BC UK

Better late than never. Here we go. What does this deal mean for borders, border formalities, customs & trade facilitation?

Long one. TL:DR very little at the moment but has potential

/1

Borders
When compared to no deal the deal changes very little in terms of border procedures. All formalities and checks will still be required.

Reminder - we're not starting from 0 here – both our container ports and our ro-ro ports are already congested

/2
On top of that, all the issues related to border readiness: lack of capacity and space, IT systems not ready, shortages of customs agents, treader readiness – have not been solved.

The deal doesn’t help with that.

/3
Here is where we are:
☑️The UK will phase-in border formalities over 6 months (customs and SPS)
☑️The EU will introduce full formalities in 3 days (customs + SPS)
☑️Irish Sea border also fully operational in 3 days with some short-term SPS easements

/4
Pre-notifications (safety & security declarations) not initially required on the UK side, needed for imports into the EU.

So what's in the deal?

/5
Anti-smuggling and safety&security checks according to each side’s criteria but signs of cooperation and data exchange.

Not much of that going on on the UK's side anyway in the first 6 months.

/6
Customs cooperation
The text is actually very good. Covers standard provisions plus elements from the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. It’s comprehensive and encouraging.

Plus we have a Protocol on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters

/7
(Side note - further case in point that a Mutual Administrative Assistance agreement is not the same as a trade deal and can be signed with or without one)

/8

https://t.co/QRsegE8Zm9
Non-committal language of the chapter in practice means that there is potential for deeper cooperation e.g. “consider developing joint initiatives” but no obligation.

This is in line with what we normally see in such chapters.

/9
For example 👇 from the UK’s initial proposal - a pilot for joint customs offices.

Again, plenty of scope for deeper cooperation but not initially.

/10
Ro-ro ports

Helpful language but less than in the UK's initial proposal. The EU did not commit to the proposed 2h time-limit for clearance.

/11
Pre-lodgement, advanced processing and exchange of information.

/12
Customs procedures
Full or simplified (deferred - UK). The key difference here vs no deal - no tariffs, provided that rules of origin are met. A quick explainer on how this will work below.

/13

https://t.co/Z4FJHbIebO
Simplified procedures
Interesting provision. Both parties already have simplified procedures and have previously committed to introducing the ones they don't currently have. So this is not technically new. But perhaps there is scope here for something more. Eventually.

/14
AEO and mutual recognition.
This is good. Still not that many benefits of having AEO but mutual recognition is helpful.
Commitment to allow SMEs to qualify but not many SMEs are able to given the current criteria.

/15
The only thing is, as I have often pointed out - to get mutual recognition our AEO programme needs to be compatible with EU's AEO.

Meaning total revamping of UK's AEO programme isn't happening. We can't diverge that much

/16
SPS
Little if any changes vs no deal in terms of what needs to happen at the border.
Not much on SPS in general. Read more 👇 from SPS expert.

/17

https://t.co/tWsjD2gHeF
Northern Ireland
Nothing in the deal but having a deal, in theory, means managing of the Irish Sea Border will be easier. With the new trusted trader programme and more than a light-touch approach to RoOs it should be easier.

/18
To sum it all up – in 3 days border procedures will look pretty much the same as they would under no deal. In terms of customs – obviously no tariffs (hello origin).

In the future, who knows, plenty of scope for deepening customs cooperation.

/19

More from Uk

A short thread on why I am dubious that the government can lawfully impose charges on travellers entering the UK for quarantine and testing (proposed at £1,750 and £210)

1/

The UK has signed up to the International Health Regulations (IHA) 2005. These therefore create binding international legal obligations on the UK.

The IHA explicitly prevent charging for travellers' quarantine or medical examinations.

https://t.co/n4oWE8x5Vg /2


International law is not actionable in a UK court unless it has been implemented in law.

But it can be used as an aide to interpretation where a statute isn't clear as to what powers it grants.

See e.g. Lord Bingham in A v SSHD https://t.co/RXmib1qGYD

/3


The Quarantine regulations will, I assume, be made under section 45B of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984

https://t.co/54L4lHGMEr

/4


That gives pretty broad powers but I can't see any power to charge for quarantine. Perhaps it will be inferred from somewhere else in Part 2A?

But...
Just finished reading an article by Iain MacWhirter that is so full of demonstrable falsehoods & logical fallacies that it requires a firm response: So seeing as I’ve done one nuclear thread this week already, I might as well do another... 🧵☢️🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿🇺🇳

Iain is able to correctly identify that the submission that @SNP_SITW group made to the UK #IntegratedReview - and therefore wasn’t policy about an independent Scotland - but that’s where his grip on reality ends.

We called for unilateral disarmament, as I pointed out on Monday:
https://t.co/DwHt9knqHh


Iain chooses to elide the fact that our submission was clearly not about policy in an independent Scotland, and therefore seeks to portray our request to the UK Government to be serious about its own commitments to multilateral arms control treaties — like the NPT — as SNP policy

Despite revealing that he knows a thing or two about internal SNP procedures, he then goes on to conflate two unconnected things — our submission, and a putative conference motion that the democratically-elected conferences committee (not the Leadership) decided not to accept

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