A quote from this excellent piece, neatly summarising a core impact of Brexit.

The Commission’s view, according to several sources, is that Brexit means existing distribution networks and supply chains are now defunct and will have to be replaced by other systems.

I have a memory of @anandMenon1 et al writing about a TM deal being greeted with a surge of ‘it’s a deal’ goodwill (it wasn’t) but the argument seems to hold true for the current deal.

Some of it is relief that we have all avoided no deal although I’d argue that much of the no deal furore was prestidigitation (as it has always been).

Some of it is exhaustion. Everyone (apart from enthusiasts and lunatics) is very tired indeed, especially after this annus horrificis.

Everyone wants to move on. Labour is a great example. That they were going to vote for the deal was visible from space. If Labour can banish the twin albatrosses of Corbyn and Brexit then, hey presto, it becomes competitive again.

So almost overnight a new consensus seems to form. The Christmas gift isn’t just a deal it’s a new beginning, again.

One wonders how long Lord Frost will retain his new position. The personnel decisions made by the PM are nothing if not frequent, ruthless and mercurial.

The whole affair is very curious. While I am sure that Lord Frost’s elevation owes much to his relationship with the PM and the perceived success of the Brexit negotiation, it is very curious indeed that allegedly it took a threat to resign to secure this new role.

A role which is needed (although might have been structured differently) but was to a large effect previously undertaken (with reasonable success) by Michael Gove who one might imagine may not be entirely happy with this diminishment of his responsibilities.

What might have happened to have resulted in this dramatic and to some extent destructive move (which appears to have been played out in the context of a wider struggle that saw Oliver Lewis (previously Lord Frost’s (LF) negotiation deputy)?

The original sin, of course, is the agreement to the Northern Ireland Protocol. Who knows who did what to who or thought what about what but my speculation is the PM either did not understand the consequences of the Protocol or was assured they could be successfully addressed.

Along the way I wrote about considering Johnson’s Brexit decision as a choice between clichéd narratives. What would read / play best? Well...

It is absolutely no surprise to me that he ended up choosing the ending that would most easily portray him as the hero who saved the day.

The tricky part of this narrative is convincing re the ‘not giving in’ part. Hence all the bluster about standing tough and being happy to walk away.

And yet.

I’m old enough to remember when we wouldn’t accept any LPF provisions, any state aid constraints and we wanted all our fish back right now. Otherwise it’s an ‘Australia’ style Brexit.

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,

It's OUT! My latest #Brexit Briefing for @FinancialTimes - examining @BorisJohnson
"buy now, pay later" Northern Ireland Protocol, why the EU-UK trust deficit is killing it, how that can be restored - because it needs to work. /1

@BorisJohnson The danger here is that lingering animus over the opportunistic nature Johnson's Faustian bargain - dividing his Kingdom in order to 'get #Brexit done' and win an 80-seat majority - is clouding judgement on both sides of the Channel /2

@BorisJohnson The facts of the Protocol are no less true for Johnson's constant denial of them - that there would be checks, that there really is a trade border that now prevents plants and pets from travelling freely from Bedford to Ballymena as M.Gove reminds us. But these are other facts/3

@BorisJohnson Firstly, NI remains part of UK, even if it is now has EU customs rules.

Secondly, NI remains politically divided and fragile; the Good Friday Agreement is a constant work in progress.

Thirdly, both the EU and the UK agreed to this unsatisfactory arrangement jointly. /4

@BorisJohnson Fourthly, therefore, they have a joint responsibility to make it work because

Fifthly - and most importantly — there is no alternative to it. /5

The chart-topping band of @ChrisGiles_ @jimbrunsden (me on drums) have a piece up about the Brexit level playing field stand-off. But here's the thing: the opacity surrounding these (as so many) trade talks is making things much worse. Quick 🧵

One of the things that struck me talking to experts about this was a lot of hedging about "this is what I think the EU means" and "this is what the UK appears to believe". There's lots of jargon (non-regression, ratchet, equivalence etc) capable of multiple meanings. (2/n)

And even if the negotiators have been clear with each other about what they mean, they certainly aren't being transparent with their domestic constituencies: the EU member states and Westminster MPs aren't being given full details about exactly what's being proposed. (3/n)

There's an unhelpful culture of secrecy around almost all trade talks. Few texts are released along the way. The standard reason is so not to give away negotiating positions to the other side. This is, to use a technical WTO term, obvious bollocks. (4/n)

If you're not telling the other side what you're proposing, you aren't negotiating, are you? Duh. The function of secrecy is actually to hide from the public what's going on. But how are you supposed to build domestic consensus around a proposal no-one can see? (5/n)

1/ Quick thread. At the end of the third week of Brexit being "done", I can only say that I'm exhausted.

Immediate pressures on companies who have been trading goods have been on grappling with all of the new customs and regulatory requirements.

2/ It's clear that agrifood businesses have been the hardest hit due to the SPS checks and other requirements.

But for others, the shift from a distributor model to importer/exporter has been a challenge. This hasn't been helped by certain IT system not working as planned.

3/ So are these "teething problems"? Companies are grappling with the new systems & formalities.

Some are, but many others aren't.

Worth noting that freight volumes are still below average. But stockpiles are running low, coming weeks are going to be interesting.

4/ Two issues that are immediately facing many businesses that won't be addressed by sorting this teething period.

First, many businesses are facing the largest shift in their cost base in a generation.

5/ This comes from the cost of dealing with the customs procedures, upgrading IT systems to manage the new requirements, setting up European operating centres to comply with regulatory requirements, new immigration costs, the list goes on.