At today's Future Relationship with the European Union Committee - we're hearing from @CSBarnard24 that the deal has a slightly "alice in wonderland quality" about it - nothing really appears quite as it first looks. If you compare to what we had until 1 Jan, it falls short. 1/

EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier has briefed Europe Ministers from EU member states that progress continues to be made in negotiations with the UK but not significantly when it comes to key sticking points: level playing field, fish, governance of deal /1

This briefing comes ahead of the EU leaders summit in Brussels end of this week, where Brexit will be discussed most likely I’m told on Friday morning. Both Michel Barnier and the PM once described this summit mid October as cut off point by which time a deal had to be agreed /2

This clearly will not be the case and each side predictably blames the other for that. Today a UK government source said: „The EU have been using the old playbook in which they thought running down the clock would work against the UK“ /3

„They have assumed that the UK would be more willing to compromise the longer the process ran, but in fact all these tactics have achieved is to get us to the middle of October with lots of work that could have been done left undone.“ /4

Both sides say they still want a deal and think it entirely possible to reach a deal this year, infact v soon, if only the OTHER side would just be „more realistic“ (ie make the big compromises) /5

1/ What are the ‘new’ demands the UK says the EU has made in the Brexit talks and are they actually new? There are 3 specific areas of contention that have emerged, one each on state aid rules, the Level Playing Field/Governance, and fish. None of them should be a total surprise.

2/ First, on state aid. The UK says the EU wants the Commission and European Investment Bank to be given carve-outs from the subsidy control provisions in the deal. It says this would create an unfair imbalance, because there would be no similar exemption for British authorities.

3/ This is particularly relevant in light of the bloc's €750bn Coronavirus recovery fund. It has already been delayed by an internal political row, and the EU is keen to ensure that isn't exacerbated by legal disputes with the UK next year. Brussels denies this is anything new.

4/ The Commission is an ex ante regulator, meaning it is called in to pre-authorise state aid spending by EU countries. The EU wants the UK to set up its own independent regulator to approve subsidies in the same way. If it does so, many of the state aid problems will fall away.

5/ LPF/Governance. This is about the 'ratchet clause' which the EU has relabelled as 'equivalence' of standards. It addresses what happens if one side raises its standards on say environmental or labour rules in the future and the other doesn't, creating a competitive imbalance.

1/ Lots of good analysis out there on why the EU-China CAI is a bad decision in the context of Xinjiang, transatlantic partnerships, etc. But I also think that even the trade/econ benefits of the CAI look quite limited. Thread:

2/ It highlights, as a win, that China’s preservation of existing liberalizations. That’s positive, but not really a big problem; the bigger issue is stagnation, where reform pledges have failed to materialize after years/decades of promises. Great example is in the FDI openings,

3/ which are highlighted to include cloud, auto, fin services etc—all areas of EU/MNC interest. Thing is, these openings aren’t new. China has begun opening auto/finance since 2018/19, while the 50% cap on cloud services has remained unchanged since 2015 (or before if we consider

4/ WTO ascension commitments vs the 2015 Telecom Catalogue, but that’s for another day). So these are existing openings that are repackaged as “wins.” More critical issue beyond FDI caps is around licensing issuance, which still big problem. Arguably some more significance in

5/ R&D and health? Not an expert, but the FDI conditions (eg hospitals only in certain cities) are limiting, while R&D could be complicated by data/info controls. It’s also unclear how existing tech transfer prohibitions exceed existing protections in the foreign investment law,

As is traditional for this time of year, and more in hope than expectation, my top ten trade / Brexit hopes for 2021...

1 - The UK Government ditches the unnecessary secrecy and engages much more openly with business, NGOs etc about their priorities, and reflects them

2 - Parliament steps up its game on government scrutiny beyond select committee reports and starts expecting answers on why priorities have been chosen, why trade agreements with which countries, what the content should be etc

3 - UK business do their best to keep on exporting and importing, innovating and partnering, to overcome the new barriers in their way, and also to keep shouting for government to remove barriers as they arise

4 - Brexiteers show even the vaguest hint of interest in the views of those who continue to want strong ties with the EU, rather then repeating over and over again, to even the vaguest hint of criticism, "you lost suckers, get over it"

5 - Remainers, rejoiners and the like stop talking quite so much about how the 2016 referendum was stolen from them, which is becoming both history and suggests that 17 odd million people were conned

(NB not confident on the last two)