They "survive" the 'tough' training, they don't thrive under it.
The "tough/hardass" coaching model occasionally works on the HS/college level because athletes have no control.
It largely fails on the pro level because athletes have more autonomy & understand their value
Pro's want to be treated as people, not subordinates.
Why? A thread:
They "survive" the 'tough' training, they don't thrive under it.
1. Feel like you belong
2. Feel like you can make progress
3. Feel like you have some control over your life (autonomy)
That doesn't come from a coach or someone dictating and directing. Over the long haul, it has to come from within.
Over time, you erode self-motivation and have to replace it with something else, or else you lose people.
That something else if often more extrinsic motivation.
A high chance to win supplements some of the lost motivation, temporarily at least.
But as I said, you have to replace that loss of motivation provided via autonomy with something. And that something often is short term.
They found that having an "abusive leader" as a coach changed the trajectory of players careers.
They had more technical fouls and worse performance over the trajectory of their career.
Players trajectories, in terms of player efficiency metrics, shifted downwards
https://t.co/dqpknRc3vc
The style wears on you. It pushes you away from intrinsic motivation.
More from For later read
Excited we finally have a draft of this paper, which attempts to provide a 'unifying theory' of the long economic divergence between the Middle East & Western Europe
As we see it, there are 3 recent theories that hit on important aspects of the divergence...
1/
One set of theories focus on the legitimating power of Islam (Rubin, @prof_ahmetkuru, Platteau). This gave religious clerics greater power, which pulled political resources away form those encouraging economic development
But these theories leave some questions unanswered...
2/
Religious legitimacy is only effective if people
care what religious authorities dictate. Given the economic consequences, why do people remain religious, and thereby render religious legitimacy effective? Is religiosity a cause or a consequence of institutional arrangements?
3/
Another set of theories focus on the religious proscriptions of Islam, particular those associated with Islamic law (@timurkuran). These laws were appropriate for the setting they formed but had unforeseeable consequences and failed to change as economic circumstances changed
4/
There are unaddressed questions here, too
Muslim rulers must have understood that Islamic law carried proscriptions that hampered economic development. Why, then, did they continue to use Islamic institutions (like courts) that promoted inefficiencies?
5/
As we see it, there are 3 recent theories that hit on important aspects of the divergence...
1/
New CEPR Discussion Paper - DP15802
— CEPR (@cepr_org) February 14, 2021
Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence@albertobisin @nyuniversity, Jared Rubin @jaredcrubin @ChapmanU, Avner Seror @SerorAvner @amseaixmars @univamu, Thierry Verdier @PSEinfohttps://t.co/lhs6AJb7jE#CEPR_DE, #CEPR_EH, #CEPR_ITRE pic.twitter.com/FtMzAELljJ
One set of theories focus on the legitimating power of Islam (Rubin, @prof_ahmetkuru, Platteau). This gave religious clerics greater power, which pulled political resources away form those encouraging economic development
But these theories leave some questions unanswered...
2/
Religious legitimacy is only effective if people
care what religious authorities dictate. Given the economic consequences, why do people remain religious, and thereby render religious legitimacy effective? Is religiosity a cause or a consequence of institutional arrangements?
3/
Another set of theories focus on the religious proscriptions of Islam, particular those associated with Islamic law (@timurkuran). These laws were appropriate for the setting they formed but had unforeseeable consequences and failed to change as economic circumstances changed
4/
There are unaddressed questions here, too
Muslim rulers must have understood that Islamic law carried proscriptions that hampered economic development. Why, then, did they continue to use Islamic institutions (like courts) that promoted inefficiencies?
5/
There is some valuable analysis in this report, but on the defense front this report is deeply flawed. There are other sections of value in report but, candidly, I don't think it helps us think through critical question of Taiwan defense issues in clear & well-grounded way. 1/
Normally as it might seem churlish to be so critical, but @cfr is so high-profile & the co-authors so distinguished I think it’s key to be clear. If not, people - including in Beijing - could get the wrong idea & this report could do real harm if influential on defense issues. 2/
BLUF: The defense discussion in this report does not engage at the depth needed to add to this critical debate. Accordingly conclusions in report are ill-founded - & in key parts harmful/misleading, esp that US shldnt be prepared defend Taiwan directly (alongside own efforts). 3/
The root of the problem is that report doesn't engage w the real debate on TWN defense issues or, frankly, the facts as knowable in public. Perhaps the most direct proof of this: The citations. There is nothing in the citations to @DeptofDefense China Military Power Report...4/
Nor to vast majority of leading informed sources on this like Ochmanek, the @RANDCorporation Scorecard, @CNAS, etc. This is esp salient b/c co-authors by their own admission have v little insight into contemporary military issues. & both last served in govt in Bush 43. 5/
This is an excellent report, and I'm glad to have joined the study group. The central focus on avoiding war is understandable--a US-China war would be catastrophic and should be avoided. But protecting Taiwan's security and prosperity requires doing more. 1/x https://t.co/P0Sg4LJcpV
— Bonnie Glaser / \u845b\u4f86\u5100 (@BonnieGlaser) February 12, 2021
Normally as it might seem churlish to be so critical, but @cfr is so high-profile & the co-authors so distinguished I think it’s key to be clear. If not, people - including in Beijing - could get the wrong idea & this report could do real harm if influential on defense issues. 2/
BLUF: The defense discussion in this report does not engage at the depth needed to add to this critical debate. Accordingly conclusions in report are ill-founded - & in key parts harmful/misleading, esp that US shldnt be prepared defend Taiwan directly (alongside own efforts). 3/
The root of the problem is that report doesn't engage w the real debate on TWN defense issues or, frankly, the facts as knowable in public. Perhaps the most direct proof of this: The citations. There is nothing in the citations to @DeptofDefense China Military Power Report...4/
Nor to vast majority of leading informed sources on this like Ochmanek, the @RANDCorporation Scorecard, @CNAS, etc. This is esp salient b/c co-authors by their own admission have v little insight into contemporary military issues. & both last served in govt in Bush 43. 5/
