"3 million people are estimated not to have official photo ID, with ethnic minorities more at risk". They will "have to contact their council to confirm their ID if they want to vote"
This is shameful legislation, that does nothing to tackle the problems with UK elections.THREAD
Millions of people do not have photo ID. By forcing through mandatory voter-ID the government risk disenfranchising millions of legitimate voters. https://t.co/y0Upzof2FI
— Electoral Reform Society (@electoralreform) February 17, 2021
More from Robert Saunders
If anyone thinks this is a good faith proposal, designed to secure democratic consent for changes to public monuments, let's look at what Robert Jenrick said four months ago about the procedures he is about to impose. [THREAD]
2. In a speech last September, Jenrick complained that "the planning system is broken". Only "1% of people" had "the esoteric knowledge to navigate [its] arcane and protracted world", shutting out those "who don’t have the time to contribute to the lengthy and archaic process".
3. If campaigners make it through that process (which Jenrick himself calls "as inconsistent as it is slow") more barriers lie ahead. "I will not hesitate to use my powers as Secretary of State" to enforce the view, to "be set out in law", that statues should "almost always" stay
4. When this govt wants councils to do something - like building houses - it invariably overrides the planning system. When it wants to *stop* them doing something - like moving statues - it enforces it. This is not an attempt to democratise change. It's an attempt to obstruct it
5.If the goal were to prevent direct action against statues, blocking lawful & constitutional avenues for change would be a foolish way of doing it. As I wrote here, we need good faith mechanisms where the case for change can be argued & contested lawfully
Robert Jenrick is to change the law so that historic statues, plaques, memorials or monuments cannot be removed without going through a formal planning process.
— Christopher Hope\U0001f4dd (@christopherhope) January 16, 2021
Twelve thousand statues are covered by the law changes.
2. In a speech last September, Jenrick complained that "the planning system is broken". Only "1% of people" had "the esoteric knowledge to navigate [its] arcane and protracted world", shutting out those "who don’t have the time to contribute to the lengthy and archaic process".
3. If campaigners make it through that process (which Jenrick himself calls "as inconsistent as it is slow") more barriers lie ahead. "I will not hesitate to use my powers as Secretary of State" to enforce the view, to "be set out in law", that statues should "almost always" stay
4. When this govt wants councils to do something - like building houses - it invariably overrides the planning system. When it wants to *stop* them doing something - like moving statues - it enforces it. This is not an attempt to democratise change. It's an attempt to obstruct it
5.If the goal were to prevent direct action against statues, blocking lawful & constitutional avenues for change would be a foolish way of doing it. As I wrote here, we need good faith mechanisms where the case for change can be argued & contested lawfully
8. Debate around public statues is not going to go away. Nor should it, for it raises profound questions about our values & the ownership of public space. So councils need to establish good-faith processes in which debate can happen - and from which meaningful change can emerge.
— Robert Saunders (@redhistorian) June 9, 2020
This article, on the repeal of the Fixed Term Parliaments Act, raises a question that needs more public discussion: who wields the historic powers of the Crown once the monarchy is no longer politically active? Should there be *any* limit on their use by a prime minister? THREAD
2. Some of the highest powers of the British state still technically belong to the Crown: from declaring war & making treaties to suspending Parliament. Those powers are now exercised "on the advice of the PM". But they do not *belong* to the PM, & might, in theory, be withheld.
3.For example: the 1950 "Lascelles Principles" set out three conditions under which a monarch might refuse to dissolve Parliament (a "Royal Prerogative" pre-2011). Others might include "when the Oppn is in the middle of a leadership contest" or "when electoral fraud is suspected"
4. In effect, the monarchy became the "emergency brake" of the constitution. It could not exercise these powers itself, but it could stop a govt from doing so. It could deny a PM access to the "nuclear weapons" of the constitution: like the power to declare war or suspend Parlt.
5.This was never a very satisfactory brake. It relied on one person with no democratic authority, who might be inept, corrupt or Prince Andrew. And as Britain evolved from a "constitutional" to a "ceremonial" monarchy, it grew ever less likely that a monarch would actually use it
ON THE BLOG: The Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill \u2013 a return to constitutional normality?
— Constitution Unit (@ConUnit_UCL) August 1, 2021
Professor Alison Young, of @cambridgelaw, argues that it is wrong to place the blame for the extraordinary events of 2019 on the provisions of the FTPA.https://t.co/yYWEEOF1Td
2. Some of the highest powers of the British state still technically belong to the Crown: from declaring war & making treaties to suspending Parliament. Those powers are now exercised "on the advice of the PM". But they do not *belong* to the PM, & might, in theory, be withheld.
