New: the European Parliament's announcement that it will not ratify any treaty before the end of December unless the deal is concluded by midnight on Sunday comes amid signals that, despite progress, a deal won't be concluded until early next week.

Amid the hail of accusations that the EU wanted to put a hard border on the island of Ireland last Friday, it's worth pointing out what the ill-fated resort to Article 16 was about:

2/ Under the Commission's trade mechanism, any Covid vaccines leaving the EU for third countries would need export authorisations, ie to ensure vaccines were not being exported which were actually part of an avanced purchase agreement between member states + pharma companies

3/ Any movements of exports from one member state to another would NOT have required such an export authorisation

4/ Because of the NI Protocol, Northern Ireland would typically have availed of NOT having to had export authorisations for any vaccines being sent there from Belgium (or wherever)

5/ However, someone in the Commission spotted the fact that, also under the Protocol, there was unfettered movement of goods between NI and GB

Where are we at as of 1450 CET?

Talks continuing, could go on for a while longer. One informed source is suggesting that because the fish deal was agreed at the high political level (btn @vonderleyen and @BorisJohnson) it was left to officials to translate it into real numbers

2/ Some reflections from an EU diplomat briefed on the rest of the deal, which appears to be in place:

3/ "There is nothing particularly surprising. It is consistent with what we've been hearing all along. The UK red lines are respected. Our concerns are also respected. Of course we have to see the fine print, but in general there is a robust level playing field."

4/ The LPF mechanism is said to be a "complicated structure" which works both ways.

5/ "It doesn't mean that because you have these structures you necessarily have to use them. The mood at the moment is, do you want to diverge [from EU standards] for the sake of diverging? In reality, most likely, pragmatism will prevail."

Here is the rough transcript and story of @realDonaldTrump's NI envoy, his meeting with @simoncoveney and the alleged threat of the EU using aviation as leverage over the UK if the Internal Market Bill led to a hard border on the island of Ireland.

2/ Mr Mulvaney was talking to the @iiea via video link.

Asked about the concerns in the US over the IMB, which breaches the NI Protocol, Mr Mulvaney said that in his meetings with all sides his worry was that the Bill could result in a border “by accident”.

3/ He told the presentation: “The best response I got on the matter was from Simon Coveney when I met with him in Dublin.

4/ “I said to him..., look, Simon, my fear is this: there’s a no deal Brexit. The IMB kicks in, the Brits don’t want to put up a border on the island, because they know what that means, the Irish don’t want to put up a border across the island because they know what that means.

5/ “The Europeans come in and say, well, if you’re not going to control the flow of goods from outside of the [European] Union [to] inside the Union, from Belfast to Dublin, for the sake of this discussion, we’re going to force you to ring the whole island of Ireland

Ireland's foreign min @SimonCoveney says there will be no breakthru at the #euco this wk, that EU fishermen will not be "sold out" in order to secure a future relationship deal, and that if there is a deal it will not be ratified unless the UK "remove" Internal Mkt Bill clauses

2/ Speaking at the General Affairs Council Mr Coveney said: “We value fishermen, we value their contribution across the EU and cerainly EU fishermen are not going to be sold out in an effort to get an agreement on a future relationship with the UK on trade.”

3/ He said that while there had been some progress on the level playing field area, there had been “little or no” movement on fisheries. Both sides, he said, had legitimate concerns on the issue.

4/ Mr Coveney had bilateral meetings with both @MichelBarnier and @MarosSefcovic

5/ “There was a very clear message that if we do manage to negotiate a deal on a future relationship agreement that involves many different areas, before that deal can be ratified or finalised, the domestic legislation that the UK has introduced...

Brexit. A Eurovision Negotiating Contest. How are the contestants doing? To read the UK press you’d be forgiven for being ... completely misinformed. We’re lurching into a crisis on a scale not seen since at least 1956 & probably 1945. Here’s what’s really going on. A thread./1.

For a number of key journalists, their only job is to take dictation from the 10 Downing Street spokesman & give it to the Times, Telegraph or Spectator for publishing. This is part of a therapy effort for the small minority of the population who read those publications & .../2.

... would otherwise be confused by being confronted with the reality of the world around them. The articles are interesting for two reasons:

⁃They tell you precisely what 10 Downing Street currently wants those readers, which include other journalists, to hear. /3.

⁃Looking at their detailed content, such as it is, shows just how possible a “deal” quite obviously is & how nonsensical a “no deal” would be. They also (if you’re familiar with a bit of background, which you surely are) highlight just how bad a “deal” of the sort .../4.

... the government envisages - a massive climb down from the UK’s extraordinarily privileged position in the EU’s customs union & single market - would be for the UK. And how a “no deal” would be even worse - substantially so - than such a (really awful) “deal”. /5.

It's OUT! My latest #Brexit Briefing for @FinancialTimes - examining @BorisJohnson
"buy now, pay later" Northern Ireland Protocol, why the EU-UK trust deficit is killing it, how that can be restored - because it needs to work. /1

@BorisJohnson The danger here is that lingering animus over the opportunistic nature Johnson's Faustian bargain - dividing his Kingdom in order to 'get #Brexit done' and win an 80-seat majority - is clouding judgement on both sides of the Channel /2

@BorisJohnson The facts of the Protocol are no less true for Johnson's constant denial of them - that there would be checks, that there really is a trade border that now prevents plants and pets from travelling freely from Bedford to Ballymena as M.Gove reminds us. But these are other facts/3

@BorisJohnson Firstly, NI remains part of UK, even if it is now has EU customs rules.

Secondly, NI remains politically divided and fragile; the Good Friday Agreement is a constant work in progress.

Thirdly, both the EU and the UK agreed to this unsatisfactory arrangement jointly. /4

@BorisJohnson Fourthly, therefore, they have a joint responsibility to make it work because

Fifthly - and most importantly — there is no alternative to it. /5

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,

The fuel injected Brexiter comments on the EU's vaccine problems miss many points.

1) no-one wanted to get out of the EU or the single market to protect ourselves better against a pandemic. See Brexit Tory controlled government policy 2016-2020 regarding the NHS and pandemic preparedness.

2) we could have, and, perhaps thanks to the need to genuflect to nationalists, or out of pragmatic needs, chosen to go our own way on procurement even within the EU.

3) none of this explains why it's good to be outside the single market, restricting our trade and making us poorer.

4) the implicit celebration of the vaccine nationalist cause, seemingly [but not actually] permitted by Brexit, ignores how this game plays out, namely: