter has a little bit of a quieter time but you still all want to listen to us. Even more wishful thinking I realise. But perhaps if we promise to try to be more relevant and less focused on how trade agreement smallprint works?
10 - Finally, and least realistic of all, I'm hoping 2021 sees everyone play nice here, with lots of debate, helpful contributions, and more cat gifs than insults. Stretch target.

In any case hoping for a better 2021 for all.

More from David Henig

Quick intro to more analysis later - since Freeports are mentioned in this article worth making the point that it seems to me under the UK-EU deal that if the UK provides subsidies for them, or relaxes labour or environmental rules in them, the EU can take retaliatory action.


There has never been level playing field content like this in a trade deal. The idea it is any kind of UK win, when the UK's opening position was no enforceable commitments whatsoever, is ridiculous.


The EU can take retaliatory action against the UK if we weaken labour standards, weaken pretty firm climate change targets, unfairly subsidise, or just in general seem to be out of line. There are processes to follow, but it looks like the PM did it again...


Final one for now. Quite how Labour gets itself in such a fuss about whether to support a deal with the strongest labour and environment commitments ever seen in a trade deal is a sign of just how far it hasn't moved on from leaving.

PS well... (sorry DAG). It certainly didn't have a good effect. And I think if we had settled LPF issues with the EU much earlier there is a good chance the conditions would have been far less stringent. By making an issue, we made it much worse.
Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.


Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.

The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.

For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.

The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.
Morning. And its Groundhog Day today. https://t.co/gRs4Dc8RH2


Some useful threads will follow, first on the Northern Ireland protocol, where unfettered is still being defined...


And on fish and level playing field. The latter seems, has always seemed, the most problematic, because the UK has apparently ruled out any compromise on shared minumum levels even if not automatic. That would be a deal breaker, but seems... unnecessary.


Your reminder closing complex deals is never easy. But there are ways to facilitate and EU is good at doing this if you meet their red lines. But still the biggest concern that the UK never understood level playing field terms are fundamental to the EU.


In the UK, one man's decision. Allegedly backed by a Cabinet who in reality will be quite happy to blame the PM either way. The temptation to send Michael Gove to seal the deal and end his leadership ambitions must be there...

More from Brexit

Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:


1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:

A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;

3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;

5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;

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