A quote from this excellent piece, neatly summarising a core impact of Brexit.
The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.
Brexit reality bites: The new dawn of trade friction via @RTENews https://t.co/p6VdlhZUAN
— Tony Connelly (@tconnellyRTE) January 9, 2021
More from Objective Columnist
I tend to agree with this - of course many things can still go wrong...but (certainly on the UK side) as the list of outstanding issues decreases and as the cost of no deal becomes more apparent deal momentum will increase.
I find it most amusing that people invest so much value in public statements, briefings, tabloid headlines, the tweets of obscure backbenchers etc. Cherchez les fundamentals!
There is a deep vein of analytical pessimism in one particular direction, which, whether correct or not, is noteworthy. On the one hand, a firm belief in the fundamentals - gravity exists - but on the other hand those fundamentals are not meaningful to the final decision.
But gravity does exist! Whether one likes it or not. We do not have wings. Or feathers. And the realisation of the fundamentals will impact the political calculation (though timing differences may apply).
You don’t have to invest any particular optimism or see any virtue in the principal players to make this point.
Still, he's taken a very big step back now. The cliff risk was today; both sides were so close to the edge they could easily have gone over it. The fact @10DowningStreet didn't means Govt must genuinely believe there's now a landing zone that works, & which it can sell ENDS
— Mujtaba Rahman (@Mij_Europe) December 13, 2020
I find it most amusing that people invest so much value in public statements, briefings, tabloid headlines, the tweets of obscure backbenchers etc. Cherchez les fundamentals!
There is a deep vein of analytical pessimism in one particular direction, which, whether correct or not, is noteworthy. On the one hand, a firm belief in the fundamentals - gravity exists - but on the other hand those fundamentals are not meaningful to the final decision.
But gravity does exist! Whether one likes it or not. We do not have wings. Or feathers. And the realisation of the fundamentals will impact the political calculation (though timing differences may apply).
You don’t have to invest any particular optimism or see any virtue in the principal players to make this point.
More from Brexit
What's in the EU-UK Brexit deal on energy?
It may be Boxing day, but I've had a quick look
Title VIII: Energy is the key section (page 156 onwards)
▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/
▶️ Existing "exemptions" for selected interconnectors will continue to apply.
This means that these interconnectors can continue to sell capacity rights ahead of time, rather than all through close to real-time markets.
(Article ENER.11, page 162)
3/
▶️ No network charges on individual interconnector transactions (as now)
▶️ But, UK cannot participate in EU procedures for capacity allocation and congestion management (more on this later)
(Article ENER.13, page 163)
4/
Gas trading: looks like the UK stays in the existing PRISMA gas trading platform.
Not my specialist area, but is this because PRISMA isn't an EU institution (unlike electricity market coupling)?
https://t.co/5GQJtZDpTa
(Article ENER. 15, page 164)
5/
It may be Boxing day, but I've had a quick look
Title VIII: Energy is the key section (page 156 onwards)
▶️ Standard stuff on commitment to competition, unbundling and customer choice
▶️ UK Capacity Market no longer needs to try to integrate overseas Capacity providers & vice versa
(Article ENER.6, Clause 3, page. 160)
2/

▶️ Existing "exemptions" for selected interconnectors will continue to apply.
This means that these interconnectors can continue to sell capacity rights ahead of time, rather than all through close to real-time markets.
(Article ENER.11, page 162)
3/

▶️ No network charges on individual interconnector transactions (as now)
▶️ But, UK cannot participate in EU procedures for capacity allocation and congestion management (more on this later)
(Article ENER.13, page 163)
4/

Gas trading: looks like the UK stays in the existing PRISMA gas trading platform.
Not my specialist area, but is this because PRISMA isn't an EU institution (unlike electricity market coupling)?
https://t.co/5GQJtZDpTa
(Article ENER. 15, page 164)
5/
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;