My very initial thoughts on the huge liquid fuel Missile displayed by North Korea. My estimates are likely within a plus/minus 10%, and loaded with some basic engineering assumptions. Much remains to be learned.... 1/n

The TEL has 11 axels, two more than Hwasong-15 TEL which is about 22m. These large vehicles are designed to be modular, so two additional axels, roughly 1.8 -2.0 m in length, were likely inserted, giving a new length of 25-26 m. The missile is about the same, 25-26 m long. 2/n
Diameter is more difficult to estimate from photos, but seems to be between 2.5 and 2.9 m. Resulting in a missile lift-off mass of 100-150 tonnes. Let’s take the middle values, 2.7m diameter and mass of ~125 tonnes. 3/n
Further assume the missile’s first stage is powered cluster of four RD-250 type chambers/engines for total sea level thrust of ~160 tonnes. This is twice that of the Hwasong-15. Lift off acceleration is then about 1.3 Gs, or thereabouts. Reasonably typical value for ICBMs. 4/n
If these estimates are close to reality, the missile, in principle, could deliver 2000 -3500 kg to any point on CONUS. This is more capable than Soviet R-16 or R-26 ICBMs that we’re never deployed. These systems had a first stage diameter of 2.7m, tho 2nd stage was smaller 5/n
Further, the old Soviet design had slightly less powerful, four chamber predecessor engines to the RD-250. 6/n
If this new missile uses auxiliary steering engine on F/S the throw weight grows. But, big question centers on S/S propulsion. Perhaps a Modified single chamber RD-250 with nozzle extensions? Performance estimates will vary significantly based on S/S assumptions. End.

More from World

Watch the entire discussion if you have the time to do so. But if not, please make sure to watch Edhem Eldem summarizing ~150 years of democracy in Turkey in 6 minutes (starting on 57'). And if you can't watch it, fear not; I've transcribed it for you (as public service). Thread:


"Let me start by saying that I am a historian, I see dead people. But more seriously, I am constantly torn between the temptation to see patterns developing over time, and the fear of hasty generalizations and anachronistic comparisons. 1/n

"Nevertheless, the present situation forces me to explore the possible historical dimensions of the problem we're facing today. 2/n

"(...)I intend to go further back in time and widen the angle in order to focus on the confusion I  believe exists between the notions of 'state', 'government', and 'public institutions' in Turkey. 3/n

"In the summer of 1876, that's a historical quote, as Midhat Pasa was trying to draft a constitution, Edhem Pasa wrote to Saffet Pasa, and I quote in Turkish, 'Bize Konstitusyon degil enstitusyon lazim' ('It is not a constitution we need but institutions'). 4/n
A quick thread on #Myitsone dam & #MyanmarChinaRelations in light of the SAC announcement that they would be restarting some stalled Chinese projects in Burma. This announcement has led to speculation about Myitsone, which has been suspended since 2011. Let’s go! ➡️ China has


consistently misunderstood & underestimated popular opposition to Myitsone. First and foremost, to the Burmese people, this is about the “mother river” of Burma - the Irrawaddy- and it’s nearly sacred importance to them as a lifeline of their country. This is what drove the

organic anti-dam movement that started locally in Kachin but +/- 2007 was effectively picked up & nationalized by Burmese environmental CSOs. Instead of understanding this, the Chinese lashed out and blamed the United States when Thein Sein suspended the project. I assure you

the USG was as surprised as China when the project was suspended. But China never believed it was truly the desire of the Burmese people that stopped the project. Today, the dam doesn’t make sense economically for Beijing & will definitely alienate Burmese, yet they stubbornly

continue to push it. Why? Let’s unpack a bit further. In addition to Myitsone, there were other campaigns & protests targeting Chinese projects such as Letpadaung copper mine & Kyaukphyu pipeline, port & SEZ. While these campaigns had varying levels off effect, none was as

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“We don’t negotiate salaries” is a negotiation tactic.

Always. No, your company is not an exception.

A tactic I don’t appreciate at all because of how unfairly it penalizes low-leverage, junior employees, and those loyal enough not to question it, but that’s negotiation for you after all. Weaponized information asymmetry.

Listen to Aditya


And by the way, you should never be worried that an offer would be withdrawn if you politely negotiate.

I have seen this happen *extremely* rarely, mostly to women, and anyway is a giant red flag. It suggests you probably didn’t want to work there.

You wish there was no negotiating so it would all be more fair? I feel you, but it’s not happening.

Instead, negotiate hard, use your privilege, and then go and share numbers with your underrepresented and underpaid colleagues. […]