1/10

The latest IMF report on China was released yesterday and provides a lot of good information and intelligent insight on the Chinese economy. The IMF’s measure of China’s adjusted fiscal deficit (including estimated off-budget

1/9

China is aging so rapidly that it urgently needs to address the problem of a rapidly declining work force in a slowly declining population. To give an idea of relative population changes among the three most populous countries, today

2/9

are 4.3 Chinese for every American and 4.7 Chinese of working age (ages 15-64), while there is just over 1 Chinese for every Indian and 1.1 Chinese of working age.

By the end of the century, however, there are expected to be 2.5 Chinese for every American and...

3/9

just 2.4 Chinese of working age, while there will be 1.4 Indians for every Chinese and 1.5 Indians of working age. Over the rest of this century, in other words, while China’s population declines quite rapidly relative to that of the two other most populous countries, it...

4/9

also switches from having a much better dependency ratio than either to having a worse one than either, with far more of its dependents being the elderly rather than children. In effect its working age population will drop by half relative to those of the other two.

5/9

This is going to be a very tough problem to resolve, although to the extent China succeeds, it will be very useful as an example for other countries. I am not sure they are going about it the right way, however. Making seniors make better use of smart technology sounds...

1/9

Good article. But while growing international criticism and rising trade tensions may have had some impact, as the article suggests, I don’t think they really explain the great reversal in BRI lending of the past few years.

2/9

As I have been writing since 2011, China’s development lending was always likely to follow the pattern of other countries when they first “went out” (e.g. the US in the 1920s, USSR in the 1950s, Japan in the late 1970s). Because of little historical...

3/9

knowledge and no previous experience, an early rapid rise in development lending would be driven mainly by underestimating risk and an overestimation of their own business "success" in making loans, and would of course be further supported by geopolitical ambitions.

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This combination would inevitably lead to bad lending decisions, followed just as inevitably by debt restructuring, loan losses, and a contraction in development lending. In the 1920s, for example, the US set off quite explicitly and aggressively to displace England in...

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Latin America, and American businesses and banks assumed they “understood” Latin America much better than the English did, in spite of the vast English experience there, but their early displacement of British lending only resulted in the huge loan losses of the 1930s.

1/11

An article worth thinking about: “As changes to the world structure accelerate, China’s rule is in sharp contrast with the turmoil in the West,” says Beijing.

I agree, but I draw a different conclusion. The world is certainly currently

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through "a period of turbulent change", in Beijing’s words, and great structural adjustments, but usually when that happens, what matters in the long run is not how stable a system seems but rather how successfully political, economic and social institutions adjust to...

3/11

the new conditions. In the past these adjustments have almost always been messy, chaotic, and disheartening to most, but ultimately they were necessary even if we were unable to judge them so at the time.

I would argue that the world today is undergoing both a reversal...

4/11

and rejection of the current model of globalization and an urgent need for most countries in the world, including China, to initiate a major rebalancing of the way income and wealth (and ultimately political power) is distributed, but there are few if any historical...

5/11

precedents in which this level of restructuring and rebalancing have been neat or orderly.

Beijing's response, which is to do whatever it takes to maintain stability, may look good in the short term, as this strategy always does, but if it prevents the necessary...

1/9

While debt-to-GDP ratios already have a limited but very misunderstood use, it seems economists are finding bright new ways of misunderstanding them. Now we say that when nominal interest rates are lower than nominal growth rates, the

2/9

downward pressure on the debt-to-GDP ratio makes rising government debt and larger government deficits more sustainable and more easily justified.

This is totally confused. When the nominal interest rate is lower than the nominal GDP growth rate, it only means that net...

3/9

borrowers are getting a disproportionate share of growth relative to net lenders. This in and of itself changes the comparability of the debt-to-GDP ratio, so the fact that the ratio may decline tells us nothing about its sustainability which, I'm glad to say, isn't...

4/9

a mistake Olivier Blanchard makes in this article.

At least three things matter. First, whether or not rising debt is sustainable depends almost wholly on underlying conditions in the real economy, and only trivially on the arithmetical relationship between...

5/9

the interest rate and the growth rate. Second, this approach simply assumes away financial distress costs, in which case debt capacity is infinite anyway and the interest rate becomes irrelevant. And third, it assumes that the nominal debt level matters independently...

1/10

This is a really tough problem to resolve, especially if the massive increase in inflows from the trade and financial accounts are sustained, as I expect they will be well into 2021.

Clearly the PBoC would like to see the RMB gradually...

2/10

strengthen. This would keep financial markets stable and promote rebalancing, but the RMB has already strengthened a lot, and this puts unwanted pressure on exporters and “international circulation”.

Although PBoC reserves have been flat, other state-controlled Chinese...

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banks have bought large amounts of dollars, but this is expensive. If these banks have half a trillion dollars of exposure, for example, they are losing at least $15-17 billion annually on negative carry, plus another $20-30 billion just this year from the rise of the RMB.

4/10

Beijing seems also to be trying other measures to slow the rise. The regulators are relaxing capital controls on outflows. In mid October the PBoC cut to zero the reserve requirement ratio for banks doing FX forward trading. This requirement was created in 2018 to reduce...

5/10

downward pressure on the RMB. In late October it suspended the counter-cyclical factor in RMB fixing, which was introduced in 2017 also to reduce downward currency pressure. But in both cases while the RMB dropped a few pips on the news, it quickly resumed its upward climb.

Thread on Invisible China: Scott Rozelle and Natalie Hell's illuminating and scary deep dive into rural China's ills and stark inequality. No matter how bad you think it is, it's worse there---more like a developing country than a global superpower. 1/n

2/Rozelle rolled up his sleeves to understand the CN most only see from plane or train windows. Issues in health and education, bringing down human capital of 300m rural Chinese, could trap it in middle income status.

Think future like Mexico/Turkey now, not Korea/Taiwan

3/Most focus on impressive elite universities and high schools topping int'l rankings, but CN average education levels are abysmal.

Only 30% of China's working age pop completed high school--last place for all middle income countries, worse than many poor countries!

4/TIL a startling fact: school in CN through grade 9 became free & mandatory only in 2006! Even today high school is not free in CN! Want to go through grade 12? Pay fees of 10-15x incomes for poor rural areas. Instead they drop out to work unskilled jobs. Xi has promised to fix

5/No country has escaped middle income trap below 50% HS grad rates, and avg for successful countries (now high income) is 76%. Why? HS skills not important for repetitive assembly jobs, but w/o ability to learn & basic skills in math and reading, can't do more productive jobs

Enough Jaw Jaw, this is War!
1. People's Justice Courts to be set up worldwide
2. Citizens' arrests of all Identified Suspects
3. Lab Inspections
3. Harsh interrogation using MKULTRA
4. Public Show Trials video streamed live
5. Cross Questioning of suspects via Twitter & Zoom
6.

A growing list of suspects to be interrogated

Foul Traitors, Charlatans, Frauds, Bat Molesters! Frankensteins, Well Poisoners, Plotters, Deceivers!
Dr. Shipmans, Saboteurs, Devils in White Coats!

Organisations to be Investigated
WIV
Wuhan University IMA
WIBP
WCDC
BEIJING IPB
Nanjing Military Lab
SinoPharm
BARDA
NIH
EMERGENT BIOSOLUTIONS
BIOPORT
GILEAD
SIAC
QTEL
USAMRIID
FORT DETRICK
DARPA
DTRA
Metbiota
ONE HEALTH
GVP
ECOHEALTH
MITRE
BATTELLE
TUNNELL
LAURIMA GOV SERVICES

Suspects (1)
China
Zhengli Shi
Peng Zhou
George Gao
Deyin Guo
Major General Chen Wei
United States
ALEX AZAR
JONNA MAZET
ALISON O’TOOLE
ANTHONY FAUCI
BOYD YOUNT
DAVID FRANZ
DAVID KARESH
DENNIS CARROLL
DYLAN GEORGE
GEORGE PAINTER
IAN LIPKIN
JENS KUHN
JEROME HAUER
JONATHAN EPSTEIN

THREAD #Serbian #Orthodox #Church bishops start Conclave (#Sabor-Holy Assembly in #SPC parlance) to elect new #Patriarch, 3 months after previous died of #Covid. Election much more about politics than religion, mainly #Serbia #Kosovo relations but also #Russia Orthodox Church /2

2/ vs. #Ecumenical Patriarch of #Constantinople. Most of numerous traditional cleavages within SPC (Young Lions vs. Old Guards); Serbians vs. TransDrinians; ecumenicals vs. hardline Orthodox etc. will be irrelevant with only the split between Russian vs. Greek students, roughly/3

3/corresponding with main division: support for whatever "solution" President Vucic might propose to satisfy int'l demand to at least de facto recognize Kosovo vs. stubborn refusal to accept anything not in line with current Serbian constitution that says #KosovoJeSrbija. /4

4/Due to 3 decades of heavy politicking under 1 weak Patriarch (Pavle) & his insipid successor (Irinej), those who’d otherwise be God-obeying “good guys” are staunchly in Kosovo Status Quo camp, refusing any deal. Those bishops who were in bed with politicians & secret services/5

5/ now support “accommodation” with Kosovo. Voting system is peculiar: Conclave picks 3 eligible bishops (each needs to obtain simple majority of votes i.e. 23); names of top 3 are sealed & 1 is drawn. System was designed in Communist times to prevent manipulation. Both sides /6

💥🇸🇪The Sweden “Problem” SOLVED!🇸🇪💥

Or, how does a biased world rid itself of the best example of a non-lockdown control for its horrible lockdown experiment?

Simple! CHANGE THE DATA.

Of course we all know Sweden has been a battleground regarding its mild voluntary lockdown strategy versus the heavy lockdowns of most of the EU. Inconvenient graphs like this one are quite a thorn in Team Lockdown’s side. Sweden fewer deaths/M, much better quality of life.

When I did some analysis in the Spring and Fall, I looked at Oxford’s stringency index as a proxy for lockdown severity. And sure enough Sweden was significantly lower stringency than all other EU countries.

Here is a plot tracking stringency for the UK, Finland Norway and Sweden. I added Norway and Finland because Team Lockdown loves to reply to Sweden threads with “but Norway but Finland”! When I plotted this in October we see Sweden’s Spring stringency was comparatively low.

But then I just happened to plot this again yesterday. What the heck? Sweden is no longer a mild-response country! It is only slightly less stringent than the UK! And the “but Norway Finland” argument is now moot! Look how much less stringent they’ve been!