My recent article on Ethereum provoked a lot of responses in favor and against, which is good.
https://t.co/WjrJt4VFxL

One of my goals is to identify what is an institutional-grade blockchain, and what is not yet one.

For example, when I bought BTC in April 2020 at $6.9k, this ended up being right ahead of a wall of institutional money that came into BTC throughout the year.

The risk/reward ratio was very strong. Not the highest absolute return (could have bought TSLA yolo calls), but great.
More importantly, I like the BTC project, the ecosystem, what it enables, and the options that it gives to people around the world.

Permissionless payments and self-custody stores of value are important for the world to have.
From there, we'll see what else works in the ecosystem over time if anything. There was an ICO boom/bust, and there is currently a DeFi boom.

Certainly one thing here to stay for a while is stablecoins of various types.
Ethereum itself is in rapid development on the base layer, figuring out how to scale, shifting from PoW to PoS, etc. Institutions are hesitant to put billions into a project like that; a small side bet perhaps.

Hence my 80/20, 90/10, or 100/0 BTC/ETH description in the article.
If you're deep into development of Ethereum and bullish on it, then consider my critiques a good thing. Because if you solve various problems, then institutional money may follow.

On the other hand, I want to make sure folks are aware of risks, to not lose money on altcoins.
I chatted with the folks at @BanklessHQ last week about macro, and we touched on DeFi: https://t.co/AAO4qSSIh5
And a couple months ago, I chatted with @AlexSaundersAU about macro, Bitcoin, etc: https://t.co/OUO4oHJH0a
In any one cycle, all sorts of malinvestments can happen.

Over the course of multiple cycles, through bull and bear markets, we see what creates persistent market demand, and what solves genuine problems in a sustainable way.

May the best projects succeed.

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Ivor Cummins has been wrong (or lying) almost entirely throughout this pandemic and got paid handsomly for it.

He has been wrong (or lying) so often that it will be nearly impossible for me to track every grift, lie, deceit, manipulation he has pulled. I will use...


... other sources who have been trying to shine on light on this grifter (as I have tried to do, time and again:


Example #1: "Still not seeing Sweden signal versus Denmark really"... There it was (Images attached).
19 to 80 is an over 300% difference.

Tweet: https://t.co/36FnYnsRT9


Example #2 - "Yes, I'm comparing the Noridcs / No, you cannot compare the Nordics."

I wonder why...

Tweets: https://t.co/XLfoX4rpck / https://t.co/vjE1ctLU5x


Example #3 - "I'm only looking at what makes the data fit in my favour" a.k.a moving the goalposts.

Tweets: https://t.co/vcDpTu3qyj / https://t.co/CA3N6hC2Lq
The entire discussion around Facebook’s disclosures of what happened in 2016 is very frustrating. No exec stopped any investigations, but there were a lot of heated discussions about what to publish and when.


In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.

In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.

This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.

In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.