Twitter Thread by Eddie Du

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Over 10% of Indonesians are Christians.





Indonesia's 28.6 million **Christians** constitute 10.72% of the country's population in 2018, with 7.60% Protestant (20.25 million) and 3.12% Catholic (8.33 million). Some provinces in **Indonesia** are majority **Christian** (Protestant or Catholic).

en.m.wikipedia.org › wiki › Christia...

Christianity in Indonesia - Wikipedia

The “Moluccas have almost been ignored in recent times even by writers of travel books and fiction” https://t.co/u0QS7R1Rin

Lineages of the Nation

18 The Revolution of 1945-49 and the formation of an Indonesian unitary state in 1950 fundamentally changed the preconditions for writing local or regional history. Dutch *bestuursambtenaren* were repatriated and new ones were obviously not trained, with the exception of Papua which remained in Dutch hands until 1962. Clearly, this caused a general downturn in cultural studies of Indonesia, if not qualitatively then at least in quantity. The eastern parts of the island nation were seldom visited by Western scholars, and educated Indonesians could still not quite fill the role of the old colonial *Indologen*. Knowledge of Dutch, the language of much of the source material, was discouraged, which inevitably had consequences for the production of new historical research. Moreover, the Indonesian nation, being born out of anti-colonial struggle, fostered a historiography that was plainly Indonesia-centric and streamlined a complicated and multifaceted past into a central narrative. [14] Its effort to erase competing stories also affected the occurrence of local studies.

19 As far as the present writer has found, very little Indonesian research about eastern Indonesian history was produced during the first democratic era (1949-57) and the Guided Democracy era (1957-66). A ponderous exception was Elvianus Katoppo’s well-crafted study of the Tidorese rebel and sultan Nuku (1738-1805), *Nuku, Sulthan Saidul Djehad Muhammad el Mabus Amirudin Sjah, Kaitjil Paparangan, Sulthan Tidore* (1957) which combined a nationalist perspective with serious archival research. It was only with the advent of the New Order after 1966 that histories of individual Indonesian regions were again written to a degree. Characteristically, however, the most visible examples were state-produced series of books, often published by the Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan (Department of Education and Culture) and written by teams of authors. For Nusa Tenggara Timur we have titles such as *Sejarah Daerah Nusa Tenggara Timor* (1978), *Sejarah kebangkitan nasional Daerah Nusa Tenggara Timur* (1979), and *Sejarah perlawanan terhadap imperialisme dan kolonialisme di Nusa Tenggara Timur* (1982). We may take a look at the first-mentioned work. The layout of the *Sejarah Daerah Nusa Tenggara Timur* is somewhat mechanical with a periodization which in effect follows colonial historiography in the successive chapters. Moreover, the presentation of the general aims of the book gives little doubt about the perspective:

1. Save the national culture.
2. Build up the performance and development of the national culture.
3. Build up the endurance of the national culture.
4. Strengthen the identity of the people. [15]


The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in November 1975, after twelve days of independence, evoked reaction from human rights groups, journalists, and intellectuals in the West.

The East Timor Issue and its Consequences


28 There is no denying that the titles mentioned so far have had a very limited audience. [22] While traveling to eastern Indonesia became easier in the backpacker boom in the heyday of the New Order, the interests of the Western visitors and armchair travelers lay in other matters than history. However, there was an event of international ramifications that turned the eyes of the world on this part of Southeast Asia. The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in November 1975, after twelve days of independence, evoked reaction from human rights groups, journalists, and intellectuals in the West. Although the issue was limited compared to many other political crises in Asia in the late twentieth century, the brutal and genocidal aspects of the occupation led to the creation of East Timor groups in a number of countries. A large number of studies and reports surfaced, by journalists, activists, and scholars. Sometimes they contained historical perspectives though not written by trained historians, such as John Taylor's *Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor* (1991), and Gudmund Jannisa's *The Crocodile's Tears: East Timor in the Making* (1997), both authored by social scientists.

29 As the East Timor issue received new attention after the Santa Cruz Massacre of 1991 and the country slid towards secession from Indonesia in the late 1990s, studies with a deeper historical perspective began to appear. A number of general surveys of the East Timorese past were published, such as Geoffrey Gunn, *Timor Lorosae: 500 years* (1999), Frédéric Durand, *East Timor, a Country at the Crossroads of Asia and the Pacific: A Geo-Historical Atlas* (2006), and Andrea Molnar, *Timor-Leste: Politics, History, and Culture* (2010). None of these provided much that was new in terms of historical sources before the 1970s but rather offered much-needed syntheses of the existing literature, including old inaccessible works in Portuguese. [23]

Linguist diversity of East Timor




It has long been observed that the Austronesian languages of Wallacea display Papuan influences. Some linguists have attempted to define linguistic Wallacea in terms of this hybridity.
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
Wallacea is the group of islands within the red area. The Weber Line is in blue.

There is evidence that Linguistic Wallacea is the result of prehistoric interactions between Austronesian migrants and a pre-existing population of seafaring Papuan agriculturalists, who were already well established in Wallacea before the Austronesians arrived.



Wallacea is at the cross-roads of the Austronesian and Melanesian worlds.

Wallacea is the westernmost region in which languages from Papuan families are found alongside languages of the Austronesian family.



Stone building was an indigenous tradition in the southeastern corner of Indonesia which subsequently was extended to stone fortifications around villages, which spread across southern Maluku.
https://t.co/4iGHHD3lgF

From 1942

RELATIONS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND RELIGIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

By J. HARDEMAN

THE first paragraph on 'Religion' in the constitutional Law of the Netherlands East Indies reads as follows:—

> All subjects are at liberty to profess their religious faiths as they desire, providing this does not interfere with the maintenance of law and order in the country.

Throughout the ages the Dutch have been known for their tolerance and understanding towards other creeds than their own. This attitude of 'live and let live'—which they have in common with the British—has been the underlying principle of Netherlands colonial policy as a whole. It is also the basis of the relationship between the government and the many religions and religious denominations in the Dutch East Indies.

The native population consists of heterogeneous elements. Out of 70,000,000 people, 63,000,000, although representing at least sixteen different tribes and separate languages, have the one feature in common that they belong to the large Malay race group, while the other 7,000,000 are Papuans. As to their religious denominations, approximately eighty-five per cent are Muslims, close on a million, or 1·3 per cent, are Christians and just over a million are Hindus, while the remaining eight million are heathen living in the shadow of their animistic beliefs and superstitions. The Hindus are chiefly found in the island of Bali, the last stronghold of Hinduism in the archipelago. To complete the picture there are 300,000 Europeans, mostly Christians, and 1,500,000 foreign Orientals, mainly Chinese.

From 1946

THE EMERGING CHURCH IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES

Whether one takes the long view of 1300 years of competition in the arena of History, or the short view of the trends of the past fifty years, admittedly there is much more to encourage and give pride to the Moslem protagonist than to the Christian. Very large areas of the world, notably in North Africa and the Near East, have swung from Christian allegiance to Moslem, and there has been no comparable swing the other way. Spain is the only large area that has returned to Christendom, and the constant tendency in all Moslem lands with Christian minorities, is for those minorities to be absorbed into the fold of Islam. So it is not surprising that even modern writers acquainted with the most recent developments, still repeat the cliché "Once a Moslem, always a Moslem," and that loyal Christians sometimes grow faint-hearted and discouraged.

Nevertheless the victories have not all been on one side. And it is certain that a score of converts genuinely converted by the power of a faith they have become convinced is superior, are more significant in the History of Religions than a thousand who change their religion under social or political pressure for material gain. And it is to these converts from Islam, few though they may be, these who "climb the steep ascent of heaven through peril, toil and pain," that we wish to give our consideration at this time. That we may start on a note of thanksgiving and optimism, we will consider the Emerging Church from Islam.

As one considers the world of Islam, one land where he finds a really strong and numerous church emerging from that religion is the Island of Java. Let us then turn our thoughts to this vast and fertile island and the new Church of Christ to be found there.

Of the seventy million inhabitants of the Dutch East Indies, no less than nine-tenths are Moslem, so there are about sixty-three million Moslems in these islands. About two-thirds of the total population of the islands are found in Java, and here the people are almost solidly Moslem, so that nearly all the indigenous Christians are converts from Islam. Islam is, however, a relatively recent arrival in Indonesia. It first established itself in Sumatra in the thirteenth century and from there spread southward, so that by the end of the fifteenth century it was well in the ascendancy. Hinduism was steadily driven out, until today only about one and a quarter million Hindus are to be found and they for the most part on the little island of Bali.

