For the lawyers. Night. pic.twitter.com/5XvFMhcaeE
— Sam Lowe (@SamuelMarcLowe) December 25, 2020
Quick intro to more analysis later - since Freeports are mentioned in this article worth making the point that it seems to me under the UK-EU deal that if the UK provides subsidies for them, or relaxes labour or environmental rules in them, the EU can take retaliatory action.
Michael Gove: "Outside the EU, with a good trade deal in place, we can tackle the injustices and inequalities that have held Britain back."
— Jennifer Rankin (@JenniferMerode) December 26, 2020
The UK did not need to leave the EU to tackle injustices and inequalities at home. Not a new point, but true.https://t.co/fE4glUAylc

As a lay person is it fair to say that the \u201cthreat\u201d to break international law in Ireland was possibly a strategic blunder that has now determined the future trajectory of the UK for the next 20 years? I can imagine most countries will study what\u2019s baked into this and replicate?
— Meister 1 (@blueelmacho) December 26, 2020
If you're curious how other countries are presenting the UK-EU deal, this is the verdict from a French left-wing paper:
— Pascal \U0001f1ea\U0001f1fa\U0001f1ec\U0001f1e7 (@PascalLTH) December 25, 2020
It is "packed with regulatory brakes stopping London from undertaking social, ecological or fiscal dumping" https://t.co/aPCtyfPKmy
EU-UK TCA.
— Rem Korteweg (@remkorteweg) December 26, 2020
Happy Boxing Day!
https://t.co/39fVCycPUI
Government argue fact that the tribunals are not connected to ECJ, shows the win here on sovereignty ... only one reference in entire text to ECJ here on governance of UK access to EU programmes (eg Horizon), where ECJ arbitration judgements and orders will be enforceable in UK pic.twitter.com/WEIS8WYO01
— Faisal Islam (@faisalislam) December 26, 2020
May I be the first to say, \u201clol, that looks like a quota\u201d.
— Sam Lowe (@SamuelMarcLowe) December 26, 2020
(I\u2019m just joking, these aren\u2019t normal quotas. They are special rules of origin quotas: a certain tonnage of the product gets to use more accommodating rules of origin.) pic.twitter.com/BE2CyQIggS
Rather than negotiations, most of this year has just been choreography.
— Sam Lowe (@SamuelMarcLowe) December 25, 2020
Merry Christmas! \U0001f384
(Incidentally I'm reading as well, but copying the best points I see from others). https://t.co/BsJQU3sJWP
Last point from industry trade expert...
— Faisal Islam (@faisalislam) December 26, 2020
Export businesses will not lobby for lower standards/ aggressive regulatory competition in this environment, indeed EU-facing ones will lobby against such moves if it risks retaliatory tariffs. Thoughts? pic.twitter.com/1fluBNsy0e
At the very least negotiators should have been allowed a lot more freedom to prepare landing zone scenarios on fish months ago.
— Dmitry Grozoubinski (@DmitryOpines) December 26, 2020
Boris Johnson losing in negotiations with the EU is probably a victory for UK strategic interests
— Alexander Clarkson (@APHClarkson) December 26, 2020
The Deal has set up a framework for pragmatic UK reconvergence with the EU short of full integration in the EU system. Future governments can tack various bits of reconvergence to deal with specific UK voter complaints or business sector problems relatively smoothly. NAFTA model
— Alexander Clarkson (@APHClarkson) December 26, 2020
Lastly food industry, already smarting from events, say lack of equivalence for GB agrifood/ SPS problematic as it stands they say \u201cNew Zealand has a closer relationship on SPS with the EU than GB from Jan 1\u201d with an agreement that limits checks (1%) & simplifies paperwork
— Faisal Islam (@faisalislam) December 26, 2020
More from David Henig
UK cabinet to back Johnson over no-deal Brexit - The Times https://t.co/uCuOTsNdJL pic.twitter.com/88x5Tw2g53
— Reuters (@Reuters) December 6, 2020
Project fear and the red wall. The first meaning that every serious threat, such as that of Nissan that their plant will be unsustainable, is dismissed with little discussion. The red wall, apparently so angry with Labour about the EU they are afraid to have a position. 2/
Because 'sovereignty' apparently. But a particularly nefarious form of sovereignty in which the normal kind of things you discuss in a Free Trade Agreement - shared rules, access to waters - become when discussed with the EU unacceptable infringements and threats. 3/
You note in the UK we aren't having a discussion on what level playing field rules or access to fishing waters might be acceptable. Or normal. Or even what we might want, like shared increased commitments on climate change. No, all rumours. Evil EU. Worse French. 4/
Those who follow closely see incredible briefings in the papers, like today claiming the EU demand for raising minimum shared standards was only raised on Thursday, treated as fact. This was known months ago. But the media too often just reports the spin as fact. 5/
V good points but overall I stick with the conclusion that this is a v risky deal.
— Alan Beattie (@alanbeattie) January 5, 2021
1. It\u2019s overstating it to say that COM now has final say over investment. FDI screening remains a MS competency. COM has had to take a v secondary supporting role over Huawei and 5G.
1/n https://t.co/RVg2jnoFgK
Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.
The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.
For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.
The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.