100 people to to the doctor and get an opioid after a procedure. About 95 will never use again.
A lot of us are exposed to extremist content. Most of us don’t get radicalized.
An extremely important point that seems to be completely missed in the discussion of disinformation.
We are exclusively focused on the *supply chain*. We neglect the *demand* for this content.
The truth is that people searched for an excuse, or opening, to be radicalized.
Keep in mind: Hitler launched the campaign of lies and evil that brought the Holocaust in an age when the Internet was yet to be even dreamed of.
— Brent Staples (@BrentNYT) January 11, 2021
100 people to to the doctor and get an opioid after a procedure. About 95 will never use again.
A lot of us are exposed to extremist content. Most of us don’t get radicalized.
So maybe the question is less about how they got the supply and more why they find it so appealing.
That’s tougher.
But again drugs suggest that those quick supply cuts don’t work.
When you cut supply, people who want drugs *will* find drugs — and often more dangerous drugs.
This is where my insight ends.
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In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.
The story doesn\u2019t say you were told not to... it says you did so without approval and they tried to obfuscate what you found. Is that true?
— Sarah Frier (@sarahfrier) November 15, 2018
In the spring and summer of 2016, as reported by the Times, activity we traced to GRU was reported to the FBI. This was the standard model of interaction companies used for nation-state attacks against likely US targeted.
In the Spring of 2017, after a deep dive into the Fake News phenomena, the security team wanted to publish an update that covered what we had learned. At this point, we didn’t have any advertising content or the big IRA cluster, but we did know about the GRU model.
This report when through dozens of edits as different equities were represented. I did not have any meetings with Sheryl on the paper, but I can’t speak to whether she was in the loop with my higher-ups.
In the end, the difficult question of attribution was settled by us pointing to the DNI report instead of saying Russia or GRU directly. In my pre-briefs with members of Congress, I made it clear that we believed this action was GRU.