IMO, the #SAFEAct is better on election security than HR1 bc it wld ban most touchscreen voting machines currently available. HR1 wld allow them as a primary in person system bc vendors call the paper they spit out a “paper ballot.” Pen & paper is safer #HandMarkedPaperBallots 1/

I have not looked at other aspects of HR1. It addresses more than election security. The #SAFEAct shld be the starting point for election security reform in my opinion. 2/
HR1 requires that all voters have the option to mark their ballots by hand. But it does not specify that, for jurisdictions with in person voting, the hand marked (pen & paper) option must be available for in person voting (vs it only being an option w/ vote by mail). 3/
HR1 may still be a good start. But it does not go nearly far enough on election security. Here are my suggestions for election security. Maybe these could be addressed in a later bill, but we shld keep them on our radar. 4/ https://t.co/mNdHrvwHcN
The key section is 1502. IMO, it shld add the following. “For jurisdictions that offer in person voting, the option to mark a paper ballot by hand must be offered at the in-person polling location; giving this option only for vote by mail won’t suffice for such jurisdictions.” 5/
Link to HR1. 6/ https://t.co/UnCf5G0vC5
Ideally, there wld be additional constraints on touchscreen voting machines (the new ones are called ballot marking devices). #HandMarkedPaperBallots should be the primary in person voting system. Thus my proposed edits don’t actually go far enough. But they’d be a good start. 7/
8/ Expert paper. https://t.co/tyQcsu45Fz
9/ Link to the #SAFEAct, which also passed the House. https://t.co/DXiwOng1nV
10/ A recent study shows that 93% of inaccuracies in the text portion of machine-marked paper records from new touchscreen voting machines (BMDs) go unnoticed by voters. That’s a problem that invites fraud for down ballot races. https://t.co/R3aVXpCOGZ
11/ A post-mortem exam of the new voting machines (BMDs) found that “dozens... ‘weren’t properly calibrated,’ even though...ES&S...had...claimed during a sales pitch...that ‘you don’t have to worry about calibration...Scout’s honor.’” by @jennycohn1 https://t.co/dJv99FEq0f
12/ #HandMarkedPaperBallots don’t break down, freeze, miscalibrate, or require power. They don’t have to be “activated” by glitchy WiFi or Bluetooth-connected electronic pollbooks either. New touchscreens have all these problems. https://t.co/cRpGoqbPyG

More from Jennifer Cohn ✍🏻 📢

Good news! The New York State Board of Elections voted yesterday to REJECT certification of ES&S’s ExpressVote XL all-in-one barcode ballot marking device (BMD), a glitchy & hackable touchscreen that ES&S has hoped officials would stupidly buy in lieu of pen and paper. 1/


I’m still trying to find out @NYSBOE’s reasoning, but I know one problem was that the ExpressVote XL runs on Windows 7 and can only mark ballots in English. If the XL were a person, it would be a MAGA. 2/

The XL has other problems. It runs the barcode “paper ballot” back under the printout AFTER the voter reviews it, which experts say means it could be maliciously programmed to eff with the barcode that is the only part of the “paper ballot” counted as your vote. 3/

Unfortunately, Philadelphia did choose the ES&S ExpressVote XL all-in-one ballot marking device (BMD), ignoring expert advice. I wrote about that unfortunate decision here in 2019. 4/

Here, for @NYRBooks, I also discuss problems involving the ES&S ExpressVote XL in PA in 2019. ES&S lobbyists had secretly donated to the two decision makers who then chose this system in Philly in lieu of #HandMarkedPaperBallots (pen & paper). 5/

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