As I have been writing since 2011, China’s development lending was always likely to follow the pattern of other countries when they first “went out” (e.g. the US in the 1920s, USSR in the 1950s, Japan in the late 1970s). Because of little historical...
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Good article. But while growing international criticism and rising trade tensions may have had some impact, as the article suggests, I don’t think they really explain the great reversal in BRI lending of the past few years.
As I have been writing since 2011, China’s development lending was always likely to follow the pattern of other countries when they first “went out” (e.g. the US in the 1920s, USSR in the 1950s, Japan in the late 1970s). Because of little historical...
knowledge and no previous experience, an early rapid rise in development lending would be driven mainly by underestimating risk and an overestimation of their own business "success" in making loans, and would of course be further supported by geopolitical ambitions.
This combination would inevitably lead to bad lending decisions, followed just as inevitably by debt restructuring, loan losses, and a contraction in development lending. In the 1920s, for example, the US set off quite explicitly and aggressively to displace England in...
Latin America, and American businesses and banks assumed they “understood” Latin America much better than the English did, in spite of the vast English experience there, but their early displacement of British lending only resulted in the huge loan losses of the 1930s.
The impression I get from Chinese friends involved in the lending process is that the real shock for Beijing occurred in 2014-15, when cratering oil prices left Venezuela in tatters, and China was forced reluctantly to provide first $4 billion in 2014 and then another $5...
billion in 2015 in cash-for-oil deals.
These and all its previous Venezuelan loans were then restructured for 3 years (and restructured again 3 years later). A friend of mine working on the deal told me at the time that all Latin American lending was now coming under...
much tighter scrutiny, and that there would be no new lending to Venezuela.
It is not surprising to me at all that this is when BRI lending peaked and began subsequently to fall. I don’t think Venezuela was the first loan...
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$600/wk Unemployment Insurance cannot deliver the benefits of a $600/wk Job Guarantee. From the outset, I should say JG is not a replacement for UI, no matter what you may have heard. I’ll get to this later, but read this long 🧶 w/ that in mind.
Automatic stabilization: Both $600/wk UI and JG will provide counter cyclical spending. But UI will be weaker. Counter-cyclical stabilization is not just about the absence of income. It is also about the transmission and structure of economy
Firms don't like to hire the unemployed. Mass and long-term unemployment make the problem worse. JG would recover labor markets much faster than a UI of the same amount, both b/c of the higher direct, induced & tertiary employment effects & b/c of private firm hiring preferences.
JG stabilizes spending patterns better. Uncertain job prospects may mean more cautious spending from the unemployed compared to those w/ guaranteed jobs.
UI is temporary, which makes matters worse. Even if it were permanent, it still won't resolve the problem of job scarcity.
Nations who once achieved tight full employment through active labor market policies demonstrate that unemployment does NOT fluctuate the same way it does w/o them. Direct employment, ELR type policies diminish drastically/even eliminate these amplitudes (eg postwar Japan/Sweden)
Surprised so many smart people bought into the idea that $600/wk UI is the same as $600/wk job guarantee (or better) or that JG jobs must be inherently inessential. I\u2019ve addressed this many times & will post a thread later. Trying not to spend precious family time on Twitter.
— Pavlina R Tcherneva (@ptcherneva) December 29, 2020
Automatic stabilization: Both $600/wk UI and JG will provide counter cyclical spending. But UI will be weaker. Counter-cyclical stabilization is not just about the absence of income. It is also about the transmission and structure of economy
Firms don't like to hire the unemployed. Mass and long-term unemployment make the problem worse. JG would recover labor markets much faster than a UI of the same amount, both b/c of the higher direct, induced & tertiary employment effects & b/c of private firm hiring preferences.
JG stabilizes spending patterns better. Uncertain job prospects may mean more cautious spending from the unemployed compared to those w/ guaranteed jobs.
UI is temporary, which makes matters worse. Even if it were permanent, it still won't resolve the problem of job scarcity.
Nations who once achieved tight full employment through active labor market policies demonstrate that unemployment does NOT fluctuate the same way it does w/o them. Direct employment, ELR type policies diminish drastically/even eliminate these amplitudes (eg postwar Japan/Sweden)
It's always been detached, and it's always made the real economy worse.
[THREAD] 1/10
What is profit? It's excess labor.
You and your coworkers make a chair. Your boss sells that chair for more than he pays for the production of that chair and pockets the extra money.
So he pays you less than what he should and calls the unpaid labor he took "profit." 2/10
Well, the stock market adds a layer to that.
So now, when you work, it isn't just your boss that is siphoning off your excess labor but it is also all the shareholders.
There's a whole class of people who now rely on you to produce those chairs without fair compensation. 3/10
And in order to support these people, you and your coworkers need to up your productivity. More hours etc.
But Wall Street demands endless growth in order to keep the game going, so that's not enough.
So as your productivity increases, your relative wages suffer. 4/10
Not because the goods don't have value or because your labor is worth less. Often it's actually worth more because you've had to become incredibly productive in order to keep your job.
No, your wages suffer because there are so many people who need to profit from your work. 5/10
[THREAD] 1/10
I know people think this is fun but -- why do we have a stock market? So productive firms can raise capital to do useful things. Detaching stock price from fundamental value (Gamestop is now worth almost as much as Best Buy) makes the markets serve the real economy worse.
— Josh Barro (@jbarro) January 27, 2021
What is profit? It's excess labor.
You and your coworkers make a chair. Your boss sells that chair for more than he pays for the production of that chair and pockets the extra money.
So he pays you less than what he should and calls the unpaid labor he took "profit." 2/10
Well, the stock market adds a layer to that.
So now, when you work, it isn't just your boss that is siphoning off your excess labor but it is also all the shareholders.
There's a whole class of people who now rely on you to produce those chairs without fair compensation. 3/10
And in order to support these people, you and your coworkers need to up your productivity. More hours etc.
But Wall Street demands endless growth in order to keep the game going, so that's not enough.
So as your productivity increases, your relative wages suffer. 4/10
Not because the goods don't have value or because your labor is worth less. Often it's actually worth more because you've had to become incredibly productive in order to keep your job.
No, your wages suffer because there are so many people who need to profit from your work. 5/10
