The Balkanization of Africa has long been a strategic aim o…

The initial intention of the powers that be in covertly supporting Boko Haram was to destabilize Nigeria, trigger sectarian divisions and violence, and then rush in to ‘save’ Nigeria under the banner of military assistance and humanitarian aid. Today the powers that be

..has essentially created a conflict intervention industry. Some are testing and exhibiting new weapons system. Others are flexing their diplomatic influence. Private military contractors are securing lucrative contracts, with Russia leading the pack in this field with its

"Little green men" in Libya and Mozambique. Not to be left out Eric Prince, the founder of U.S based Blackwater, travelled to Abuja where he met with Nigeria's President and offered to destroy Boko Haram for a fee of US$1.5 billion. That offer was rejected. See the dynamics?

They criticized Eeben Barlows STTP involvement in Nigeria and then used the back door to try cut a $1.5 billion deal with the Nigerian government. Abuja chose the South African based Special Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP) International Ltd.

Its a no brainer why Abuja chose STTEP. It has worked across Africa and has extensive experience in advising, training, and mentoring African armies in combating armed anti government forces. Its record is both unblemished and unparalleled.

STTEP is a true African PMC that provides African security solutions to under siege governments. What most Nigerians dont know is that the STTEP was initially contracted to train a hostage release team for the Nigerian army to rescue the Chibok girls held captive by Boko Haram.

This mission later transitioned into an offensive role in order to halt Boko Haram’s rapid advance and create breathing space to enable the government to hold elections, and boy did they deliver !! Nigeria benefited a great deal as it garnered valuable expertise in COIN Op.

We have to remember that the army prio to this had zero experience in COIN warfare. The Nigerian army is a clone of its ex colonial master, Britannia. Organized and trained to fight according to a European doctrine unsuited to a harsh and unforgiving African environment..

and the terrorist threat facing Nigeria. The army was unable to withstand attacks by a mobile and maneuverable Boko Haram. Nigeria had no experience in operating in such a complex terrain. Lacking in battlefield intelligence, Boko Haram was able to strike at will,

forcing the Nigerian army to fight defensively with little to no battlefield initiative. It was the Golden Age of Boko Haram whose actions instilled fear not only in the local populace but also in the army units. This resulted in numerous army units being overrun and withdrawing

from the engagement areas, leaving valuable equipment in their wake. Lacking in credible and actionable battlefield intelligence, the Nigerian army units facing Boko Haram was lacking in morale and both air reconnaissance and air support.

This resulted in the Nigerian forces applying predictive tactics unsuitable to both the terrain and the threat. Intelligence gained from aerial surveillance operations conducted by US and French drones was not shared with Nigeria.This further compounded the difficulties

...our troops had in initiating any proactive actions in countering the Boko Haram threat. At this point it became clear Nigeria was on its own. Unable to pre-empt Boko Haram, Nigerian troops were hurriedly and rigorously retrained in numerous COIN Ops on an ad hoc basis such as

mounting/dismounting maneuver, and pursuit along with the application of direct and indirect fire. Numerous doctrinal adjustments and changes were made to allow the unit to operate as an unconventional maneuver force that could rapidly deploy across the harsh terrain.

The retrained Nigerian troops soon proved that despite the negativity surrounding them, they were, once properly trained and correctly led, more than a match for Boko Haram. Key to their success was the concept of relentless pursuit, denying the enemy time to rest.

One underlying lesson of this conflict is that large armies, like the Nigerian army fight small wars badly. Without intelligence, the forces are blind. The army was incorrectly structured and simply follow the organizational structure of a large and powerful conventional army.

This made them unable to fight with agility, flexibility, speed, and rapid maneuver. Nigeria learned quickly that the tables of organization and equipment (TOE) of a large conventional army cannot be used as a template to structure an army in an assymetric battlefield.

The Nigerian army realized this fact and made appropriate changes in doctrine and tactics to meet this challenge. An incredible feat. Not many countries in Africa can pull this off on an ad hoc basis.