Breathless accounts of brilliant negotiating are oddly unaccompanied by statements of UK wins.

Twice the PM has signed up to deals he previously said no PM could sign up for. The level of self-deception in turning these into triumphs is off the scale.
A wise man has suggested that Johnson's self delusions are good for the UK in the way he folds under EU pressure but denies it - that this actually delivers the best result.
But it doesn't do much for the country's politcal debate to have such delusions at the heart of the most important economic relationship. And they don't have such delusions in Belfast.
Perhaps it is the way of UK politics that no leader can be seen to be pro-EU, that the UK must be seen to be bigger than the EU, even though the UK is obviously smaller and needs the EU for trade.
On current precedent the UK will continue to lean towards the EU in practice but deny it in principle. All the EU has to do is threaten us with tariffs, and after bluster, here will come the concession.
And obviously you are going to struggle to win a negotiation when your public position is totally at odds with reality, and your actual position. But you can win the media.
Still going to be very hard to rebuild international business confidence in a UK unable to give a straight answer about relations with the EU.
As for a US trade deal, anyone want to trust the Prime Minister's word that UK farmers will be protected? Do you think the US will be impressed if he threatens to walk away?
The fracturing of UK politics into the comic book version of heroes and villains, and the real one of trade-offs and choices. But the first is more fun, and the PM plays it well. The second one is dull by comparison.
The challenges for the future. For the PM, keep politics away from the real world. For Labour, either the opposite, or get better at story telling. For business, identify how to navigate the gap between their real world and Johnson's fictional one.
The high drama phase of Brexit is over. Boris Johnson and the EU won. Many books will now be written about why and how. Now for the dull grind of implementation. There might be different winners and losers. /end

More from David Henig

Morning. And its Groundhog Day today. https://t.co/gRs4Dc8RH2


Some useful threads will follow, first on the Northern Ireland protocol, where unfettered is still being defined...


And on fish and level playing field. The latter seems, has always seemed, the most problematic, because the UK has apparently ruled out any compromise on shared minumum levels even if not automatic. That would be a deal breaker, but seems... unnecessary.


Your reminder closing complex deals is never easy. But there are ways to facilitate and EU is good at doing this if you meet their red lines. But still the biggest concern that the UK never understood level playing field terms are fundamental to the EU.


In the UK, one man's decision. Allegedly backed by a Cabinet who in reality will be quite happy to blame the PM either way. The temptation to send Michael Gove to seal the deal and end his leadership ambitions must be there...
Quick intro to more analysis later - since Freeports are mentioned in this article worth making the point that it seems to me under the UK-EU deal that if the UK provides subsidies for them, or relaxes labour or environmental rules in them, the EU can take retaliatory action.


There has never been level playing field content like this in a trade deal. The idea it is any kind of UK win, when the UK's opening position was no enforceable commitments whatsoever, is ridiculous.


The EU can take retaliatory action against the UK if we weaken labour standards, weaken pretty firm climate change targets, unfairly subsidise, or just in general seem to be out of line. There are processes to follow, but it looks like the PM did it again...


Final one for now. Quite how Labour gets itself in such a fuss about whether to support a deal with the strongest labour and environment commitments ever seen in a trade deal is a sign of just how far it hasn't moved on from leaving.

PS well... (sorry DAG). It certainly didn't have a good effect. And I think if we had settled LPF issues with the EU much earlier there is a good chance the conditions would have been far less stringent. By making an issue, we made it much worse.
So many stories of new barriers to trade between UK and EU, but you might be thinking at some point these will run out. The government is certainly hoping so. Well they may slow down, but trade relations and regulations are not static, and changes will lead to further problems.

The likelihood of continued trade problems for a £650 bn trade relationship is why there should be a huge cross-government effort led by the Foreign Office and Department for International Trade to put in place the necessary resources to seek best results.

There isn't.

So the UK's relationship with the EU currently consists of two not particularly good deals and no consistent effort to manage current problems or prevent future ones. Joint committees are a second order problem to putting in place the right internal structures.

But that's been the consistent UK problem in relations with the EU since 2016. Lack of focus on getting the right internal structures, people, asks, strategy, too much attention on being tough and a single leader.

News just in. This doesn't necessarily mean the right structure being put into UK-EU relations. I suspect Frost's main role is to ensure no renegotiations with the EU.

Also, wonder what this says about the PM's trust in Michael Gove?

More from Brexit

Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:


1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:

A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;

3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;

5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
#Brexitadventcalendar

31 liars & hypocrites who facilitated brexit

Some are mad, some are bad

All are millionaires, some are billionaires

They’ll profit from UK companies failing, keep their money abroad to avoid UK tax and travel freely with their EU passports

#RejoinEU


https://t.co/mZRr9u1RPb


https://t.co/BY6hKloR9d


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