Along the way I wrote about considering Johnson’s Brexit decision as a choice between clichéd narratives. What would read / play best? Well...

It is absolutely no surprise to me that he ended up choosing the ending that would most easily portray him as the hero who saved the day.
The tricky part of this narrative is convincing re the ‘not giving in’ part. Hence all the bluster about standing tough and being happy to walk away.
And yet.
I’m old enough to remember when we wouldn’t accept any LPF provisions, any state aid constraints and we wanted all our fish back right now. Otherwise it’s an ‘Australia’ style Brexit.
Were their tactical and negotiating manoeuvres that were successful? I’m sure there were. But it’s noteworthy that we’ve ended up with the sort of deal that everyone thought we would end up with a year ago.
Will it proceed smoothly through the hawk-eyed (sic) gaze of the ERG and pals? It’s looking hopeful. Needless to say there’s a full court press from D Street comms and friendly media to present the deal as most meritorious.
Best in mind that the ERG has been happy with various deal iterations in the past and then rowed back furiously. But post Johnson’s election the ERG is largely a spent force. I suspect they’ll go for it.
The most insightful part of the Times piece is this:

‘Critics ridicule Johnson’s self-reverential mirroring of Winston Churchill, but even they can scarcely contest that he has become the most consequential politician of his generation.’
But the problem (and benefit) of being consequential is the consequences. Has he really thought about them? I sincerely doubt it. We’ve just agreed the biggest rupture to the country’s trade relations at the last minute during a pandemic.
The short term consequences range from disruptive to disastrous. FWIW I’m at very disruptive. It’s worth remembering that whatever the level of disruption its acceptance (ie no implementation period etc) is a policy choice.
As for the longer term consequences, the most obvious are the damage to trust in government (principally from those among the c 50% of the public who lost the referendum), the decline of the manufacturing sector, and the turbo charging of independence movements.
Would the referendum have been won by Leave knowing what we know now? I sincerely doubt it. There was always a good argument for Leave but the campaign and subsequent government policy and messaged have denied or downplayed the painful trade-offs.
This vast obfuscation of the truth has been a hallmark of politics over the last five years. Ironically it’s another symptom of the sort of attitude (not caring about people’s interests) that led to the referendum result except this time aimed at a different part of society.
A substantial majority of people below the age of c 49 do not think all of this is a good idea. A substantial majority of people in Scotland do not think this is a good idea. A substantial majority of people with degrees do not think this is a good idea.
An overwhelming majority of young people do not think this is a good idea.

These people’s views have been ignored and belittled. You lost, get over it.

Will there be consequences? Oh yes.

/ends

More from Objective Columnist

A quote from this excellent piece, neatly summarising a core impact of Brexit.

The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.


Of course, this was never written on the side of a bus. And never acknowledged by government. Everything was meant to be broadly fine apart from the inevitable teething problems.

It was, however, visible from space to balanced observers. You did not have to be a trade specialist to understand that replacing the Single Market with a third country trade arrangement meant the end of many if not all of the complex arrangements optimised for the former.

In the absence of substantive mitigations, the Brexit winners are those who subscribe to some woolly notion of ‘sovereignty’ and those who did not like freedom of movement. The losers are everyone else.

But, of course, that’s not good enough. For understandable reasons Brexit was sold as a benefit not a cost. The trading benefits of freedom would far outweigh the costs. Divergence would benefit all.

More from Brexit

This very short article by Jeremy Cliffe is the best thing I have ever read on Brexit and the EU. It pivots on the contrast between Delors’ and Thatcher’s authentically provincial Christian visions and suggests the battle in Britain between the two is not over.


Thatcher: Protestant believer in the totally free market and absolutely sovereign centralised nation state. Delors: Catholic believer in third way personalism, corporatism and federalism. Individualism versus relational love. Heterodoxy versus Orthodoxy.

The article useful gives the lie to the idea that the Catholic vision of the EU has altogether vanished even though it is weakened. Delors wanted a social dimension to the free market and single currency and yet lexiteers laughably insist the EU is more neoliberal than the U.K.!

Subsidiary federalism is a doctrine of democracy and human fraternity. State sovereignty is a doctrine of naked power. It is a face of Antichrist. Leviathan.

Those combined that democracy can only be inside a single state fail to power just how much of private law and evermore so is necessarily international. Thus if political institutions don’t extend over borders there can be no democracy.
On this, I think it’s highly unlikely to occur in the timeframe given. For several reasons, I don’t think it’s realistic for Scotland to secede, and then join the EU, in 9 years.

For that, thanks goes to Brexit.

A thread because why not...


Two important dates: March 2016 and January 1st 2021.

Firstly, prior to the 2014 referendum, the Nationalists proposed a date of March 2016 to secede.

Secondly, today - the end completion of Brexit five-and-a-half years after Cameron’s majority in 2015.

Brexit has demonstrated many things, primarily that splitting unions is not easy. The UKs membership of the EU was 47 years and by the end it was not at the heart of the EU. The Union has existed for over 300 as a unitary state.

Dividing a unitary state, like the UK, will not be easy. Frankly, it will make Brexit look simple. Questions of debt, currency, defence, and more will need to be resolved ... something not addressed with Brexit.

Starting with debt. Scotland will end up with its proportionate share of the UKs national debt. It’s not credible to suggest otherwise. Negotiating what is proportionate won’t be easy when both sides disagree.

It’s importance will be seen shortly.
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:


1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:

A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;

3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;

5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;

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