Story of the very first Biological Warfare.
Story of a mentally sick I$l@mist Jeh@di who killed almost 50-60% population of #Europe.
The inhabitants fled, taking with them the disease to Sicily and other parts of Europe.
A contemporary witness de Mussis describes the entire episode:
No one knew, or could discover, a means of defense.
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Part 2
Lengthy again..
By 1974 the debate focused on whether there was a credible risk of explosion from the liquid fuel, or if this was manageable.
This risk led to the beginning of a major policy debate in the very heart of the secret state about whether this was an acceptable level of risk, or if there were alternative options open to consider.
There appears to have been a difference of opinion between different parts of government on what the right answer was in this case.
To the Royal Navy, charged with delivering the nuclear deterrent mission, the only acceptable answer was to step away from Chevaline and Polaris and upgrade to Poesidon as quickly as possible to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.
By contrast No10 was growing increasingly frustrated with what it saw as an inability by the Royal Navy to focus on delivering a capable SSBN force, & its constant demands to goldplate the solution – in one memo to the Prime Minister from his Private Secretary there is the line:
Lengthy again..
By 1974 the debate focused on whether there was a credible risk of explosion from the liquid fuel, or if this was manageable.
Part 1
— \u2728 (@Aamani_03) November 15, 2021
It's a bit lengthy, just keep reading :)
The British Nuclear Policy In The 1970s. https://t.co/DE1A7e1SQ0 pic.twitter.com/VSuUgpVMk6
This risk led to the beginning of a major policy debate in the very heart of the secret state about whether this was an acceptable level of risk, or if there were alternative options open to consider.
There appears to have been a difference of opinion between different parts of government on what the right answer was in this case.
To the Royal Navy, charged with delivering the nuclear deterrent mission, the only acceptable answer was to step away from Chevaline and Polaris and upgrade to Poesidon as quickly as possible to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.
By contrast No10 was growing increasingly frustrated with what it saw as an inability by the Royal Navy to focus on delivering a capable SSBN force, & its constant demands to goldplate the solution – in one memo to the Prime Minister from his Private Secretary there is the line: