1st (cf. @MGSchmelzer): there is no reason to assume that a massive productivity- & hence production-boom will lead to reduced emissions, because it will increase production&growth, & it is those two variables that global greenhouse emissions track most closely. #Degrowth.
Until 2050 we'll likely see "a #supercycle in investments in 'clean' energy infrastructure, 'clean' transportation & everything that's required for the '#green' transition."
There's so much bullshit in here, I'll unpack some of it in a
1st (cf. @MGSchmelzer): there is no reason to assume that a massive productivity- & hence production-boom will lead to reduced emissions, because it will increase production&growth, & it is those two variables that global greenhouse emissions track most closely. #Degrowth.
Every time capitalism has made massive productivity gains (e.g. w/ the #steamengine; the taylorist #assemblyline; computers), that has led to a *radicalisation* of capitalism as a mass production system (as opposed to earlier versions, where luxury goods were for elites),...
So there's no reason believe that a new round of capitalist accumulation (#accumulationbydispossession / #primitiveaccumulation) - in this case: some kind of "#greencapitalism - will in any way positively impact emissions rates, but every reason to believe the opposite...
I would like to look into this, as it speaks to an often-overlooked issue: the relationship between different phases of capitalist development, such as imperialism, fordism, & post-fordism, connected to energy regimes (coal-based, oil-based, renewables-based capitalism)?
The question is: when one new phase of capitalism starts - & (cf. abramsky, mitchell, malm) these are often connected to specific energy regimes: coal, oil, gas... renewables?) - what happens to the structures (institutional, material, etc.) that constituted the past phase?
Would a renewables-based "green capitalism" simply supersede & replace (much of) what came before? That claim is a necessary tool in the #greencapitalist (GC) box, since the only way their argument makes sense is if the expansion of GC means less fossil capitalism in turn.
Well... no. It wouldn't, & here's some empirical claims to support that statement:
a) Consider the progression of "modes of production" (MoPs), from "slavery" to "feudalism" to capitalism: there is today, in quantitative terms, more slave-labour than during the high-time of
the slave trade & the golden triangle.
There is also, today, more feudal, quasi-bonded labour in the world than during the high time of European feudalism, usually (in Eurocentric history) taken to mark the era of dominance of that MoP.
What happens here (cf. Althusser)...
is that MoPs don't replace one another; the new, dominant MoP *articulates* the old MoPs & their structures (labour organisation, etc.) *to*, & renders them productive *for* itself.
A massive expansion in GC-mining, for example, would no doubt lead to an extension of the
most gruesome, old-fashioned types of mining, including in quasi-slavery & bondage-conditions.
b) consider the progression of energy regimes (closely linked to that of different phases of cap. dev.): from renewables (pre-indust. revolution) to coal to oil (w/ some nuclear)
to gas & then, inshallah, to renewables.
Now, do you believe that the oil age meant that less coal was being burnt? That more renewables means burning less fossil fuel?
It might not surprise u that that's not what happens. Every new energy regime is a massive adrenaline-
shot in capitalism's arm, it becomes much more productive, further extends its (formal&real) subsumption of the world under its regime of constantly accelerated production. In order for this to be effective- returning to the article above - there need to be huge investments
all over the world, existing but maybe even defunct production units have to be kicked into shape again, the whole productive & therefore destructive edifice of global capitalism shudders into action once again where before, for the past 12, but more likely 25 years, there
has been a massive crisis of overaccumulation & underinvestment ("cash-glut", "Investitionsstau").
Need real examples of this? Take a look at the @EU_Commission & its fabled #GreenDeal: a "green" programme that centrally involves building new #fossilgas-infrastructures...
Read the guardian-piece: "'Things like copper, nickel & cobalt are all likely to see a boost from the extra demand to build infrastructure. Even steel & petrochemicals will be needed,' said Midgeley."
Not satisfied, want to hear the same from a forward-looking capitalist?
The head of #Mitsubishi Heavy Industries told the @FT that "hydrogen, ammonia, carbon capture & nuclear power would all be needed to meet the global goal of 0 emissions." Meaning: every available technology will be milked for all it's worth in the push to expand production.
