Dear @HouseDemocrats: HR 1 requires that the voter “have t…

Without this clarifying language, jurisdictions cld still force all in person voters to use risky touchscreen voting machines called ballot marking devices (BMDs), as long as vote by mail is also an option. That won’t suffice to protect election integrity & faith in elections. 2/

Unlike #HandMarkedPaperBallots (pen and paper), BMDs are vulnerable to electronic failure, screen freezes, miscalibration, disproportionate distribution (causing bottlenecks & long lines in suppressed areas), and hacking. 3/

4/ I also suggest that you supplement HR 1 to specify that BMDs “must not put votes into barcodes or QR codes.” This language is important because barcodes & QR codes are not transparent, further endangering integrity and confidence in elections.

5/ We are only beginning now to understand how these barcodes and QR code’s unnecessarily increase the attack surface for bad actors seeking to interfere in our elections. This is unacceptable & unnecessary.

6/ Sourced thread about concerns involving the zebra technologies integrated barcode reader in ES&S ExpressVote barcode BMDs. https://t.co/gTTZgmUi9U

7/ Even without the barcodes & QR code’s, using BMDs as a primary voting systems is unacceptable. A recent study shows that 93% of inaccuracies in the text portion of machine-marked paper records from BMDs go unnoticed by voters. https://t.co/R3aVXpCOGZ

8/ This is an invitation for fraud especially for down ballot races (eg, for state legislature).

9/ Per the author of the study in post 7, @jhalderm, merely instructing voters to review the printouts didn’t help much. The only thing that did was giving them a pre-filled slate (such as a sample ballot) to compare to the printout. Many/most voters don’t know to do this.

10/ Another suggestion for HR1: supplementing it to require updated paper pollbooks as a backup for electronic pollboooks on Election Day , as recommended by @BrennanCenter.

11/ To the extent HR1 does not already ban remote access and internet connectivity to voting systems, it should be amended to include such a ban. (Good luck to any politicians who oppose this proposed ban.)

12/ To the extent HR1 does not already require robust manual audits for all federal races, it should be supplemented to add that too.

13/ I discuss these recommendations and more (eg, preservation of ballot images and disclosure of vendor ownership) here. There is a synopsis at the end. Thank you for your consideration. #ProtectOurVotes https://t.co/Sm7CKY2dKB

14/ Synopsis:

15/ PS. We must also require reasonably prompt public disclosure of election-system breaches and details thereof unless the government persuades a court that such disclosure would impede an ongoing investigation. #Transparency

16/ PPS. The requisite robust manual election audits must be conducted in public and before certification. See @philipbstark, inventor of Risk Limiting Audits, for further guidance.

17/ September 2020 letter from experts advising that jurisdictions remove wireless modems from voting systems because they connect the ballot scanners and receiving end systems to the internet. https://t.co/JbSBGSxK7o

18/ Note: the GOP blocked the #SAFEAct last year which would have banned this internet connectivity & required robust manual audits for all federal races. I doubt their constituents would let them get away with this again. We have an opportunity here. https://t.co/LDXnPl3Kkx

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