😳ES&S’s ExpressVote voting system reportedly has an integrated zebra technologies barcode reader whose “operation can be modified by scanning configuration barcodes,” which can “reconfigure which types of barcodes the scanner reads,” & “how it reads...&..processes them.” 1/

2/ “They could cause the barcode scanner to stop tabulating ExpressVote barcodes or to tabulate them incorrectly. They can even be used to allow sending unintended data & keyboard commands to the voting system.”
3/ “A set of carefully constructed keyboard commands could be used to manipulate the voting system software.”
4/ This is a serious problem because, with the ExpressVote, the only part of the paper record counted as your vote is the barcode....
5/ Although there is human readable text beneath the barcode, a recent study showed that voters miss 93% of inaccuracies in that text. This is an invitation to fraud, especially for down ballot races, such as for state legislature.
6/ Discussion of the study referenced in post 5. @jhalderm led the study. https://t.co/R3aVXpCOGZ
7/ As I explain here, the US rarely conducts robust manual audits anyway. This must change. https://t.co/mbxFpCpFoQ
8/ “America’s preeminent election-auditing expert, Philip Stark...told me...that ‘only a few jurisdictions currently audit elections in a way that has a good chance of catching & correcting wrong reported outcomes...[E]ven those states only audit a few contests in each election.”
9/ Link to screenshot in post 1. It was election security expert @kskoglund who identified the concern about the zebra barcode reader. The ExpressVote XL apparently doesn’t have it, but ESS acknowledged that the ExpressVote does. https://t.co/p0fozWDzww
10/ I wrote about ES&S as a company here. https://t.co/JnJ8bwF3vH
11/ Verified Voting’s verifier tool shows which jurisdictions used ES&S ExpressVote voting systems in 2020. The ones in yellow used it for all or most in person voting. The ones in green used it primarily for ADA use. https://t.co/CxiHJD5hew
12/ I don’t know if all versions of the ExpressVote use the Zebra barcode reader.
13/ It appears that much of Texas and all of Arkansas and SC used the ExpressVote as a primary voting system. The largest county in Kansas, Johnson County, did too.
14/ Much of West Virginia and Ohio too.
15/ More from post 1 report: “These configuration barcode are not secret...They cld cause the barcode scanner to stop tabulating ExpressVote barcodes or to tabulate them incorrectly. They can even be used to allow sending unintended data & keyboard commands to the voting system.”
16/ “A set of carefully constructed keyboard commands could be used to manipulate the voting system software.”
The kicker: “A ballot card pre-printed with configuration barcodes could be submitted by any voter while inside the privacy of the voting booth.” 😳

We really just need #HandMarkedPaperBallots (exception for voters w/ disabilities). #BanTheExpressVote #BanBarcodeVoting 17/
PS. This does NOT prove fraud. It does indicate a potentially serious vulnerability. 18/
19/ #BanBarcodeVoting
20/ #HandMarkedPaperBallots #PenAndPaper #ProtectOurVotes

More from Jennifer Cohn ✍🏻 📢

IMO, the #SAFEAct is better on election security than HR1 bc it wld ban most touchscreen voting machines currently available. HR1 wld allow them as a primary in person system bc vendors call the paper they spit out a “paper ballot.” Pen & paper is safer #HandMarkedPaperBallots 1/


I have not looked at other aspects of HR1. It addresses more than election security. The #SAFEAct shld be the starting point for election security reform in my opinion. 2/

HR1 requires that all voters have the option to mark their ballots by hand. But it does not specify that, for jurisdictions with in person voting, the hand marked (pen & paper) option must be available for in person voting (vs it only being an option w/ vote by mail). 3/

HR1 may still be a good start. But it does not go nearly far enough on election security. Here are my suggestions for election security. Maybe these could be addressed in a later bill, but we shld keep them on our radar. 4/ https://t.co/mNdHrvwHcN


The key section is 1502. IMO, it shld add the following. “For jurisdictions that offer in person voting, the option to mark a paper ballot by hand must be offered at the in-person polling location; giving this option only for vote by mail won’t suffice for such jurisdictions.” 5/

More from Politics

Here we go. Tag 4 des Impeachments. Trumps Verteidigung.


Es wird argumentiert, dass Trump nur habe sicherstellen wollen, dass die Wahl fair abgelaufen sei. Die Verteidigung zeigt Clips einzelner Demokraten, die der Zertifizierung von Trumps Stimmen 2016 widersprechen. (Dass es 2016 keinen von Obama gesandten Mob aufs Kapitol gab?Egal!)

Die intellektuelle Unehrlichkeit ist so unfassbar, ich weiß kaum, wo ich hier überhaupt anfangen soll; so viele fucking Strohmänner auf einmal.

Die Verteidigung spielt random Clips, in denen Demokraten “fight” sagen, fast zehn Minuten lang. Weil Trump 20mal am 6. Januar “fight” gesagt hat. Dies ist kein Witz. Komisch, dass sonst die Folge nie war, dass ein Mob das Kapitol gestürmt hat und Pence hängen wollte


“Dieser Fall geht um politischen Hass” Ich mein, ja. “Die House Managers hassen Donald Trump.”

So close.

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A brief analysis and comparison of the CSS for Twitter's PWA vs Twitter's legacy desktop website. The difference is dramatic and I'll touch on some reasons why.

Legacy site *downloads* ~630 KB CSS per theme and writing direction.

6,769 rules
9,252 selectors
16.7k declarations
3,370 unique declarations
44 media queries
36 unique colors
50 unique background colors
46 unique font sizes
39 unique z-indices

https://t.co/qyl4Bt1i5x


PWA *incrementally generates* ~30 KB CSS that handles all themes and writing directions.

735 rules
740 selectors
757 declarations
730 unique declarations
0 media queries
11 unique colors
32 unique background colors
15 unique font sizes
7 unique z-indices

https://t.co/w7oNG5KUkJ


The legacy site's CSS is what happens when hundreds of people directly write CSS over many years. Specificity wars, redundancy, a house of cards that can't be fixed. The result is extremely inefficient and error-prone styling that punishes users and developers.

The PWA's CSS is generated on-demand by a JS framework that manages styles and outputs "atomic CSS". The framework can enforce strict constraints and perform optimisations, which is why the CSS is so much smaller and safer. Style conflicts and unbounded CSS growth are avoided.
The UN just voted to condemn Israel 9 times, and the rest of the world 0.

View the resolutions and voting results here:

The resolution titled "The occupied Syrian Golan," which condemns Israel for "repressive measures" against Syrian citizens in the Golan Heights, was adopted by a vote of 151 - 2 - 14.

Israel and the U.S. voted 'No'
https://t.co/HoO7oz0dwr


The resolution titled "Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the Palestinian people..." was adopted by a vote of 153 - 6 - 9.

Australia, Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the U.S. voted 'No' https://t.co/1Ntpi7Vqab


The resolution titled "Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan" was adopted by a vote of 153 – 5 – 10.

Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the U.S. voted 'No'
https://t.co/REumYgyRuF


The resolution titled "Applicability of the Geneva Convention... to the
Occupied Palestinian Territory..." was adopted by a vote of 154 - 5 - 8.

Canada, Israel, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and the U.S. voted 'No'
https://t.co/xDAeS9K1kW