Quick intro to more analysis later - since Freeports are mentioned in this article worth making the point that it seems to me under the UK-EU deal that if the UK provides subsidies for them, or relaxes labour or environmental rules in them, the EU can take retaliatory action.

There has never been level playing field content like this in a trade deal. The idea it is any kind of UK win, when the UK's opening position was no enforceable commitments whatsoever, is ridiculous. https://t.co/iXlWqzzrlu
The EU can take retaliatory action against the UK if we weaken labour standards, weaken pretty firm climate change targets, unfairly subsidise, or just in general seem to be out of line. There are processes to follow, but it looks like the PM did it again...
Final one for now. Quite how Labour gets itself in such a fuss about whether to support a deal with the strongest labour and environment commitments ever seen in a trade deal is a sign of just how far it hasn't moved on from leaving.
PS well... (sorry DAG). It certainly didn't have a good effect. And I think if we had settled LPF issues with the EU much earlier there is a good chance the conditions would have been far less stringent. By making an issue, we made it much worse. https://t.co/M4MYbjSbK3
Interesting... https://t.co/V4DimjmVPm
Oh, here's the text. Have a quick flick through it, be astonished at the dull legalese, wait for specialist takes. Well that's my plan anyway... https://t.co/sOAyoi5AKJ
So the UK signed up for ECJ as well, in a, shall we say, limited and specific way. Inevitable I think, but a powerful precedent. https://t.co/FEDCYJIWMM
I am incidentally very much looking forward to distinguishing between those in the ERG who drop their principled objections to follow the prevailing political wind (true followers of Johnson?) and those who note that Johnson never saw a UK red line he wasn't prepared to relax.
Rules of origin quotas. Catnip for @SamuelMarcLowe. https://t.co/3zVyDilYbC
Most of the year has actually been internal negotiations within parties, the crucial bit that the media misses. And in the UK the need for a deal to safeguard car manufacturing in the short term seems to have won in the end. https://t.co/YgahmntPQ0
This is the Brussels Effect.

(Incidentally I'm reading as well, but copying the best points I see from others). https://t.co/BsJQU3sJWP
Absolutely this (from a former negotiator). My evolving conclusion is that a UK failure to reach a realistic internal position sufficiently early on LPF and fish in particular has meant ending up with a worse deal than expected in these areas. https://t.co/sww9JNejEj
On even simpler, talking tough to the domestic gallery when competing with a very experienced trade superpower is a very poor negotiating strategy, particularly if your leader has form for folding when the going gets tough.
Alternate view. https://t.co/MNsl46xkV5
And more worth considering, especially in comparison to Conservative MPs with their Number 10 briefs claiming improbably the opposite. https://t.co/rgenUqwGmv
A weak deal for UK agricultural exporters in terms of checks. https://t.co/rJsp413oRK

More from David Henig

Not the easiest to follow, but for those interested in the big picture of trade relations between US, EU and China this exchange between @alanbeattie and @IanaDreyer is an essential read. Real debate on key issues, and good points on both sides.


Also reading this from @gideonrachman on EU-China. My view (cynically?) - that EU-China is a deal that makes a lot of sense given a probably unresolvable trade policy superpower triangle with the US, and best for the EU to move while China will.

The US and EU roughly agree on China that it should do some things differently, but not really the details of what those are. Meanwhile the EU and US have long standing trade policy differences, which neither (or their key stakeholders) prioritise resolving.

For the EU, the China deal has sent a message to the new US administration, you can't just tell us what to do. And delivered some (probably marginal in reality) benefits to business. For China, this is the 3rd deal with EU or US in 12 months. Pretty clear strategy there.

The key assumption that lies at the heart of too much writing on EU-US relations is that the two should cooperate on trade. After 25 years of largely failing to do so, I'd suggest we might want to question that a bit more deeply.
This potential benefit list from CPTPP is not the longest and is still misleading. Those Malaysian whisky tariffs - emilimated over 15 years (if they don't seek any specific exemption for UK). Those rules of origin benefits? Only apply to import / export to CPTPP countries. https://t.co/9TbheOVhsR


Here's my more realistic take on CPTPP. Economic gains limited, but politically in terms of trade this makes some sort of sense, these are likely allies. DIT doesn't say this, presumably the idea of Australia or Canada as our equal upsets them.


As previously noted agriculture interests in Australia and New Zealand expect us to reach generous agreements in WTO talks and bilaterals before acceding to CPTPP. So this isn't a definite. Oh and Australia wants to know if we'll allow hormone treated beef

Ultimately trade deals are political, and the UK really wants CPTPP as part of the pivot to indo-pacific, and some adherents also hope it forces us to change food laws without having to do it in a US deal (isn't certain if this is the case or not).

If we can accede to CPTPP without having to make changes to domestic laws it is fine. Just shouldn't be our priority, as it does little for services, is geographically remote, and hardly cutting edge on issues like climate change or animal welfare.

More from Brexit

On this, I think it’s highly unlikely to occur in the timeframe given. For several reasons, I don’t think it’s realistic for Scotland to secede, and then join the EU, in 9 years.

For that, thanks goes to Brexit.

A thread because why not...


Two important dates: March 2016 and January 1st 2021.

Firstly, prior to the 2014 referendum, the Nationalists proposed a date of March 2016 to secede.

Secondly, today - the end completion of Brexit five-and-a-half years after Cameron’s majority in 2015.

Brexit has demonstrated many things, primarily that splitting unions is not easy. The UKs membership of the EU was 47 years and by the end it was not at the heart of the EU. The Union has existed for over 300 as a unitary state.

Dividing a unitary state, like the UK, will not be easy. Frankly, it will make Brexit look simple. Questions of debt, currency, defence, and more will need to be resolved ... something not addressed with Brexit.

Starting with debt. Scotland will end up with its proportionate share of the UKs national debt. It’s not credible to suggest otherwise. Negotiating what is proportionate won’t be easy when both sides disagree.

It’s importance will be seen shortly.

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