The way to read the graph is: each line is a time history of difficulty. It starts dotted, goes through a criticality inflection point, and then crests in difficulty before coming down to a stable plateau.
following a discussion at @yak_collective this morning, I came up with this chart to capture a hypothesis I have that the difficulty of creating communities scales exponentially with the the "depth" of what you're trying to do
The way to read the graph is: each line is a time history of difficulty. It starts dotted, goes through a criticality inflection point, and then crests in difficulty before coming down to a stable plateau.
And even *talk* communities ain't easy. Failure rate is like 95%.
More from Venkatesh Rao
I’m guessing these responses really reflect people’s weighted averages (age*current average effort fraction) though I kept it simple and asked for just averages.
I suspect a healthy weighted average should be ~ (age-20)/2. So a 30 year old should be at 5, a 40 year old at 10, a 50 year old at 15 etc.
Standard deviation should be ~average/3 maybe, so distribution spreads as you age and accumulate projects and get better at them.
Other things being equal, people get good at starting in their 20s, at follow through in 30s, at finishing in 40s.
No point learning food follow through until you’ve found a few good starts to bet on. No point getting good at finishing until a few projects have aged gracefully.
I’m in the 7+ range myself. Probably 8-9. Slightly less than healthy for my age.
I suspect most self-judgments on being good starters/follow-through-ers/finishers are really flawed because of the non-ergodicity of project management skill learning. You can’t learn good practices for the 3 phases in an arbitrary order. On,y one order actually works.
Poll: where is the temporal center of gravity of all your live projects based on average age of start-dates?
— Venkatesh Rao (@vgr) January 17, 2021
I suspect a healthy weighted average should be ~ (age-20)/2. So a 30 year old should be at 5, a 40 year old at 10, a 50 year old at 15 etc.
Standard deviation should be ~average/3 maybe, so distribution spreads as you age and accumulate projects and get better at them.
Other things being equal, people get good at starting in their 20s, at follow through in 30s, at finishing in 40s.
No point learning food follow through until you’ve found a few good starts to bet on. No point getting good at finishing until a few projects have aged gracefully.
I’m in the 7+ range myself. Probably 8-9. Slightly less than healthy for my age.
I suspect most self-judgments on being good starters/follow-through-ers/finishers are really flawed because of the non-ergodicity of project management skill learning. You can’t learn good practices for the 3 phases in an arbitrary order. On,y one order actually works.
Heh, one thing the nyt piece managed was to do a Cunningham's law nerdsnipe-wmd at newspaper scale... now a bunch of people are energetically trying to post the right answer.
IMO trying to correct whatever the NYT writer thought he knew/understood is futile. "Willing to be misunderstood by the NYT" should be the default stance unless you want to waste a lot of time correcting an obsolete 2013 map for people who don't care.
The thing is, the NYT still has enough normative cultural power, even as it has fallen from newspaper-of-record, that it takes a particular sort of heretical self-confidence to sort of ignore whatever they happen to be wrong about on any given week, whether or not it concerns you
A subtle shift has occurred in the workings of the Gell-Mann amnesia effect. It used to be an individual private amnesia re: media ("I'll believe myself when I am certain they got it wrong because I'm an expert, but still believe them when I am not"). Now it's a collective effect
A sort of common-knowledge threshold has been crossed lately. "Everybody knows that everybody knows the NYT is wrong on X across largish subcultures." It's no longer mutual beliefs being validated occasionally 1:1.
One other thing I should really clarify and that the @nytimes piece got *severely* wrong: while I believe there are very strong sociological and even causal links between rationalism and NRx (especially in the Silicon Valley homes bases) their ideological and methodological
— (((E. Glen Weyl))) (@glenweyl) February 14, 2021
IMO trying to correct whatever the NYT writer thought he knew/understood is futile. "Willing to be misunderstood by the NYT" should be the default stance unless you want to waste a lot of time correcting an obsolete 2013 map for people who don't care.
The thing is, the NYT still has enough normative cultural power, even as it has fallen from newspaper-of-record, that it takes a particular sort of heretical self-confidence to sort of ignore whatever they happen to be wrong about on any given week, whether or not it concerns you
A subtle shift has occurred in the workings of the Gell-Mann amnesia effect. It used to be an individual private amnesia re: media ("I'll believe myself when I am certain they got it wrong because I'm an expert, but still believe them when I am not"). Now it's a collective effect
A sort of common-knowledge threshold has been crossed lately. "Everybody knows that everybody knows the NYT is wrong on X across largish subcultures." It's no longer mutual beliefs being validated occasionally 1:1.
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The entire discussion around Facebook’s disclosures of what happened in 2016 is very frustrating. No exec stopped any investigations, but there were a lot of heated discussions about what to publish and when.
In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.
In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.
The story doesn\u2019t say you were told not to... it says you did so without approval and they tried to obfuscate what you found. Is that true?
— Sarah Frier (@sarahfrier) November 15, 2018
In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.
In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.
1/x Fort Detrick History
Mr. Patrick, one of the chief scientists at the Army Biological Warfare Laboratories at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Md., held five classified US patents for the process of weaponizing anthrax.
2/x
Under Mr. Patrick’s direction, scientists at Fort Detrick developed a tularemia agent that, if disseminated by airplane, could cause casualties & sickness over 1000s mi². In a 10,000 mi² range, it had 90% casualty rate & 50% fatality rate
3/x His team explored Q fever, plague, & Venezuelan equine encephalitis, testing more than 20 anthrax strains to discern most lethal variety. Fort Detrick scientists used aerosol spray systems inside fountain pens, walking sticks, light bulbs, & even in 1953 Mercury exhaust pipes
4/x After retiring in 1986, Mr. Patrick remained one of the world’s foremost specialists on biological warfare & was a consultant to the CIA, FBI, & US military. He debriefed Soviet defector Ken Alibek, the deputy chief of the Soviet biowarfare program
https://t.co/sHqSaTSqtB
5/x Back in Time
In 1949 the Army created a small team of chemists at "Camp Detrick" called Special Operations Division. Its assignment was to find military uses for toxic bacteria. The coercive use of toxins was a new field, which fascinated Allen Dulles, later head of the CIA
Mr. Patrick, one of the chief scientists at the Army Biological Warfare Laboratories at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Md., held five classified US patents for the process of weaponizing anthrax.
2/x
Under Mr. Patrick’s direction, scientists at Fort Detrick developed a tularemia agent that, if disseminated by airplane, could cause casualties & sickness over 1000s mi². In a 10,000 mi² range, it had 90% casualty rate & 50% fatality rate
3/x His team explored Q fever, plague, & Venezuelan equine encephalitis, testing more than 20 anthrax strains to discern most lethal variety. Fort Detrick scientists used aerosol spray systems inside fountain pens, walking sticks, light bulbs, & even in 1953 Mercury exhaust pipes
4/x After retiring in 1986, Mr. Patrick remained one of the world’s foremost specialists on biological warfare & was a consultant to the CIA, FBI, & US military. He debriefed Soviet defector Ken Alibek, the deputy chief of the Soviet biowarfare program
https://t.co/sHqSaTSqtB
5/x Back in Time
In 1949 the Army created a small team of chemists at "Camp Detrick" called Special Operations Division. Its assignment was to find military uses for toxic bacteria. The coercive use of toxins was a new field, which fascinated Allen Dulles, later head of the CIA