Ten days in and it seems the government's post-Brexit economic policy is to ignore reality, priority and choice, and just claim with no evidence that everything is going to be great. This, needless to say, is dangerous territory. Exhibit 1... 1/
Right now they don't. Big talk, little reality. Tough world. 12/ end
No US deal yet, instead we have the usual warm words about being deep in talks, and the CPTPP. But for what? If we get deals with Australia and NZ we'll have deals with 10 of 12 CPTPP countries. How will joining then help goods trade? And why goods, not services? 7/ pic.twitter.com/NaiUXr1y4f
— David Henig (@DavidHenigUK) January 12, 2021
More from David Henig
Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.
Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.
The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.
For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.
The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.
V good points but overall I stick with the conclusion that this is a v risky deal.
— Alan Beattie (@alanbeattie) January 5, 2021
1. It\u2019s overstating it to say that COM now has final say over investment. FDI screening remains a MS competency. COM has had to take a v secondary supporting role over Huawei and 5G.
1/n https://t.co/RVg2jnoFgK
Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.
The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.
For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.
The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.
Morning. And its Groundhog Day today. https://t.co/gRs4Dc8RH2
Some useful threads will follow, first on the Northern Ireland protocol, where unfettered is still being defined...
And on fish and level playing field. The latter seems, has always seemed, the most problematic, because the UK has apparently ruled out any compromise on shared minumum levels even if not automatic. That would be a deal breaker, but seems... unnecessary.
Your reminder closing complex deals is never easy. But there are ways to facilitate and EU is good at doing this if you meet their red lines. But still the biggest concern that the UK never understood level playing field terms are fundamental to the EU.
In the UK, one man's decision. Allegedly backed by a Cabinet who in reality will be quite happy to blame the PM either way. The temptation to send Michael Gove to seal the deal and end his leadership ambitions must be there...
Source say Michel Barnier has told EU ambassadors that there has been no breakthrough on the fisheries question, and that reports to that effect were \u201ccompletely untrue\u201d
— Tony Connelly (@tconnellyRTE) December 7, 2020
Some useful threads will follow, first on the Northern Ireland protocol, where unfettered is still being defined...
The trouble with \u2018unfettered access\u2019...
— JPCampbellBiz - Wash your hands keep your distance (@JP_Biz) December 6, 2020
And on fish and level playing field. The latter seems, has always seemed, the most problematic, because the UK has apparently ruled out any compromise on shared minumum levels even if not automatic. That would be a deal breaker, but seems... unnecessary.
1/ On fish, both sides are far apart, but it sounds like the UK wants the EU to jump first before it, in turn, shows flexibility. The UK is offering a three year phase in but with an upfront payment of \u20ac300m in demersal fish (ie, out of the \u20ac650m EU boats catch in UK waters)
— Tony Connelly (@tconnellyRTE) December 6, 2020
Your reminder closing complex deals is never easy. But there are ways to facilitate and EU is good at doing this if you meet their red lines. But still the biggest concern that the UK never understood level playing field terms are fundamental to the EU.
In case it wasn't obvious the final choreography of a complex trade deal is complex. The big issues, and potentially some smallprint / related matters of relevance to both sides (for example I wonder if soon after a deal we hear about data or financial services equivalence?)
— David Henig (@DavidHenigUK) December 6, 2020
In the UK, one man's decision. Allegedly backed by a Cabinet who in reality will be quite happy to blame the PM either way. The temptation to send Michael Gove to seal the deal and end his leadership ambitions must be there...
Fact is: EU objectives/focus unlikely to change much in remaining 24-48 hours: fish, non-regression & ability to retaliate across sectors/entire agreement in case of systematic divergence by HMG
— Mujtaba Rahman (@Mij_Europe) December 7, 2020
Most in Cabinet want a deal. @BorisJohnson has big decision he now needs to make https://t.co/mJ49WLt3Qd
This potential benefit list from CPTPP is not the longest and is still misleading. Those Malaysian whisky tariffs - emilimated over 15 years (if they don't seek any specific exemption for UK). Those rules of origin benefits? Only apply to import / export to CPTPP countries. https://t.co/9TbheOVhsR
Here's my more realistic take on CPTPP. Economic gains limited, but politically in terms of trade this makes some sort of sense, these are likely allies. DIT doesn't say this, presumably the idea of Australia or Canada as our equal upsets them.
