1/10

The latest IMF report on China was released yesterday and provides a lot of good information and intelligent insight on the Chinese economy. The IMF’s measure of China’s adjusted fiscal deficit (including estimated off-budget

2/10

spending) is projected to rise to 18.2% of GDP in 2020 from 12.6% in 2019. The authors correctly note the worrying surge in debt and warn that Beijing must continue to try to contain financial stability risks, but I notice that they are projecting average GDP...
3/10

growth of just over 6% between 2012 and 2025, including a downward revision of their 2021 forecast from 8.2% to 7.9% (which I still think is a little high).

As I’ve long argued, it will be impossible for China both to control the surge in debt and to achieve growth...
4/10

targets above the real underlying growth rate of the economy, which I suspect is 2-3% at best. I know the IMF is constrained in what it is able to say about the Chinese economy if it wants to remain part of the advisory process, but I do think that after 10 years...
5/10

of watching this game we should be a lot more explicit about the relationship between unreasonably high GDP growth targets and high credit growth. There really is no point in advising Beijing to get financial risks under control while at the same time approving...
6/10

GDP growth targets that cannot but result in out-of-control increase in debt. The former requires the latter: if China grows by an average of 6% over the next five years, total social financing will rise from roughly 280% of GDP today to at least 320-40% of GDP.
7/10

The IMF also recommends that China do more to rebalance domestic demand towards consumption, which Beijing has been saying it would do since at least 2007. To do so it proposes expanding unemployment benefits, increasing transfers to low income households, enhancing...
8/10

public healthcare and otherwise strengthening the social safety net. This all makes sense, of course, but it is only half the story. Transfers involve not just “transfers to” but also “transfers from”. If Beijing permits these transfers to be funded by local government...
9/10

borrowing, as they always have been, it cannot resolve the underlying problem. Higher consumption only comes at the expense, in that case, of more local-government debt, and the whole point of rebalancing is to get Chinese growth to depend less on debt. I understand...
10/10

that this is an intensely political problem and very hard to resolve, which is perhaps why the IMF is staying clear of it, but the key to rebalancing demand, just as the key to resolving debt, is how to allocate the costs. The benefits are obvious.

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1/“What would need to be true for you to….X”

Why is this the most powerful question you can ask when attempting to reach an agreement with another human being or organization?

A thread, co-written by @deanmbrody:


2/ First, “X” could be lots of things. Examples: What would need to be true for you to

- “Feel it's in our best interest for me to be CMO"
- “Feel that we’re in a good place as a company”
- “Feel that we’re on the same page”
- “Feel that we both got what we wanted from this deal

3/ Normally, we aren’t that direct. Example from startup/VC land:

Founders leave VC meetings thinking that every VC will invest, but they rarely do.

Worse over, the founders don’t know what they need to do in order to be fundable.

4/ So why should you ask the magic Q?

To get clarity.

You want to know where you stand, and what it takes to get what you want in a way that also gets them what they want.

It also holds them (mentally) accountable once the thing they need becomes true.

5/ Staying in the context of soliciting investors, the question is “what would need to be true for you to want to invest (or partner with us on this journey, etc)?”

Multiple responses to this question are likely to deliver a positive result.