EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier has briefed Europe Ministers from EU member states that progress continues to be made in negotiations with the UK but not significantly when it comes to key sticking points: level playing field, fish, governance of deal /1

One of the root causes of the Govt's Brexit difficulties is that it has overpromised.

We can, it is said, reclaim our sovereignty, with the freedom to make our own rules, and, at the same time, retain many of the advantages of EU membership. 1/14

The reality is that we cannot.

Unless we agree to certain standards and rules (and there is scope to argue about which rules), there will be borders, and checks, and tariffs. 2/

There will always be a relationship between rights (eg tariff free access to EU/UK markets) and responsibilities (eg abiding by level-playing field commitments). 3/

A 'good' outcome for the UK, in the Govt's view, would involve access gains (eg fewer border checks) without corresponding obligations (or with weak, or difficult-to-enforce obligations). 4/

The chances of this sort of 'good' outcome are low. The EU looks likely, in the face of the threats in the Internal Market Bill and now the Finance Bill, to insist on rigorous governance provisions. [Also, such provisions are the foundation of the single market.] 5/

Your regular reminder that Brexit is going badly because the UK has still to decide what the purpose of leaving the EU is

1/

#EUref came about as piece of party mgt by Cameron, rather than as culmination of considered and structured debate about UK's place in the world

2/

Yes, we talked a lot (A LOT) about 'Europe' and the EU, but primarily as a function of lots of other things

A touchstone of dissent, if you will (h/t @PaulAdamTaggart)

3/

Referendum campaigns on both sides were simply about getting people to vote their way, not efforts to set out settled plans of What Comes Next

"Vote for us and everything will be dandy" is not a plan

4/

That might have been alright if post-vote there had been a national discussion on how to proceed in an inclusive manner, but instead the political logic pointed to trying to capture the meaning of it all to serve particular agendas

All very majoritarian, as per

5/

🚨🚨🚨🇪🇺🇬🇧🚛🚒🇪🇺🇬🇧🚨🚨🚨 serious #brexit story alert - companies now starting to see penny drop on what rules of origin does to supply chains (food for example) but Brussels seems deaf to both EU & U.K. pleading. A bellwether? 😬 Stay with me. 1/


So first the problem: its a tad complicated but basically goods that are imported into UK and then 'hubbed' onwards into Ireland or other parts of the EU are facing full EU tariffs - this is particularly bad for food stuffs, which attract high tariffs. Why is this? /2

It's a function of the Rules of Origin clauses that mean that goods have to sufficiently "originate" in the UK to qualify for zero-tariff entry to EU (and vice versa).

But to qualify, you have to do something to the goods - process them or add value - not just punt them on /3

The brilliant @AnnaJerzewska does a better job than me of explaining, but the important thing is that this is a nightmare for companies that 'hub' /distribute products through the UK - and that's both EU and UK companies /4

So both the @Foodanddrinkfed and EU groups like @CAOBISCO_EU (chocs etc) say they want the EU Commission to fix this with a derogation/waiver that takes into account proximity and interdependence of EU/UK supply chains. /5

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,