3.For example: the 1950 "Lascelles Principles" set out three conditions under which a monarch might refuse to dissolve Parliament (a "Royal Prerogative" pre-2011). Others might include "when the Oppn is in the middle of a leadership contest" or "when electoral fraud is suspected"
4. In effect, the monarchy became the "emergency brake" of the constitution. It could not exercise these powers itself, but it could stop a govt from doing so. It could deny a PM access to the "nuclear weapons" of the constitution: like the power to declare war or suspend Parlt.
5.This was never a very satisfactory brake. It relied on one person with no democratic authority, who might be inept, corrupt or Prince Andrew. And as Britain evolved from a "constitutional" to a "ceremonial" monarchy, it grew ever less likely that a monarch would actually use it
The big story in Parliament today really isn't which of three bad options the Opposition parties will choose. It is the absolute travesty of parliamentary democracy that is about to play out: a microcosm of the shattering effect Brexit has had on our constitution. [THREAD]
MPs are being asked to shovel through, in a single day, a bill that was published yesterday, implementing a treaty agreed six days ago, which comes into force tomorrow night. The European Communities Act 1972 was debated in Parliament for 300 hours. Today's bill will get about 5.
MPs will have at most four minutes to speak on a trade agreement covering more than 1,200 pages. Few will have had time to read it anyway, and their votes will mostly be cast by the Whips. The entire charade will be over shortly after lunch.
Today's legislation doesn't just transform our trade relations. As @jeff_a_king points out, it gives ministers the power to rewrite vast swathes of domestic law without further scrutiny. It is a massive transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive.
Parliament has to do this with the legislative equivalent of a gun to its head. The UK's current terms of trade with the EU cease to exist in 48 hrs. MPs cannot inflict a crash-out on their constituents, so all that's left for the Opposition parties to argue about is positioning.
MPs are being asked to shovel through, in a single day, a bill that was published yesterday, implementing a treaty agreed six days ago, which comes into force tomorrow night. The European Communities Act 1972 was debated in Parliament for 300 hours. Today's bill will get about 5.
MPs will have at most four minutes to speak on a trade agreement covering more than 1,200 pages. Few will have had time to read it anyway, and their votes will mostly be cast by the Whips. The entire charade will be over shortly after lunch.
Today's legislation doesn't just transform our trade relations. As @jeff_a_king points out, it gives ministers the power to rewrite vast swathes of domestic law without further scrutiny. It is a massive transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive.
Third, the general implementation powers contained in cl 31 allow ministers to make any law that is required to implement the agreement by regulations - and that this power can be used to do anything an Act of Parliament can do (including amend the bill/Act itself).
— Jeff King (@jeff_a_king) December 30, 2020
Parliament has to do this with the legislative equivalent of a gun to its head. The UK's current terms of trade with the EU cease to exist in 48 hrs. MPs cannot inflict a crash-out on their constituents, so all that's left for the Opposition parties to argue about is positioning.
There are important differences between Trump and Johnson, but I'm wary of the idea that Johnson is "liberal" and Trump "authoritarian". I fear this overstates Johnson's "liberalism", and risks missing the warning lights that should now be flashing across British politics. THREAD
2. It's true that Johnson has a "libertarian" streak: he dislikes rules, taxes, "red tape", "do-gooders" and the "nanny state". But so does Trump. Indeed, Trump goes much further on this, presenting masks, lockdowns, gun control, taxes & environmentalism as a danger to "freedom".
3. Johnson is not morally conservative, but nor is Trump. Neither much cares what people do in private, & neither sets much store by "conservative" moral norms on truth, fidelity or sexual continence. (Tories used to call this "licence", not "liberalism", but it's common to both)
4. Johnson might, personally, be more "liberal" on immigration than Trump, but he's been no less quick to weaponize the issue for political gain. The demand to "Take Back Control of our Borders" was as central to Johnson's victory in 2016 as "Build the Wall" was to Trump's.
5. Johnson is not, like Trump, an instinctive protectionist. But he was happy to lead a nationalist insurgency against the UK's biggest free trade arrangement, and stoked support for a "no deal" Brexit that would have involved huge tariff increases. To quote an earlier leader...
Good piece on lazy "Boris is Trump" nonsense. I'd go further. Johnson is socially liberal at heart, Trump is authoritarian. Johnson is instinctive free trader, Trump is protectionist. Johnson is pro-migration at heart, Trump is xenophobe https://t.co/RGom19xSfx
— Matt Goodwin (@GoodwinMJ) January 7, 2021
2. It's true that Johnson has a "libertarian" streak: he dislikes rules, taxes, "red tape", "do-gooders" and the "nanny state". But so does Trump. Indeed, Trump goes much further on this, presenting masks, lockdowns, gun control, taxes & environmentalism as a danger to "freedom".
