Or unwillingness?
OK - now in Honduras narco-case including Prez JOH & brother Tony, now Geovanny Fuentes Ramirez has a proceeding before Judge Castel - Inner City Press will live tweet, thread below
Or unwillingness?
Defendant's counsel: I understand reading between the lines what your Honor is saying [about corruption in Honduras] and the alleged homicide...
[To him, maybe]
Defense: The evidence should be kept out.
Assistant US Attorney: He was in the presence of CC-4 and Owner-1 when the statements were made.
AUSA: They spurred assistance and allowed CC-4 to conduct monetary negotiations. It shows why CC-4 would have meetings about drug trafficking at Business-1
Judge Castel: Business-1 was allegedly used by the defendant to launder drug money. Was that the case when CC-4 was soliciting campaign contributions?
AUSA: Yes, Your Honor.
[JOH - to have testimony taken?]
Defense lawyer: We didn't know this was going to be part of the trial. We knew there were allegations, but...
AUSA: Corruption and violence, we identified from early in the case as relevant to the case. We made early 3500 production.
Defense: The witness known as Medro, his statements to Mr. Rivera, they are big part of the US' case. It is outrageous. Mr. Rivera made the witness unavailable by murdering him.
Judge Castel: And defendant's participation?
Defense lawyer: This is more extreme that the situation with the political corruption
Judge Castel: There are communications about Lopez Canabria. That murder was covered. So remarking about the death doesn't have much probative value.
[An aside: When shall we expect Narcos Honduras??]
This was not people discussing news reports about a murder. The Commissioner refers to being hounded by prosecutors. The Defendant wanted info about this case.
Assistant US Attorney Gutwillig: "Did it again" is not accurate. The episode with Freddy Najara was different.
Judge Castel: There is not evidence of government inducement so I'm not going to exclude the evidence at this juncture. But I'll keep an open mind.
AUSA: We've identified those statements we intend to use.
Defense lawyer: They cherry pick from my client's lengthy post arrest statement.
Defense: We've seen the new SDNY order that people will have to wear 2 masks or N-95. I'm not sure I can be heard that way.
[Note: they put the lawyers in plexiglass box]
[Inner City Press covered both of them]
"We have constructed and tested a booth with a HEPA filter. You will only wear a mask when at counsel table.
More from World
THREAD
1)
Newsweek — #Iran has sent deadly "Shahed-136 suicide/kamikaze drones" to the Houthis in #Yemen. These advanced UAVs are deployed to the Houthi-controlled northern Yemeni province of Al-Jawf.
More reason why the West should not appease Tehran.
https://t.co/gtNDCGbtQs
2)
#Iran has long provided drones to the Houthis
March 22, 2017
“… seven Houthi Qasef-1 drones and one drone engine recovered by forces from the UAE. Six of the drones were captured in October on a known Iranian smuggling route that runs through
3)
US to designate #Iran-backed Houthis in #Yemen as a foreign terrorist org (FTO)
https://t.co/ILBCg3Pfvs
Iran’s IRGC long funded/armed/trained/provided for the Houthis.
Dec 30—Missile attack on Aden airport. Yemen gov holds Houthis
4)
#Iran provides at least $360 million, ballistic missiles, other ordnance, technology and training to the Houthis in
5)
The Houthis recently claimed responsibility for a missile attack targeting Saudi Arabia’s Aramco oil
1)
Newsweek — #Iran has sent deadly "Shahed-136 suicide/kamikaze drones" to the Houthis in #Yemen. These advanced UAVs are deployed to the Houthi-controlled northern Yemeni province of Al-Jawf.
More reason why the West should not appease Tehran.
https://t.co/gtNDCGbtQs
2)
#Iran has long provided drones to the Houthis
March 22, 2017
“… seven Houthi Qasef-1 drones and one drone engine recovered by forces from the UAE. Six of the drones were captured in October on a known Iranian smuggling route that runs through
3)
US to designate #Iran-backed Houthis in #Yemen as a foreign terrorist org (FTO)
https://t.co/ILBCg3Pfvs
Iran’s IRGC long funded/armed/trained/provided for the Houthis.
Dec 30—Missile attack on Aden airport. Yemen gov holds Houthis
4)
#Iran provides at least $360 million, ballistic missiles, other ordnance, technology and training to the Houthis in
5)
The Houthis recently claimed responsibility for a missile attack targeting Saudi Arabia’s Aramco oil
@Ayjchan @K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia @Ayjchan @K_G_Andersen please note that there were 11 infections in the Beijing 2004 leaks, not 8.
