THREAD.
In analysing the Afghan political spectrum something becomes obvious: Kabul's base is far more diverse than the Taliban's. For simplicity's sake, I'll count stronger opposition toward the Taliban than Kabul as 'pro Kabul'.
Let's assess these generally. Exceptions apply.
1) ethnonationalists of all ethnicities. Whilst the non-Pashtuns amongst them aren't pro-Ghani, they're pro-Kabul as an institution; they see it as far more representative and amenable to their interests than the Taliban.
a) The Taliban/Pakistan relationship
b) their overt Islam, which many Pashtun nationalists are hostile toward.
Liberals/seculars. Not much intro needed: progress, freedom, spectacular gains of the last 19 years, women's rights et cetera. You generally notice quite an anti-Islam, wholesale adoption of War on Terror rhetoric in their rationale.
Again, not much intro needed: the Taliban are Pakistani proxies just like the Mujahideen were. Pakistan is to blame, Islam is bad/needs to be de-emphasised as it is exploited.
Noticeable that whilst distinct, they share a large overlap with groups 1) and 2).
Generally pro-Mujahideen who consider Kabul a legitimate Islamic authority, strongly condemn the Taliban on Islamic grounds, consider their jihad void and focus on perceived unIslamic nature of the Taliban's method of war.
Massive tension between 4) and 1/2/3.
Nominally pro-Kabul but not from a moral/ideological perspective, but because their favourite politicians/warlords are currently represented in Kabul's team. Willing to cut separate deals with the Taliban as long as their party's interests are upheld.
Many across all groups see peace as a sham. Almost all ethnicities in 1) see their existence as mortally threatened in the event of a peace deal.
How do you reconcile these?
Worth noting groups 1,2&3 comprise fringe elements, yet enjoy healthy representation, for whichever reason.
For them, how much worse can it get? They haven't seen 'gains' Kabul boasts of, so their preservation is unimportant.
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