1/ Regulations are ultimately about managing risk, whether that risk is fraud, unsafe practices or someone building an ugly building.
The more (actually or performatively) worried you are about the specific risk, the more checks, approvals, rules and guidelines you put in place.
Their regulations tend to assume that management are bastards, and must be monitored and constrained lest they exploit people or generate negative externalities for profit.
Their regulations tend to assume folks are out to scam any benefits scheme, and must be monitored and constrained lest they take advantage of the tax-payer's generosity.
The specific behaviors targeted tend to be different (criminalizing hate speech vs criminalizing drug use, for example), but it's still all regulation.
Because cutting regulations on something you don't think should be controlled is harder administratively and politically than new rules on an area you think is too lax, the democratic back and forth tends to lead to ever increasing aggregate levels of regulation.
"We want to (largely performatively) trim some regulation in the areas we aren't worried about, but we'll be adding much more in the areas we are."
Transparency, digitization, single windows, removing arbitrary gatekeepers, and removing pointless redundancy. /end
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The entire discussion around Facebook’s disclosures of what happened in 2016 is very frustrating. No exec stopped any investigations, but there were a lot of heated discussions about what to publish and when.
In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.
In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.
The story doesn\u2019t say you were told not to... it says you did so without approval and they tried to obfuscate what you found. Is that true?
— Sarah Frier (@sarahfrier) November 15, 2018
In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.
In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.
