Because, rest assured, there will have to be a reallignment with the EU. This will be necessitated not only by the economics but also, most likely, by unfolding events in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
1/19
I am pretty annoyed about Starmer's statement about FoM on the Marr Show today, but I'm still not sure what the thinking behind it is. If it's just that this is not the time to talk about EU allignment, fair enough, but it could have been expressed in a more nuanced way.
Because, rest assured, there will have to be a reallignment with the EU. This will be necessitated not only by the economics but also, most likely, by unfolding events in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
I am not convinced that complete endorsement of the Tory's Brexit is required to win back the red wall seats; its not what a careful analysis of polling says and it's, frankly, treating red wall voters as idiots while pandering to their supposed idiocy (pretty patronising).
Given the well-documented harms caused to border trade, UK-based European hub distribution centres, manufacturing (e.g. BASF) and fishing that have emerged just in the first week, it's pretty obvious that THIS Brexit can't be a success.
Indeed, given that these problems have emerged in a period when cross-border trade has been at a minimum we can bet that things are going to get much worse, as the odious Gove has admitted.
This economic puncture will be accompanied by hundreds of stories of the misery caused by small Brexits (e.g. people held up at the Dutch border today, SMEs being unable to export, cost of sending stuff to friends in the EU, pet passports etc.); some we're seeing already.
There will be also other Brexit insults: refusal to join Erasmus (which the defective Turing scheme will not adequately replace) and the troubles experienced by artists wanting to perform abroad - all wounds inflicted in the name of nationalist ideology.
And let's not forget events in the United States. Biden is a strong friend of Ireland; who knows what dirt will be found when his team takes over the White House? Trump and Farage were like evil twins; Trumpism and Brexit are part of the same ubernationalist project.
For all of these reasons and more, it is vital that Labour positions itself so it can hold the Tory government to account for the damage it has caused. Ok, give Brexit as an idea conditional support but certainly not unconditional support for THIS Brexit.
Which takes me to what Europeans should be doing and the attitude they should have to @UKLabour. I left the party under Corbyn and rejoined under Starmer. Right now I'm hold my nerve.
We also know that Labour policy can be influenced by its members and that public opinion can change - very rapidly under some circumstances (hardly anyone wanted to leave the EU in early 2015).
So a plausible way forwards involves a three-prong strategy:
1) I agree with @nicktolhurst that no party can campaign to rejoin right now. Instead we need to identify an intermediate step. It is not difficult to make a strong case for joining EFTA/EEA and/or customs union
2) We need a national nonparty pro-European campaign group which will openly make the case for (1). I see lots of interest in forming such a group, and fragmented groups already existing. How do we come together?
The campaign group should make a big fuss about every loss and f*ck up caused by THIS Brexit and should argue for piecemeal changes to the treaties which ease border problems and allign us more with the EU. This can be done while accepting 'Brexit' (but not THIS Brexit).
The campaign group needs a social media strategy. The far right have shown that Twitter, Facebook etc can be used to drive public opinion. Let's do this (while striving to be ethical). We need something like the US Lincoln Project. This requires funding - from where?
3) Pro-Europeans need to stay in Labour and use our influence to change the party from within. This shouldn't be too hard as more and more Brexit f*ck ups become evident, especially given that most Labour members are already there.
More from Brexit
Two excellent questions at the end of a very sensible thread summarising the post-Brexit UK FP debate. My own take at attempting to offer an answer - ahead of the IR is as follow:
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
Both the @ChathamHouse and @Policy_Exchange reports are excellent and leave a healthy tension to the UK foreign policy debate. I\u2019m left with two questions that won\u2019t go away. Is the first underestimating how the world has changed. Is the second overestimating Britain\u2019s capacity?
— Ben Judah (@b_judah) January 11, 2021
1. The two versions have a converging point: a tilt to the Indo-pacific doesn’t preclude a role as a convening power on global issues;
2. On the contrary, it underwrites the credibility for leadership on global issues, by seeking to strike two points:
A. Engaging with a part of the world in which world order and global issues are central to security, prosperity, and - not least - values;
B. Propelling the UK towards a more diversified set of economic, political, and security ties;
3. The tilt towards the Indo-Pacific whilst structurally based on a realist perception of the world, it is also deeply multilateral. Central to it is the notion of a Britain that is a convening power.
4. It is as a result a notion that stands on the ability to renew diplomacy;
5. It puts in relation to this a premium on under-utilised formats such as FPDA, 5Eyes, and indeed the Commonwealth - especially South Pacific islands;
6. It equally puts a premium on exploring new bilateral and multilateral formats. On former, Japan, Australia. On latter, Quad;
It is time to talk Brexit and standards again. (thread)
Let's start off with: I don't think any trade experts are surprised by this. It is why the TCA did not do much on SPS. It is why the EU did not offer much on SPS. It is why the UK did not ask much on SPS.
But it also shows that the popular slogan "after Brexit we'll have the same standards as before, so why would anything change in trade" was wrong - and worse, it was purposefully trying to stifle a necessary debate.
And this leads me to the next point: I have no issue with changing the rules, I have a massive issue with how it is done. Here's what we should discuss:
The decisive question: What are the standards the UK as a country wants. To inform this debate, we need the following information:
London intends to make use of its costly SPS regulatory autonomy. As widely anticipated, first area of divergence expected to take place in the field of Crispr technology for genome editing, area where the UK has long argued for a more liberal stance.https://t.co/btRoxU3saZ
— Emily Rees (@emilyrees_eu) January 7, 2021
Let's start off with: I don't think any trade experts are surprised by this. It is why the TCA did not do much on SPS. It is why the EU did not offer much on SPS. It is why the UK did not ask much on SPS.
But it also shows that the popular slogan "after Brexit we'll have the same standards as before, so why would anything change in trade" was wrong - and worse, it was purposefully trying to stifle a necessary debate.
And this leads me to the next point: I have no issue with changing the rules, I have a massive issue with how it is done. Here's what we should discuss:
The decisive question: What are the standards the UK as a country wants. To inform this debate, we need the following information:
