Scoop...Britain faces dearer electricity and occasional black-outs if it bans EU fishing boats from its waters after 2026. This de facto power over the UK power market is handed to the EU in the post-Brexit deal which MP’s will wave almost unread through parliament today. 1/10

Your regular reminder that Brexit is going badly because the UK has still to decide what the purpose of leaving the EU is

1/

#EUref came about as piece of party mgt by Cameron, rather than as culmination of considered and structured debate about UK's place in the world

2/

Yes, we talked a lot (A LOT) about 'Europe' and the EU, but primarily as a function of lots of other things

A touchstone of dissent, if you will (h/t @PaulAdamTaggart)

3/

Referendum campaigns on both sides were simply about getting people to vote their way, not efforts to set out settled plans of What Comes Next

"Vote for us and everything will be dandy" is not a plan

4/

That might have been alright if post-vote there had been a national discussion on how to proceed in an inclusive manner, but instead the political logic pointed to trying to capture the meaning of it all to serve particular agendas

All very majoritarian, as per

5/

I really can’t see how, after the last four and half years, the breakup of the UK can be avoided. What a historical irony that a Brexit intended to make Britain ‘great again’ actually brings about the demise of ‘Great’ Britain.

I actually don’t see this as a bad thing. After all, the aggressive chauvinistic nationalism, hubris, and exceptionalism that made Brexit possible is predominantly an English phenomenon. Part of the historical paradox whereby Englishness expresses itself through Britishness,

without explicitly recognising that this nationalism is primarily embedded in England rather than the Celtic periphery. A United Ireland is long overdue. Scotland - regardless of the debates about the economic viability of independence- has reached the point when a decisive

breach now seems inevitable. If this happens, Wales may well follow. Then, finally, England will have to decide what it wants to be, and look at the flaws and failings - political, economic, and constitutional - that it has put off dealing with, or blamed on others

Not arguing that Brexit was therefore a progressive development btw - far from it - but a country that was willing to do something so fundamentally harmful, and so stupid, and which allowed itself to be taken over by political forces of the kind we’ve seen, is an ill country

Amid all the announcements today, it's easy to overlook that the OBR has updated its scenario on a no-deal Brexit. It exposes an undeniably hard reality for the Govt that claims that the UK would "prosper mightily" under no-deal next year.

(Short thread)

1. Key chart: a no-deal/WTO/Australia-style Brexit would delay the point at which econ output regains its pre-virus peak by "almost a year to the third quarter of 2023."

In the upside scenario, this cross-over point could be at the start of 2022; in the downside, in 2025. Grim.

2. Next year, a no deal Brexit would reduce real GDP by around a further 2% - as a result of immediate disruption to the border and uncertainty facing businesses. That's on top of the Covid-related contraction.

3. While there's some short-term border disruption, most of the costs come in the medium term: from lost employment; productivity losses; lower business investment.

Exactly the opposite of what the Chancellor said to @AndrewMarr9 on Sunday.

4. Underneath these numbers, output would fall *below* the Covid levels for several key sectors: Manufacturing, professional services, financial services, retail, energy.

All trade intensive sectors that have been spared the same drop in output as the non-tradables this year.

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So here it is. After the euphoria, the @FinancialTimes @FTMag long read of how @BorisJohnson did his Trade deal with the EU. Tl:dr...not so much “build back better”, more “build back the borders” - stay with me/1.

@FTMag @BorisJohnson The really under-appreciated part of this story is the extent to which the Johnson government, having won its 80 seat majority promising to "Get Brexit Done" then explicitly and actively chose the hardest possible version of #brexit in defiance of commercial interests /2

@FTMag @BorisJohnson Our story begins in January last year when David Frost commenced what Whitehall insiders call a "Star Chamber" process to strip away anything that might be considered more than a "Canada-style" deal - regardless of the fact that UK doesn't trade with EU like Canada! /3

@FTMag @BorisJohnson So what did that mean in practice?

Well, for example leaving EU aviation safety agency (EASA); Chemicals agency (ECHA), not getting a waiver of 'safety and security' declarations for hauliers, not seeking special arrangements for animal products...on and on it goes /4

@FTMag @BorisJohnson Didn't industry object? Well yes it did - but those who yelled too hard found themselves shut out of the door.

Did Whitehall object? Yes it did - Defra and Beis and Treasury all tried at some level to temper the revolutionary fury. But mostly failed. /5

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,