Thread: This is Exhibit #19 in the MI case filed by @SidneyPowell1.
https://t.co/7dQtnTay5n

You can find all the affidavits

@SidneyPowell1 I don’t see how a court could ignore this evidence. Only corruption would explain ignoring it.

The affiant is an acknowledged expert in cyber security.
@SidneyPowell1
@SidneyPowell1
@SidneyPowell1
@SidneyPowell1
@SidneyPowell1
@SidneyPowell1 Normally, I would give you a link and suggest you read it, but this is far too important for you not to read. So, I posted the screenshots. The proof of fraud is now irrefutable and overwhelming. It’s time for someone in law enforcement to get involved. These are federal crimes.

More from Law

I’ve been reading lots recently about the interaction between First Amendment law and free speech principles with respect to online services in light of the events of the last few weeks.

And I have thoughts (MY OWN). So, I’m sorry ... a thread 1/25

One of the main reasons I think users are best served by a recognition that social media services have 1st Amendment rights to curate the content on their sites is because many users want filtered content, either by topic, or by behavior, or other. 2/

So online services should have the right to do this filtering, and to give their users the tools to do so too. For more detail see our Prager U amicus brief
https://t.co/73PswB9Q7Q 3/

So, I disagree with my friends (and others) who say that every online service should apply First Amendment rules, even though they cannot be required to do so. There are both practical and policy reasons why I don’t like this. 4/

Most obviously, the 1st Amendment reflects only one national legal system when this is inherently an international issue. So it’s politically messy, even if you think a 1st Amendment-based policy will be most speech-protective (though probably only non-sexual speakers). 5/

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The entire discussion around Facebook’s disclosures of what happened in 2016 is very frustrating. No exec stopped any investigations, but there were a lot of heated discussions about what to publish and when.


In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.

In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.

This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.

In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.