As previously noted agriculture interests in Australia and New Zealand expect us to reach generous agreements in WTO talks and bilaterals before acceding to CPTPP. So this isn't a definite. Oh and Australia wants to know if we'll allow hormone treated beef
Ultimately trade deals are political, and the UK really wants CPTPP as part of the pivot to indo-pacific, and some adherents also hope it forces us to change food laws without having to do it in a US deal (isn't certain if this is the case or not).
If we can accede to CPTPP without having to make changes to domestic laws it is fine. Just shouldn't be our priority, as it does little for services, is geographically remote, and hardly cutting edge on issues like climate change or animal welfare.
Tomorrow we will formally apply to join #CPTPP \U0001f1ec\U0001f1e7
— Liz Truss (@trussliz) January 31, 2021
Membership will help drive an export- led, jobs-led recovery across \U0001f1ec\U0001f1e7 bringing more opportunities to trade with fast growing Pacific nations. \U0001f30e
Read more here\U0001f447https://t.co/5sQhgW4vCM
Here's my more realistic take on CPTPP. Economic gains limited, but politically in terms of trade this makes some sort of sense, these are likely allies. DIT doesn't say this, presumably the idea of Australia or Canada as our equal upsets them.
Gather UK application to join CPTPP is finally about to be announced, not that it was exactly a secret. Economic value limited given distance and existing UK deals, not a particularly strong or modern agreement in areas of UK strength like services, but...
— David Henig (@DavidHenigUK) January 30, 2021
As previously noted agriculture interests in Australia and New Zealand expect us to reach generous agreements in WTO talks and bilaterals before acceding to CPTPP. So this isn't a definite. Oh and Australia wants to know if we'll allow hormone treated beef
Ultimately trade deals are political, and the UK really wants CPTPP as part of the pivot to indo-pacific, and some adherents also hope it forces us to change food laws without having to do it in a US deal (isn't certain if this is the case or not).
If we can accede to CPTPP without having to make changes to domestic laws it is fine. Just shouldn't be our priority, as it does little for services, is geographically remote, and hardly cutting edge on issues like climate change or animal welfare.
More from Brexit
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
They have started in the Scottish case
Looks like a near-concession that the side letter is Padfield-compliant
Looks like a near-concession that the side letter is Padfield-compliant
O\u2019Neill says @BorisJohnson \u201cat the very least sailing close to the wind\u201d by potentially breaching promises to #courtofsession not to frustrate #BennAct in his signed letter to Donald Tusk
— Severin Carrell, Esq (@severincarrell) October 21, 2019
On this, I think it’s highly unlikely to occur in the timeframe given. For several reasons, I don’t think it’s realistic for Scotland to secede, and then join the EU, in 9 years.
For that, thanks goes to Brexit.
A thread because why not...
Two important dates: March 2016 and January 1st 2021.
Firstly, prior to the 2014 referendum, the Nationalists proposed a date of March 2016 to secede.
Secondly, today - the end completion of Brexit five-and-a-half years after Cameron’s majority in 2015.
Brexit has demonstrated many things, primarily that splitting unions is not easy. The UKs membership of the EU was 47 years and by the end it was not at the heart of the EU. The Union has existed for over 300 as a unitary state.
Dividing a unitary state, like the UK, will not be easy. Frankly, it will make Brexit look simple. Questions of debt, currency, defence, and more will need to be resolved ... something not addressed with Brexit.
Starting with debt. Scotland will end up with its proportionate share of the UKs national debt. It’s not credible to suggest otherwise. Negotiating what is proportionate won’t be easy when both sides disagree.
It’s importance will be seen shortly.
For that, thanks goes to Brexit.
A thread because why not...
On the current trajectory, I think this is likely to be the map of Europe of 2030. pic.twitter.com/65i1A8CiP8
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 1, 2021
Two important dates: March 2016 and January 1st 2021.
Firstly, prior to the 2014 referendum, the Nationalists proposed a date of March 2016 to secede.
Secondly, today - the end completion of Brexit five-and-a-half years after Cameron’s majority in 2015.
Brexit has demonstrated many things, primarily that splitting unions is not easy. The UKs membership of the EU was 47 years and by the end it was not at the heart of the EU. The Union has existed for over 300 as a unitary state.
Dividing a unitary state, like the UK, will not be easy. Frankly, it will make Brexit look simple. Questions of debt, currency, defence, and more will need to be resolved ... something not addressed with Brexit.
Starting with debt. Scotland will end up with its proportionate share of the UKs national debt. It’s not credible to suggest otherwise. Negotiating what is proportionate won’t be easy when both sides disagree.
It’s importance will be seen shortly.
