The economic impact of the Brexit deal: our

Key points to remember:

1. Leaving Single Market/Customs Union means major new trade barriers - customs and border checks, regulatory barriers, end of rules allowing services to be sold across borders.
2. A deal doesn't change that. It means no tariffs and quotas and *some* provisions that will stop trade breaking down. But the main impacts -on our and the government's own analysis, about two-thirds - happen either way
3. That also means that some disruption is inevitable. You can't introduce new systems/processes overnight. The delay in doing a deal plus covid means some things will go wrong
4. But short term disruption, even if it gets headlines, does *not* mean Brexit is a failure. And when that disruption is resolved and new systems are working, we should*not* conclude it's a success.
5. It is the medium)long term impact that matters. Our analysis, and that if government economists, and other independent economists, is that this Brexit deal will reduce growth/productivity/wages/incomes, perhaps by 4-6%, over 10-15 years - so knocking maybe 0.5% a year off
6. Lots of uncertainty here but there really is little/no doubt Brexit will make us (somewhat/ poorer than we would otherwise be. Erecting major new trade barriers -which is what Brexit does - does that.
7. But the impacts will mount over time, the UK economy will continue to grow nevertheless, and other things - AI, net zero - will have large and maybe larger impacts at the same time. Economically, Brexit will be a slow slow puncture, not a blow out.
8. The UK economy will adapt - economies do. And future policy choices will matter a lot. Plenty of work to do (for economists and others!) ENDS

More from Economy

1/ Trend Factor: Any Economic Gains from Using Information over Investment Horizons? (Han, Zhou, Zhu)

"A trend factor using multiple time lengths outperforms ST reversal, momentum, and LT reversal, which are based on the three price trends separately."

https://t.co/udkvsdw2Lz


2/ This resembles combining multiple measures of ST reversal, momentum, and LT reversal (forecasts determined by walking forward rather than using signs from the full sample).

Unlike normal moving average signals, these are *cross-sectional.* More below:
https://t.co/wkIFLg9jtK


3/ Unsurprisingly, the Trend factor formed by this approach outperforms benchmarks in terms of both Sharpe ratio and tail metrics. It's combining momentum with two factors that are negatively correlated to it AND using multiple specifications.

More here:
https://t.co/x8Tloz3iyL


4/ "Average return and volatility of the trend factor are both higher in recession periods. However, the Sharpe ratio is virtually the same.

"Interestingly, all of the factors still have positive average returns.

"Momentum experiences the greatest increase in volatility."


5/ "In terms of maximum drawdown and the Calmar ratio, the trend factor performs the best.

"The trend factor is correlated with the short-term reversal factor (35%), long-term reversal factor (14%), and the market (20%) but is virtually uncorrelated with the momentum factor."
In this paper, we study vote choices of voters who are left-wing on economic issues and authoritarian/nationalist on cultural issues, especially immigration. For these voters, there is no often party combining positions in this way.


In the data from the Campaign Panel of the German Election Study 2017, many voters prefer higher social benefits and taxes and want to restrict immigration. @ches_data show that no party bundles issue positions in this way.


In the article, we show that many such “left-authoritarians” perceive the party they voted for to also hold a left-authoritarian position. Interestingly, this includes many AfD voters who report a perceived left-wing economic position of the party.


Our statistical models study the interplay between this (mis-)perceived congruence and issue importance, using an open-ended question on the most important political problem in Germany.

We find that (mis-)perceived congruence and issue importance interactively shape the left-authoritarian vote. Simply, perceived congruence matters more on an important issue—and issue salience matters most if voters accurately perceive incongruent party supply.

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