1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

EU views PMs letter accompanying his formal #Brexit extension request - saying that he doesn’t actually want an extension- as a gimmick aimed at a domestic audience. As far as EU law is concerned: a formal request from the UK prime minister, is a formal request full stop /1

EU leaders not rushing to make decisions. Instead they watch events in Westminster carefully. If their newly negotiated #Brexit deal is approved by the majority of MPs - as the PM promised them it would be - then possibly no extension will be needed OR /2

Only a short one maybe to allow for necessary legislation to be completed. If this is the case, EU leaders won’t think twice about granting this short extension. They may even approve it by writing rather than on person at an emergency #Brexit summit. Spoiler alert../3

EU leaders - who surprise, surprise already have a thing or two planned in their diaries over next couple of weeks - have zero appetite to return to Brussels again especially for #Brexit They have no desire to be involved in the drama playing out right now in the UK BUT /4

If MPs reject the deal, if there are plans for a general election or a referendum on the deal then a longer extension will be necessary. Here it is harder for EU leaders to come to immediate consensus so an emergency summit becomes likely /5

While we await white smoke signalling a #Brexit deal, let us consider what the end of the transition period on 31 Dec (deal or no deal) will mean for the future of UK politics. Will the end of the Brexit process lead to the end of British #populism? I am very sceptical.
Thread 1/

This thread serves as an English summary and translation of a long essay I published in the Swiss @RepublikMagazin last week. Contrary to its title, it is not just about @BorisJohnson

British populism is a political method, not an ideology. It is not identical with Trumpism, even if it shares some of its traits. The populist method in the UK does not become redundant with #Brexit, because its use hasn't been limited to the UK's relationship with the EU.
3/

The populist method in the UK consists of two key elements:
1) the emotionalization and over-simplification of highly complex issues (such as Brexit, the pandemic, migration, culture or history)
2) the reliance on bogeymen ('enemies') both abroad and at home

4/

Populists depend on enemies, real or imagined, to legitimize their actions and deflect from their own shortcomings. There has been an obvious candidate for the enemy abroad since 2016: the EU. But once transition is over, this may, in the long term, become more difficult.
5/

I really can’t see how, after the last four and half years, the breakup of the UK can be avoided. What a historical irony that a Brexit intended to make Britain ‘great again’ actually brings about the demise of ‘Great’ Britain.

I actually don’t see this as a bad thing. After all, the aggressive chauvinistic nationalism, hubris, and exceptionalism that made Brexit possible is predominantly an English phenomenon. Part of the historical paradox whereby Englishness expresses itself through Britishness,

without explicitly recognising that this nationalism is primarily embedded in England rather than the Celtic periphery. A United Ireland is long overdue. Scotland - regardless of the debates about the economic viability of independence- has reached the point when a decisive

breach now seems inevitable. If this happens, Wales may well follow. Then, finally, England will have to decide what it wants to be, and look at the flaws and failings - political, economic, and constitutional - that it has put off dealing with, or blamed on others

Not arguing that Brexit was therefore a progressive development btw - far from it - but a country that was willing to do something so fundamentally harmful, and so stupid, and which allowed itself to be taken over by political forces of the kind we’ve seen, is an ill country

🚨🇬🇧🇪🇺🚛🍤🐟🥬📦✈️🇬🇧🇪🇺🚨
So here it is. After the euphoria, the @FinancialTimes @FTMag long read of how @BorisJohnson did his Trade deal with the EU. Tl:dr...not so much “build back better”, more “build back the borders” - stay with me/1.

@FTMag @BorisJohnson The really under-appreciated part of this story is the extent to which the Johnson government, having won its 80 seat majority promising to "Get Brexit Done" then explicitly and actively chose the hardest possible version of #brexit in defiance of commercial interests /2

@FTMag @BorisJohnson Our story begins in January last year when David Frost commenced what Whitehall insiders call a "Star Chamber" process to strip away anything that might be considered more than a "Canada-style" deal - regardless of the fact that UK doesn't trade with EU like Canada! /3

@FTMag @BorisJohnson So what did that mean in practice?

Well, for example leaving EU aviation safety agency (EASA); Chemicals agency (ECHA), not getting a waiver of 'safety and security' declarations for hauliers, not seeking special arrangements for animal products...on and on it goes /4

@FTMag @BorisJohnson Didn't industry object? Well yes it did - but those who yelled too hard found themselves shut out of the door.

Did Whitehall object? Yes it did - Defra and Beis and Treasury all tried at some level to temper the revolutionary fury. But mostly failed. /5