THREAD.

In analysing the Afghan political spectrum something becomes obvious: Kabul's base is far more diverse than the Taliban's. For simplicity's sake, I'll count stronger opposition toward the Taliban than Kabul as 'pro Kabul'.

Let's assess these generally. Exceptions apply.

A diverse base isn't necessarily, however, a good thing. Appealing to everyone ensures you appeal to no one, or that your support base is so fractured that it actually becomes a liability. Think of Clinton losing the Democrat majority in Congress being a blessing in disguise.
Some pro-Kabul groupings:

1) ethnonationalists of all ethnicities. Whilst the non-Pashtuns amongst them aren't pro-Ghani, they're pro-Kabul as an institution; they see it as far more representative and amenable to their interests than the Taliban.
Some Pashtun nationalists do support the Taliban (majority Pashtun) but these are a minority. The biggest blemishes on the Taliban's Pashtun credentials:

a) The Taliban/Pakistan relationship
b) their overt Islam, which many Pashtun nationalists are hostile toward.
2) The enlightened 'roshan-fikr' demographic

Liberals/seculars. Not much intro needed: progress, freedom, spectacular gains of the last 19 years, women's rights et cetera. You generally notice quite an anti-Islam, wholesale adoption of War on Terror rhetoric in their rationale.
3) The ex-communist

Again, not much intro needed: the Taliban are Pakistani proxies just like the Mujahideen were. Pakistan is to blame, Islam is bad/needs to be de-emphasised as it is exploited.

Noticeable that whilst distinct, they share a large overlap with groups 1) and 2).
4) The religious

Generally pro-Mujahideen who consider Kabul a legitimate Islamic authority, strongly condemn the Taliban on Islamic grounds, consider their jihad void and focus on perceived unIslamic nature of the Taliban's method of war.

Massive tension between 4) and 1/2/3.
5) The partisans

Nominally pro-Kabul but not from a moral/ideological perspective, but because their favourite politicians/warlords are currently represented in Kabul's team. Willing to cut separate deals with the Taliban as long as their party's interests are upheld.
This isn't at all a coincidence. Kabul, like other regional governments, markets itself differently based on audience. It justifies its existence on ethnic, Islamic, anti-Islamic, secular, feminist grounds and as protector of minorities simultaneously, against the daunting Talib.
Having a broad base isn't inherently a liability, but as we're in the process of negotiations we can ask of Kabul the same question that is asked of the Taliban: can it retain its unity whilst its base is comprised of elements undoubtedly hostile to one another?
4) may agree with the Taliban in making Afghanistan 'Islamic'. 2&3 would object to this. Vociferously.

Many across all groups see peace as a sham. Almost all ethnicities in 1) see their existence as mortally threatened in the event of a peace deal.

How do you reconcile these?
This thread ignores a large demographic of the Taliban base, whose fractures could appear between leadership and rank and file, but aren't as glaringly ideological.

Worth noting groups 1,2&3 comprise fringe elements, yet enjoy healthy representation, for whichever reason.
There is the massive, ignored demographic: ethnically diverse whose priority is peace, aren't fond of either side, generally indifferent as to which side 'wins'.

For them, how much worse can it get? They haven't seen 'gains' Kabul boasts of, so their preservation is unimportant.
These fault-lines will become glaringly obvious as breakthroughs are achieved in the Doha talks, especially because these factions within Kabul are well connected and represented internationally. They amplify abroad what has become tiring rhetoric and sloganeering in Afghanistan.
Anyways, I wrote something similar in my first @AfgEye article on the eve of the US-Taliban deal, critiquing whether the Taliban, in the event of peace, could maintain their movement and unity in Afghanistan.

https://t.co/JFnMO99iFP

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I'll bite, Mr. Gray. We can even play by your rather finicky rules.

Let's begin with some of the things you have said about Xinjiang, notably absent from your more recent media appearances, but still present in your blog about your 2014 biking trip.


The following is taken from an ongoing list I keep of people who have been to Xinjiang and written/spoken about their experiences. It is separate from the testimony of detainees and their relatives I also keep. Jerry is on this

Jerry, your article for CGTN, as well as your various Medium pieces, belabor themselves to emphasize the smoothness of your time in Xinjiang. Why did you leave out so many details from your log of your 2014 trip? They seem relevant.

For example, would CGTN not let you speak about Shanshan, the town that evidently disturbed you so much?


Why, pray tell, after noting how kind and hospitable Xinjiang police were to you in 2019 for CGTN—and how you were never told where you could or could not go—would you omit these details?
All the leftists in the comments like oh no prageru made a good point lol


Polls consistently show conservative support for nuclear energy. It also has high support among elites. The myth that it is unpopular in general isn’t true—although it is unpopular in almost every specific case where they need to site it

Article is old but yeah

This study finds that risk & benefit predict individual opinion the most, followed by the share of nuclear energy already extant, followed by ideology (conservatives support more)

This one finds that journalists attitude affect public perceptions, but that energy consultants, nuclear engineers, bureaucrats, and the military show the highest support for nuclear energy

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