Ok, here's my first bash at how I think UK-EU fisheries will be managed in future now we have the agreement

It’s quite complicated in parts, so would appreciate any corrections…

@StevePeers @BD_Stew @AntonSpisak (& others)

1) QUOTAS: For the next 5.5 years (until end-June 2026), each side’s quotas are set out in the agreement

This amounts to a 25% value reduction for the EU gradually over this period
2) These quotas shares set a new baseline for 2026, but they will be up for negotiation from thereon
3) CATCH LEVELS: However, they will still both need to negotiate overall allowed catch levels for each year, starting in 2021

By 31 Jan, a schedule must be agreed for talks, culminating in final agreement by 10 December (this fits in with the internal EU fisheries negotiation)
4) PROVISIONAL ACCESS: If there’s no agreement by 20 December, each side will apply a provisional allowable catch level for 1 January, defined by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea based on scientific recommendations
5) These provisional catch levels will apply the existing agreed quotas (access must allow a similar amount to be caught as in previous years during the provisional period)

I.e. it continues the status quo but prevents a fish grab in the provisional period
6) Access will be provided provisionally for 3 months for most species, but for as little as 1 month in the 6-12 mile zone

Further provisional access can be negotiated thereafter if there's still no overall agreement
7) DISPUTE RESOLUTION: If either side reduces the other’s access, it can take retaliatory measures.

This basically has three levels:

1) reduction of fishing access and tariffs on fish
2) tariffs on other goods
3) suspension of other parts of the trade and economic partnership
8) I don’t think there’s anything stopping either side escalating straight to point 3) if they consider the economic impact substantial enough

In other words, they don’t have to apply 1) and 2) first
9) These measures can only be applied with 7 days’ notice and not until access has actually ceased

i.e. one side could warn the other that provisional access would not continue in 2 weeks' time, but retaliation couldn’t apply until then
10) Arbitration follows automatically – even if the sanctioned side doesn’t request it (though they can), the one imposing the sanctions must do so within two weeks
11) The panel will be asked to assess whether there has been a breach and whether the measures were proportionate

If it’s yes and yes, then fine; if it’s no to either, they must be removed or changed
12) If they aren’t, the sanctioned side can request that the panel set out what proportionate retaliation it can take in response, this can only be applied 15 days after any ruling
13) TERMINATION: Overall, the fisheries section can be terminated by either side with 8 months’ notice

However, doing so would also automatically terminate the trade, aviation and road transport sections (a high price!)
14) In such a scenario, any existing agreements on access and quotas would continue for the rest of the year in which the agreement ended

i.e. if UK terminated in May 2021, EU fishing rights would continue until the end of December 2022
15) The agreement will be reviewed four years after the transition period, so in 9.5 years, to discuss access, quotas and other issues

Though these issues will be up for discussion each year
16) MANAGEMENT: It will be managed on an ongoing basis through the Specialised Committee on Fisheries, which is part of the Partnership Council

This committee will prepare annual negotiations, but that's not where they'll take place (presumably ministerial level)

More from Brexit

A quote from this excellent piece, neatly summarising a core impact of Brexit.

The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.


Of course, this was never written on the side of a bus. And never acknowledged by government. Everything was meant to be broadly fine apart from the inevitable teething problems.

It was, however, visible from space to balanced observers. You did not have to be a trade specialist to understand that replacing the Single Market with a third country trade arrangement meant the end of many if not all of the complex arrangements optimised for the former.

In the absence of substantive mitigations, the Brexit winners are those who subscribe to some woolly notion of ‘sovereignty’ and those who did not like freedom of movement. The losers are everyone else.

But, of course, that’s not good enough. For understandable reasons Brexit was sold as a benefit not a cost. The trading benefits of freedom would far outweigh the costs. Divergence would benefit all.

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