From 2017,
https://t.co/qjgwDQqpQC

Dutch anti-Muslim bigotry, however, is less novel than it seems. Only 70 years ago, the Netherlands was a majority-Muslim empire, stretching from Aceh in Northern Sumatra to the Eastern Maluku islands, 2,500 miles to the east. Its rule was often brutally intolerant. During the colonial period, the Dutch empire regularly banned its East Indies subjects—today's Indonesians—from practicing key aspects of their faith, like making the pilgrimage to Mecca. "The polemics that come out from that period against Islam by Dutch missionaries and local Dutch officials … [are] that Islam is inconsistent with freedom, Islam is oppressive. This is the same thing Wilders is saying now," Jeremy Menchik, a scholar of Indonesian Islam at Boston University, told me. Far from being *sui generis*, Geert Wilders is merely echoing his colonialist forbears.

When the Dutch arrived in modern-day Indonesia at the turn of the 16th century, their sole mission was to wrest control of the East Indies spice trade.

When the Dutch arrived in modern-day Indonesia at the turn of the 16th century, their sole mission was to wrest control of the East Indies spice trade. To that end, they established the Dutch East India Company, which parlayed shrewd diplomacy and force of arms to expel Portuguese and British rivals, subjugate powerful local kingdoms, and monopolize the regional spice trade. It was a lucrative operation: By some estimates, the Dutch East India Company is the most valuable company to ever exist.

The company's masters soon learned they had to reckon with Islam, which came to Indonesia with traders in the 13th century. By the 17th century, it had superseded Hinduism and Buddhism on major Indonesian islands. Today, Indonesia has more Muslims than any other country in the world.

“Geert Wilders’ anti-Islam rhetoric Islam recalls earlier eras of Dutch politics.”

As a result, the Dutch have managed to preserve their self-image as a historically liberal, tolerant nation, distinct, say, from their German neighbors to the east. As with many other self-professed liberal nations, like the United States and Germany, Dutch enlightenment values have always clashed with baser, tribal impulses in the nation's politics.

Geert Wilders's anti-Islam rhetoric Islam recalls earlier eras of Dutch politics. His anxieties over a supposedly Islamicizing nation are distinct from imperial Dutch worries about Islam providing a vehicle for anti-colonial resistance. Nonetheless, historical ignorance in the Netherlands helps explain why so many Dutch view Islam as foreign even though the religion is deeply tied to their country's history.

"People have no idea," Nordholt said. "There is ongoing amnesia about the colonial past."

Wilders was born to a Dutch father and a mixed-race mother born in the Dutch East Indies.



“Wilders’ extreme proposals and blunt speaking do appeal to a remarkable number of Dutch voters who feel bewildered by globalization and ignored by their more orthodox politicians.”
https://t.co/R7yHEeG40Q

“Sneered at by Dutch colonialists, the Eurasians would stress their Dutch identity.”

Wilders was born in 1963, the youngest of four children. His father, a printing company executive, was so traumatised by the wartime occupation of the Netherlands that for 40 years after it ended he refused to enter Germany. His mother was Dutch-Indonesian, and her mixed race has given amateur psychologists much to ponder over, given her son's robust views about Dutch culture and identity. Sneered at by Dutch colonialists, the Eurasians would stress their Dutch identity. They were also expelled from Muslim Indonesia after the Second World War.

"Ringed by bodyguards, he might, for instance, make a fleeting appearance at a market in some PVV stronghold to hand out pepper sprays (to deter aggressive Muslim men) to adoring supporters."

For security reasons, he seldom attends public events in the Netherlands, but when he does, his appearances are carefully staged for the cameras. Ringed by bodyguards, he might, for instance, make a fleeting appearance at a market in some PVV stronghold to hand out pepper sprays (to deter aggressive Muslim men) to adoring supporters. But mostly – like Trump – he communicates by posting statements and videos on social media: primarily Twitter, where he has more than 760,000 followers. That allows him to bypass the mainstream media and spread his message without any questioning or demands for accountability.

Wilders calls young Muslim men “street terrorists” and “testosterone bombs” who endanger Dutch women.

He calls mosques “hate palaces”. He calls young Muslim men “street terrorists” and “testosterone bombs” who endanger Dutch women. He calls hijabs “head rags” and has proposed a tax on those who wear them in public places, with the proceeds to go towards women’s emancipation. He claims that Muslims beat up homosexuals, and that blonde women in the Netherlands have become afraid to show their hair in the street lest they be abused.

Wilders has pushed the Dutch government further to the right.

Although Rutte believes in immigration and integration, and quietly teaches immigrant teenagers history and citizenship at a school in The Hague each Thursday morning, he published an open letter in all leading Dutch newspapers in January saying that immigrants who “refuse to adapt and criticise our values” should “act normally or go”. He told those who harass gay people, whistle at women wearing short skirts, dump rubbish in the streets or who spit in public that “if you reject our country so fundamentally I’d prefer you to leave”.