Warning. With remote access to e-poll books (yes, vendors have it & I’m told they pass around a url to watch), bad actors cld track in real time how many votes they need & where to alter election outcomes. This wld NOT work w/ vote by mail. 1/

I remain very concerned about e-pollbooks, which have exploded in use since 2016. A former election official told me about the Election Day remote access & URL. 2/
I wrote about America’s largest e-pollbook vendor, Knowink, here. Knowink is managed by a former Republican election official. It’s product manager is Religious Right. It’s products are in 23 states now. 3/ https://t.co/mbxFpCpFoQ
I was told about the passing around of a URL re: Tenex. They can watch voters sign in as they sign in. They can tell what party they are from. 4/
In theory, w/ e-pollbooks (electronic sign ins), bad actors cld fraudulently sign in real voters who rarely vote in order to pad vote totals. This wld work best at the end of Election Day. Mail voting wld obviously throw this off. 5/
These are risks. I do not know if any of this occurred. But they are risks. And a former election official was worried enough to mention it to me about Tenex. 6/
“The [Kentucky] State Finance and Administration Cabinet awarded a contract for electronic poll books to Tenex Software Solutions, a Tampa, Florida-based company, for up to 5,500 e-poll books for the state's 3,732 voting precincts.” - 7/26/19
7/https://t.co/CpRzENXPON
8/ I keep trying to figure out why bad actors might prefer in person voting to vote by mail. Both systems use hackable electronics. At the moment, we don’t conduct evidence-based elections with either system. But this is one reason why they might prefer in person voting.
9/ The phrase evidence-based election was coined by @philipbstark. This is what it means.
10/ I’m not sure what this is about but I hope to find out! @robchandhok https://t.co/iefnbhVL54
11/ BTW, vote by mail does use #HandMarkedPaperBallots, ie, a reliable paper trail, which is another reason why I prefer it to touchscreen voting machines. Even when touchscreens generate paper records, the records often put votes into unverifiable QR code’s & barcodes & many...
12/ ... experts consider them too unreliable to provide the basis for a reliable audit or recount (even if they didn’t use barcodes or QR codes). https://t.co/tyQcsu45Fz
13/ But I do not want to suggest that we are conducting evidence-based elections with either in person voting or vote by mail. Because we aren’t. And we must demand that and change that ASAP.

More from Jennifer Cohn ✍🏻 📢

Good news! The New York State Board of Elections voted yesterday to REJECT certification of ES&S’s ExpressVote XL all-in-one barcode ballot marking device (BMD), a glitchy & hackable touchscreen that ES&S has hoped officials would stupidly buy in lieu of pen and paper. 1/


I’m still trying to find out @NYSBOE’s reasoning, but I know one problem was that the ExpressVote XL runs on Windows 7 and can only mark ballots in English. If the XL were a person, it would be a MAGA. 2/

The XL has other problems. It runs the barcode “paper ballot” back under the printout AFTER the voter reviews it, which experts say means it could be maliciously programmed to eff with the barcode that is the only part of the “paper ballot” counted as your vote. 3/

Unfortunately, Philadelphia did choose the ES&S ExpressVote XL all-in-one ballot marking device (BMD), ignoring expert advice. I wrote about that unfortunate decision here in 2019. 4/

Here, for @NYRBooks, I also discuss problems involving the ES&S ExpressVote XL in PA in 2019. ES&S lobbyists had secretly donated to the two decision makers who then chose this system in Philly in lieu of #HandMarkedPaperBallots (pen & paper). 5/
IMO, the #SAFEAct is better on election security than HR1 bc it wld ban most touchscreen voting machines currently available. HR1 wld allow them as a primary in person system bc vendors call the paper they spit out a “paper ballot.” Pen & paper is safer #HandMarkedPaperBallots 1/


I have not looked at other aspects of HR1. It addresses more than election security. The #SAFEAct shld be the starting point for election security reform in my opinion. 2/

HR1 requires that all voters have the option to mark their ballots by hand. But it does not specify that, for jurisdictions with in person voting, the hand marked (pen & paper) option must be available for in person voting (vs it only being an option w/ vote by mail). 3/

HR1 may still be a good start. But it does not go nearly far enough on election security. Here are my suggestions for election security. Maybe these could be addressed in a later bill, but we shld keep them on our radar. 4/ https://t.co/mNdHrvwHcN


The key section is 1502. IMO, it shld add the following. “For jurisdictions that offer in person voting, the option to mark a paper ballot by hand must be offered at the in-person polling location; giving this option only for vote by mail won’t suffice for such jurisdictions.” 5/

More from Politics

I told you they’d bring this up


I was wondering why that tweet had so many stupid replies. And now I see


Seriously, this was “the night before.” If you’re at the march where they’re changing “Jews will not replace us” and “Blood and soil,” you’re not a “very fine person.” Full stop.


There are 3 important moments in that transcript.

1.) When someone asked Trump about a statement *he had already made* about there being blame on “both sides,” he said the “fine people” line.


2. Trump does clarify! “I’m not talking about the neo-Nazis and white nationalists — because they should be condemned totally “

Okay!

Then adds that there were “many people in that group other than neo-Nazis and white nationalists.”

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