In a final address, @JusticeATR Makan Delrahim says some of the changes recommended by House Judiciary are "quite sensible." DOJ needs more funding for antitrust, and he backs higher filing fees for mergers.

He has six recommendations: 1) Create bright line rules and alter burden of proof for mergers.
“Courts need additional guidance in these cases.” In cases where a company has more than 50 percent market share, burden should be on merging parties for any transaction in that market, he says
DOJ would still have to prove the market definition and the market share of the dominant firm.

More from Law

1/ After a good night's sleep, I have a few thoughts on the impending Ripple lawsuit.

Less schadenfreude, more "what now?" https://t.co/a0oTwblBHB


2/ First of all, the USG is going to lose.

I don't even need to read the complaint. They might force a settlement, but they're outclassed on legal.

Remember Ripple engaged former SEC Chair Mary Jo White in a civil matter in 2018. A hint of their

3/ Second, the USG should lose.

The SEC restrictions on non-accredited investors; the ridiculous Howey test; 80 year old securities law like the "40 Act" all need to die in fire. They are un-American and completely outdated.

I hope Ripple wins. (WUT?)

4/ Third, it's incumbent upon industry to self-police and hold the moral high ground.

I give certain individuals A's and others F's, but as a whole, the most powerful people and companies generally take a Swiss neutrality stance on assets.

So we're effectively in this together.

5/ We're "in this together" to draw lines of regulatory demarcation.

XRP as a "security" further hurts the U.S. businesses while global comps will continue to make these markets.

XRP as a security also means other assets will meet the same fate. At least Ripple has $ to fight.
We need to talk about the 'expert' witness statement evidence led by Ms Bell in her successful case before the Tavistock. THREAD

You can see who gave evidence in her support from these extracts from the Tavistock's Skeleton Argument.


Helpful for you to bear in mind that her solicitor was a man called Paul Conrathe, who has a long association with the religious right in the US (I have talked about him a number of times but this is as good a starting point as any).


I am not going to address here other criticisms that might be made of the form in which that evidence was given or the timing of its service before the court. I am just going to address, in alphabetical order, the individuals whose evidence Mr Conrathe led on Ms Bell's behalf.

The first witness, alphabetically, was Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Oxford, Michael Biggs.

Mr Biggs was exposed for posting transphobic statements online under a fake twitter handle: @MrHenryWimbush according to this report.
Today the superior court will hear oral arguments in Midtown Citizens Coalition v. Municipality of Anchorage. "MCC" is an unofficial group that opposes the recall of Assembly member Felix Rivera. The question is whether the Muni properly certified the recall petition. #aklaw


Before posting the MCC v. MOA briefs, it's worth noting that the legal arguments made by Rivera's supporters parallel those made by Dunleavy in Recall Dunleavy v. State. Both Rivera and Dunleavy argued that their recall petitions should have been denied by election officials.

So let's play a game called "Who Argued It." Guess which politician, Rivera or Dunleavy, made the following arguments in court:

1. "The grounds for recall stated in the petition are insufficient as a matter of law, and therefore the petition should have been rejected."


2. "Even under Alaska’s liberal recall standards, courts have not hesitated to find petitions legally insufficient when those petitions did not contain sufficient factual allegations of unlawful activity to state sufficient grounds for recall.”

3. "The allegations must be sufficiently particular to allow the official a meaningful opportunity to respond . . . . [and] ensure that voters have the information they need to vote."
There is a now-relevant parallel here to the difference here between matters before a judge & matters before a jury. Judges are far more reluctant to strike testimony or evidence if they are the only recipients of it, with the theory being that they are really smart about ...


law stuff & will know what they can & can't consider. For instance, there is a long-held rule that a fact witness can't make legal arguments, only a lawyer. So what will happen in a motion for summary judgment, where the entire proceeding is on paper, will play out like this:

1) Defendant makes a motion for summary judgment. It includes a sworn declaration from some fact witness.

2) The declaration includes all sorts of legal arguments about why the defendant should win. Often the declaration includes arguments the brief didn't even make.

Defendants (especially DOJ-represented ones) often do this to get around the word or page-limits placed on briefs.

3) Plaintiff moves to strike the declaration for its inclusion of inadmissible legal arguments.

4) Judge denies the motion to strike, on the grounds that a ...

judge is a sophisticated consumer of evidence & can choose what to consider & what to ignore, unlike a jury.

The legal fiction behind this impeachment exception is that Senators are also smart enough to know what to listen to & what to ignore. Now, that may not be ACCURATE, ...

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