The 8 you are mentioning are for the main chain of infection with 3 levels from one primary case in April.
But there were 3 more primary cases for a total of 11 cases.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia All were linked to the heavily contaminated CDC P3 lab (the top P3 in China at the time).
The cases are typically separated between:
- The February ones (Cui and Ren) which seem to have been covered up by the CDC Institute of Virology. Also we only have pseudonyms for these 2.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia - The April ones-9 infections (1+8, officially the 'Beijing-Anhui Apr-2004 breakout'.
The official Chinese report only focussed on the April infections - keeping very quiet about the February ones. Here is the main April chain of infection.
Here is are the 9 from Apr 2004:
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia And here are the 9 people infected in Apr 2004:
(4-22 in the title -> April chain with alarm raised on the 22nd):
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia The WHO eventually correctly mentioned 11 cases:
https://t.co/a1HvuT0C8z
The 8 you are mentioning are for the main chain of infection with 3 levels from one primary case in April.
But there were 3 more primary cases for a total of 11 cases.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia All were linked to the heavily contaminated CDC P3 lab (the top P3 in China at the time).
The cases are typically separated between:
- The February ones (Cui and Ren) which seem to have been covered up by the CDC Institute of Virology. Also we only have pseudonyms for these 2.
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia - The April ones-9 infections (1+8, officially the 'Beijing-Anhui Apr-2004 breakout'.
The official Chinese report only focussed on the April infections - keeping very quiet about the February ones. Here is the main April chain of infection.
Here is are the 9 from Apr 2004:
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia And here are the 9 people infected in Apr 2004:
(4-22 in the title -> April chain with alarm raised on the 22nd):
@K_G_Andersen @stgoldst @RozSofia The WHO eventually correctly mentioned 11 cases:
https://t.co/a1HvuT0C8z
A quick thread on #Myitsone dam & #MyanmarChinaRelations in light of the SAC announcement that they would be restarting some stalled Chinese projects in Burma. This announcement has led to speculation about Myitsone, which has been suspended since 2011. Let’s go! ➡️ China has
consistently misunderstood & underestimated popular opposition to Myitsone. First and foremost, to the Burmese people, this is about the “mother river” of Burma - the Irrawaddy- and it’s nearly sacred importance to them as a lifeline of their country. This is what drove the
organic anti-dam movement that started locally in Kachin but +/- 2007 was effectively picked up & nationalized by Burmese environmental CSOs. Instead of understanding this, the Chinese lashed out and blamed the United States when Thein Sein suspended the project. I assure you
the USG was as surprised as China when the project was suspended. But China never believed it was truly the desire of the Burmese people that stopped the project. Today, the dam doesn’t make sense economically for Beijing & will definitely alienate Burmese, yet they stubbornly
continue to push it. Why? Let’s unpack a bit further. In addition to Myitsone, there were other campaigns & protests targeting Chinese projects such as Letpadaung copper mine & Kyaukphyu pipeline, port & SEZ. While these campaigns had varying levels off effect, none was as
Can\u2019t overstate how politically dangerous this is. As readers told me: a deeply unpopular regime pushing for deeply unpopular infrastructure projects. Not sure this is what Beijing wants either. https://t.co/TnlrgjPyxZ
— Thompson Chau (@tchau01) February 15, 2021
consistently misunderstood & underestimated popular opposition to Myitsone. First and foremost, to the Burmese people, this is about the “mother river” of Burma - the Irrawaddy- and it’s nearly sacred importance to them as a lifeline of their country. This is what drove the
organic anti-dam movement that started locally in Kachin but +/- 2007 was effectively picked up & nationalized by Burmese environmental CSOs. Instead of understanding this, the Chinese lashed out and blamed the United States when Thein Sein suspended the project. I assure you
the USG was as surprised as China when the project was suspended. But China never believed it was truly the desire of the Burmese people that stopped the project. Today, the dam doesn’t make sense economically for Beijing & will definitely alienate Burmese, yet they stubbornly
continue to push it. Why? Let’s unpack a bit further. In addition to Myitsone, there were other campaigns & protests targeting Chinese projects such as Letpadaung copper mine & Kyaukphyu pipeline, port & SEZ. While these campaigns had varying levels off effect, none was as