3. Johnson is not morally conservative, but nor is Trump. Neither much cares what people do in private, & neither sets much store by "conservative" moral norms on truth, fidelity or sexual continence. (Tories used to call this "licence", not "liberalism", but it's common to both)
4. Johnson might, personally, be more "liberal" on immigration than Trump, but he's been no less quick to weaponize the issue for political gain. The demand to "Take Back Control of our Borders" was as central to Johnson's victory in 2016 as "Build the Wall" was to Trump's.
5. Johnson is not, like Trump, an instinctive protectionist. But he was happy to lead a nationalist insurgency against the UK's biggest free trade arrangement, and stoked support for a "no deal" Brexit that would have involved huge tariff increases. To quote an earlier leader...
It is right to ask *why* industries like fishing have declined. The problem is the blithe assumption that the answer must always be "because of the EU". The problems facing the UK fishing industry long predate EU membership, and will not be magically solved by Brexit. [THREAD]
1. Fishing had been declining for much of the twentieth century. The number of UK fishermen more than halved in mid-century: from nearly 48,000 in 1938 to 21,000 in 1970. By 1970 - the year *before* the UK signed the Treaty of Accession - fishing made up less than 0.1% of UK GDP.
2. That decline had many causes. A century of over-fishing had left stocks dangerously depleted. Younger generations were moving out, in search of safer and better-paid work inland. And the "Cod Wars" with Iceland (1958-76) triggered the collapse of the Atlantic trawler fleet.
3. The "Cod Wars", in which Iceland expelled GB trawlers from its waters, were a grim reminder (a) that other states have sovereignty too & (b) that power-politics still exist outside the EU. For Cold-War reasons, the US backed Iceland. The UK had to fold. https://t.co/t8wdvtCgMb
4. There were other challenges, too. In the early 1970s, Norway & Iceland were dumping large quantities of frozen fish on the British market, driving down prices for domestic suppliers. The fishing fleet badly needed investment for modernisation but was struggling to raise funds.
After all these years... remainers still go "AH HA but fishing is a tiny contribution to the economy".. Well why might that be? Why has it withered? Why has it become a totemic issue in our relationship with Brussels? Yes it is tiny now. But for millions that's the sodding point.
— Harry Cole (@MrHarryCole) December 17, 2020
1. Fishing had been declining for much of the twentieth century. The number of UK fishermen more than halved in mid-century: from nearly 48,000 in 1938 to 21,000 in 1970. By 1970 - the year *before* the UK signed the Treaty of Accession - fishing made up less than 0.1% of UK GDP.
2. That decline had many causes. A century of over-fishing had left stocks dangerously depleted. Younger generations were moving out, in search of safer and better-paid work inland. And the "Cod Wars" with Iceland (1958-76) triggered the collapse of the Atlantic trawler fleet.
3. The "Cod Wars", in which Iceland expelled GB trawlers from its waters, were a grim reminder (a) that other states have sovereignty too & (b) that power-politics still exist outside the EU. For Cold-War reasons, the US backed Iceland. The UK had to fold. https://t.co/t8wdvtCgMb
4. There were other challenges, too. In the early 1970s, Norway & Iceland were dumping large quantities of frozen fish on the British market, driving down prices for domestic suppliers. The fishing fleet badly needed investment for modernisation but was struggling to raise funds.
More from Politics
This idea - that elections should translate into policy - is not wrong at all. But political science can help explain why it's not working this way. There are three main explanations: 1. mandates are constructed, not automatic, 2. party asymmetry, 3. partisan conpetition 1/
First, party/policy mandates from elections are far from self-executing in our system. Work on mandates from Dahl to Ellis and Kirk on the history of the mandate to mine on its role in post-Nixon politics, to Peterson Grossback and Stimson all emphasize that this link is... 2/
Created deliberately and isn't always persuasive. Others have to convinced that the election meant a particular thing for it to work in a legislative context. I theorized in the immediate period of after the 2020 election that this was part of why Repubs signed on to ...3/
Trump's demonstrably false fraud nonsense - it derailed an emerging mandate news cycle. Winners of elections get what they get - institutional control - but can't expect much beyond that unless the perception of an election mandate takes hold. And it didn't. 4/
Let's turn to the legislation element of this. There's just an asymmetry in terms of passing a relief bill. Republicans are presumably less motivated to get some kind of deal passed. Democrats are more likely to want to do *something.* 5/
I\u2019m sorry it\u2019s just insane that Democrats are like, \u201cwe won everything and our opening position on relief is $1.9T\u201d and Republicans are like, \u201cwe lost and our opening position is $600B,\u201d and the media will be like, \u201cDemocrats say they want unity but reject this bipartisan deal.\u201d
— Meredith Shiner (@meredithshiner) January 31, 2021
First, party/policy mandates from elections are far from self-executing in our system. Work on mandates from Dahl to Ellis and Kirk on the history of the mandate to mine on its role in post-Nixon politics, to Peterson Grossback and Stimson all emphasize that this link is... 2/
Created deliberately and isn't always persuasive. Others have to convinced that the election meant a particular thing for it to work in a legislative context. I theorized in the immediate period of after the 2020 election that this was part of why Repubs signed on to ...3/
Trump's demonstrably false fraud nonsense - it derailed an emerging mandate news cycle. Winners of elections get what they get - institutional control - but can't expect much beyond that unless the perception of an election mandate takes hold. And it didn't. 4/
Let's turn to the legislation element of this. There's just an asymmetry in terms of passing a relief bill. Republicans are presumably less motivated to get some kind of deal passed. Democrats are more likely to want to do *something.* 5/
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1/Politics thread time.
