How to make sense of the increasing number of UK-EU trade disruption stories?

In short - outside of a single market product checks and people working restrictions are inevitable. And outside a customs union you will have tariffs and / or rules of origin.

Detail ---> 1/

The UK decided to leave a Customs Union. Within that Customs Union, no tariffs, just a common external tariff or preferential rates for bilateral deals or developing countries. Hence, distribution hubs in one country for all make a lot of sense. 2/
Outside a Customs Union our choice was tariffs under WTO rules or remove them subject to rules of origin with a deal. We chose the latter, but it means we can't just import from China, rebadge, and get zero tariffs from the EU. As we could until December 31. 3/
Net result of being outside of the Customs Union - it no longer makes sense for the UK to be a distribution hub for the whole of Europe. Particularly when so many neighbouring countries remain in it. No trade deal changes that. 4/
Now, product checks, of the sort causing problems for food exporters (see Scottish seafood). In the single market, we shared regulations, so a safe product in the UK was safe in France. No inspections. We chose to leave that system, as we want to change some regulations. 5/
All developed countries have extensive safety regulations, particularly on food and drink products. They have stringent entry checks. Outside of a single market, you face the full weight of those checks. They take time. 6/ https://t.co/3NY7zgXRet
Countries outside a single market can negotiate with each other to reduce the number of product checks. Agreements usually involve commitments on both sides to build trust, such as not changing regulatory standards. The UK chose not to pursue this on food. 7/
You could be forgiven for wondering why if I knew all of this, the UK government, MPs, and businesses did not. But you recall there was a campaign for the purest possible Brexit. You may recall Brexit central. Not everything written there was true... 8/ https://t.co/PuppVdIHWZ
Individuals who said leaving the single market and customs union meant product checks and rules of origin were told we were biased. We weren't invited to advise government. Business was not encouraged to say this. EU-shills. Code for inconvenient. Anyway, enough Trumpism... 9/
There is a whole category of restrictions we are hardly seeing yet, on services. We aren't travelling to the EU for work right now, because of covid. After covid it will be because of work permit restrictions. Financial services changes are coming. 10/ https://t.co/ankZwPqeUp
For services like goods, it no longer makes sense for London to be the hub serving the EU, when there will be barriers in terms of trade, people, perhaps data. The UK's European HQs are threatened. Hard to know how exactly this might unfold, but there will be change to come/ 11/
But the UK government is not powerless to prevent the erection or maintenance of EU trade barriers. It was a choice not to prioritise easing of regulatory checks. We chose a quick deal, with little regulatory alignment. We could choose differently. 12/
The UK government can choose to prioritise easing checks on food exports to the EU. But it will probably mean less regulatory divergence. We can choose to prioritise a data equivalence agreement, but that might require certain commitments. 13/
The government could argue that global Britain means pursuing deals and regulatory freedom elsewhere. Thus for example a US trade deal to change our food standards. That again is a choice. Can Scottish seafood be sold to the US? Such are the choices. 14/
But this is where we are now. A government supposed committed to free trade has chosen high barriers to £670 billion (approx 50%) of our trade. It can try to reduce them, or accept the consequences. It can try to replace EU trade with further away countries. Tricky. 15/
All of this was known last year and before. What is happening now the inevitable consequence of the decisions taken. But we also need to talk about the future choices. Alignment and reduced checks, divergence and higher barriers. No getting out of it, whatever partisans say. 16/
Goods regulatory checks and to a lesser extent rules of origin also apply to Northern Ireland - Great Britain trade. As widely stated when the Withdrawal Agreement was signed in 2019 but denied by the Prime Minister. 17/
Finally, element of "told you so"? Sure, not denying it. It isn't always easy being told that facts = bias, doors in government being closed because easier to listen to those who are factually wrong but politically right. But more a hope we start dealing in reality. 18/ end
PS a telling little detail. A modern trading relationship is made up of numerous such decisions, and on them will trade and investment depend. https://t.co/1Mt8xjslnf

More from David Henig

Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.


Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.

The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.

For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.

The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.

More from Brexit

A further thread on the EU/UK musicians/visa for paid work issue (the issue is paid work: travelling to sing or play at eg a charity event for free can be done without a visa).


The position that we now have now (no relevant provisions under the TCA) is complicated. For EU musicians visiting the UK see


In essence the UK permits foreign (including EU) nationals to stay up to 30 days to carry out paid engagements, but they must (a) prove they are a professional musician and (b) be invited by an established UK business.

Either condition could be tricky for a young musician starting out and wanting to play gigs. And 30 days isn’t long enough for a part in a show with a run.

Longer stays require a T5 visa - which generally requires you to be in a shortage occupation (play an instrument not played in the UK?) or to have an established international reputation.

You May Also Like

Following @BAUDEGS I have experienced hateful and propagandist tweets time after time. I have been shocked that an academic community would be so reckless with their publications. So I did some research.
The question is:
Is this an official account for Bahcesehir Uni (Bau)?


Bahcesehir Uni, BAU has an official website
https://t.co/ztzX6uj34V which links to their social media, leading to their Twitter account @Bahcesehir

BAU’s official Twitter account


BAU has many departments, which all have separate accounts. Nowhere among them did I find @BAUDEGS
@BAUOrganization @ApplyBAU @adayBAU @BAUAlumniCenter @bahcesehirfbe @baufens @CyprusBau @bauiisbf @bauglobal @bahcesehirebe @BAUintBatumi @BAUiletisim @BAUSaglik @bauebf @TIPBAU

Nowhere among them was @BAUDEGS to find