More from Economy
The argument for deficits & debt raising interest rates in the US is not increased credit risk, it is that interest rates are a function of economic fundamentals, flows & policy. Deficits/debt change those.
I can't tell if I'm agreeing or disagreeing with @jc_econ.
Increasing government spending or reducing taxes increases demand (or reduces saving). This raises the price of loanable funds or the interest rate.
In a dynamic context, more demand means a stronger economy, the central bank raises interest rates sooner, and long rates rise.
(As an aside, we are not close to the United States needing to worry about credit risk and the risks are more overstated than understated in most other advanced economies too. But credit risk is not always & everywhere irrelevant, just look at the UK in 1976 or Canada in 1994.)
Interest rates have fallen over the last 20 yrs while debt has risen. This does not necessarily mean that debt rising causes interest rates to fall. It could also mean that other things have happened at he same time that pushed down interest rates more than debt pushed them up.
The suspects for these "other things" include slower productivity growth, slower popln growth, higher inequality, less investment, etc. All of which either increase the supply of saving or reduce the demand for investment, reducing the equilibrium interest rate.
I can't tell if I'm agreeing or disagreeing with @jc_econ.
There is no relationship b/w deficits & interest rates in the US & many other advanced economies. Centuries of dynamic institution building underpin our reserve currency status that allows rates to be a function of economic fundamentals, flows & policy not credit risk 1/3
— Dr. Julia Coronado (@jc_econ) January 26, 2021
Increasing government spending or reducing taxes increases demand (or reduces saving). This raises the price of loanable funds or the interest rate.
In a dynamic context, more demand means a stronger economy, the central bank raises interest rates sooner, and long rates rise.
(As an aside, we are not close to the United States needing to worry about credit risk and the risks are more overstated than understated in most other advanced economies too. But credit risk is not always & everywhere irrelevant, just look at the UK in 1976 or Canada in 1994.)
Interest rates have fallen over the last 20 yrs while debt has risen. This does not necessarily mean that debt rising causes interest rates to fall. It could also mean that other things have happened at he same time that pushed down interest rates more than debt pushed them up.
The suspects for these "other things" include slower productivity growth, slower popln growth, higher inequality, less investment, etc. All of which either increase the supply of saving or reduce the demand for investment, reducing the equilibrium interest rate.
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So the cryptocurrency industry has basically two products, one which is relatively benign and doesn't have product market fit, and one which is malignant and does. The industry has a weird superposition of understanding this fact and (strategically?) not understanding it.
The benign product is sovereign programmable money, which is historically a niche interest of folks with a relatively clustered set of beliefs about the state, the literary merit of Snow Crash, and the utility of gold to the modern economy.
This product has narrow appeal and, accordingly, is worth about as much as everything else on a 486 sitting in someone's basement is worth.
The other product is investment scams, which have approximately the best product market fit of anything produced by humans. In no age, in no country, in no city, at no level of sophistication do people consistently say "Actually I would prefer not to get money for nothing."
This product needs the exchanges like they need oxygen, because the value of it is directly tied to having payment rails to move real currency into the ecosystem and some jurisdictional and regulatory legerdemain to stay one step ahead of the banhammer.
If everyone was holding bitcoin on the old x86 in their parents basement, we would be finding a price bottom. The problem is the risk is all pooled at a few brokerages and a network of rotten exchanges with counter party risk that makes AIG circa 2008 look like a good credit.
— Greg Wester (@gwestr) November 25, 2018
The benign product is sovereign programmable money, which is historically a niche interest of folks with a relatively clustered set of beliefs about the state, the literary merit of Snow Crash, and the utility of gold to the modern economy.
This product has narrow appeal and, accordingly, is worth about as much as everything else on a 486 sitting in someone's basement is worth.
The other product is investment scams, which have approximately the best product market fit of anything produced by humans. In no age, in no country, in no city, at no level of sophistication do people consistently say "Actually I would prefer not to get money for nothing."
This product needs the exchanges like they need oxygen, because the value of it is directly tied to having payment rails to move real currency into the ecosystem and some jurisdictional and regulatory legerdemain to stay one step ahead of the banhammer.