To me, the most important aspect of the 2018 midterms wasn't even about partisan control, but about democracy and voting rights. That's the real battle.
2/The good news: It's now an issue that everyone's talking about, and that everyone cares about.
3/More good news: Florida's proposition to give felons voting rights won. But it didn't just win - it won with substantial support from Republican voters.
That suggests there is still SOME grassroots support for democracy that transcends
4/Yet more good news: Michigan made it easier to vote. Again, by plebiscite, showing broad support for voting rights as an
5/OK, now the bad news.
We seem to have accepted electoral dysfunction in Florida as a permanent thing. The 2000 election has never really
To me, the most important aspect of the 2018 midterms wasn't even about partisan control, but about democracy and voting rights. That's the real battle.
2/The good news: It's now an issue that everyone's talking about, and that everyone cares about.
3/More good news: Florida's proposition to give felons voting rights won. But it didn't just win - it won with substantial support from Republican voters.
That suggests there is still SOME grassroots support for democracy that transcends
4/Yet more good news: Michigan made it easier to vote. Again, by plebiscite, showing broad support for voting rights as an
5/OK, now the bad news.
We seem to have accepted electoral dysfunction in Florida as a permanent thing. The 2000 election has never really
Bad ballot design led to a lot of undervotes for Bill Nelson in Broward Co., possibly even enough to cost him his Senate seat. They do appear to be real undervotes, though, instead of tabulation errors. He doesn't really seem to have a path to victory. https://t.co/utUhY2KTaR
— Nate Silver (@NateSilver538) November 16, 2018
I just finished Eric Adler's The Battle of the Classics, and wanted to say something about Joel Christiansen's review linked below. I am not sure what motivates the review (I speculate a bit below), but it gives a very misleading impression of the book. 1/x
The meat of the criticism is that the history Adler gives is insufficiently critical. Adler describes a few figures who had a great influence on how the modern US university was formed. It's certainly critical: it focuses on the social Darwinism of these figures. 2/x
Other insinuations and suggestions in the review seem wildly off the mark, distorted, or inappropriate-- for example, that the book is clickbaity (it is scholarly) or conservative (hardly) or connected to the events at the Capitol (give me a break). 3/x
The core question: in what sense is classics inherently racist? Classics is old. On Adler's account, it begins in ancient Rome and is revived in the Renaissance. Slavery (Christiansen's primary concern) is also very old. Let's say classics is an education for slaveowners. 4/x
It's worth remembering that literacy itself is elite throughout most of this history. Literacy is, then, also the education of slaveowners. We can honor oral and musical traditions without denying that literacy is, generally, good. 5/x
As someone\u2019s who\u2019s read the book, this review strikes me as tremendously unfair. It mostly faults Adler for not writing the book the reviewer wishes he had! https://t.co/pqpt5Ziivj
— Teresa M. Bejan (@tmbejan) January 12, 2021
The meat of the criticism is that the history Adler gives is insufficiently critical. Adler describes a few figures who had a great influence on how the modern US university was formed. It's certainly critical: it focuses on the social Darwinism of these figures. 2/x
Other insinuations and suggestions in the review seem wildly off the mark, distorted, or inappropriate-- for example, that the book is clickbaity (it is scholarly) or conservative (hardly) or connected to the events at the Capitol (give me a break). 3/x
The core question: in what sense is classics inherently racist? Classics is old. On Adler's account, it begins in ancient Rome and is revived in the Renaissance. Slavery (Christiansen's primary concern) is also very old. Let's say classics is an education for slaveowners. 4/x
It's worth remembering that literacy itself is elite throughout most of this history. Literacy is, then, also the education of slaveowners. We can honor oral and musical traditions without denying that literacy is, generally, good. 5/x
