BC UK

An assessment of Johnson's press conference
Pros:
1. He has finally acted (better late than never)
2. He has extended the furlough scheme
3. He recognises test and trace needs to improve

Cons:
1. Even though coming 6 weeks after the SAGE call, with cases, hospitalisations and dealths now some 10 times as high, the measures are STILL weaker than proposed (e.g. no move to online teaching in universities)
2. No acknowledgement of the failures of the testing system, beyond numbers of tests (e.g. the falling proporttion of contacts being traced) and the need to root it in local public health structures.
3. A call for people to self-isolate, but no mention of the support needed to help people to do what is necessary: empty exhortations in the place of practical help.
4. No reversal of the laissez faire approach which simply hands over responsibility to others - employers, owners, head-teachers etc. - to create COVID safe facilities. No help to make this happen, no inspection to ensure it happens.
5. No strategy to keep infections low once restrictions (assuming they work) are lifted. Just an empty optimism that vaccines will come along and save us in the spring.
Overall verdict: A move in the right direction, and certainly better than nothing, but far too late, possibly too little, a last ditch reaction, and most seriously, no overall plan.

More from Uk

A short thread on why I am dubious that the government can lawfully impose charges on travellers entering the UK for quarantine and testing (proposed at £1,750 and £210)

1/

The UK has signed up to the International Health Regulations (IHA) 2005. These therefore create binding international legal obligations on the UK.

The IHA explicitly prevent charging for travellers' quarantine or medical examinations.

https://t.co/n4oWE8x5Vg /2


International law is not actionable in a UK court unless it has been implemented in law.

But it can be used as an aide to interpretation where a statute isn't clear as to what powers it grants.

See e.g. Lord Bingham in A v SSHD https://t.co/RXmib1qGYD

/3


The Quarantine regulations will, I assume, be made under section 45B of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984

https://t.co/54L4lHGMEr

/4


That gives pretty broad powers but I can't see any power to charge for quarantine. Perhaps it will be inferred from somewhere else in Part 2A?

But...
Better late than never. Here we go. What does this deal mean for borders, border formalities, customs & trade facilitation?

Long one. TL:DR very little at the moment but has potential

/1


Borders
When compared to no deal the deal changes very little in terms of border procedures. All formalities and checks will still be required.

Reminder - we're not starting from 0 here – both our container ports and our ro-ro ports are already congested

/2

On top of that, all the issues related to border readiness: lack of capacity and space, IT systems not ready, shortages of customs agents, treader readiness – have not been solved.

The deal doesn’t help with that.

/3


Here is where we are:
☑️The UK will phase-in border formalities over 6 months (customs and SPS)
☑️The EU will introduce full formalities in 3 days (customs + SPS)
☑️Irish Sea border also fully operational in 3 days with some short-term SPS easements

/4

Pre-notifications (safety & security declarations) not initially required on the UK side, needed for imports into the EU.

So what's in the deal?

/5
Just finished reading an article by Iain MacWhirter that is so full of demonstrable falsehoods & logical fallacies that it requires a firm response: So seeing as I’ve done one nuclear thread this week already, I might as well do another... 🧵☢️🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿🇺🇳

Iain is able to correctly identify that the submission that @SNP_SITW group made to the UK #IntegratedReview - and therefore wasn’t policy about an independent Scotland - but that’s where his grip on reality ends.

We called for unilateral disarmament, as I pointed out on Monday:
https://t.co/DwHt9knqHh


Iain chooses to elide the fact that our submission was clearly not about policy in an independent Scotland, and therefore seeks to portray our request to the UK Government to be serious about its own commitments to multilateral arms control treaties — like the NPT — as SNP policy

Despite revealing that he knows a thing or two about internal SNP procedures, he then goes on to conflate two unconnected things — our submission, and a putative conference motion that the democratically-elected conferences committee (not the Leadership) decided not to accept

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