Twitter Thread by Jennifer Cohn ✍■ ■



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
IMO, the #SAFEAct is better on election security than HR1 bc it wld ban most touchscreen voting machines currently available. HR1 wld allow them as a primary in person system bc vendors call the paper they spit out a “paper ballot.” Pen & paper is safer #HandMarkedPaperBallots 1/

> Even HR1 did not require that jurisdictions give all voters the option to mark their ballots by hand AT THE POLLS. The House has not even warned the public about the dangers of new touchscreen ballot marking devices. Pls do that NOW. TY.
>
> Expert Report: https://t.co/I2EWvFIQEH pic.twitter.com/euekDq65mr
>
> — Jennifer Cohn \u270d\U0001f3fb \U0001f4e2 (@jennycohn1) April 24, 2019

I have not looked at other aspects of HR1. It addresses more than election security. The #SAFEAct shld be the starting point for election security reform in my opinion. 2/

HR1 requires that all voters have the option to mark their ballots by hand. But it does not specify that, for jurisdictions with in person voting, the hand marked (pen & paper) option must be available for in person voting (vs it only being an option w/ vote by mail). 3/

HR1 may still be a good start. But it does not go nearly far enough on election security. Here are my suggestions for election security. Maybe these could be addressed in a later bill, but we shld keep them on our radar. 4/ https://t.co/mNdHrvwHcN



Fwd: Public Records Request

The key section is 1502. IMO, it shld add the following. “For jurisdictions that offer in person voting, the option to mark a paper ballot by hand must be offered at the in-person polling location; giving this option only for vote by mail won’t suffice for such jurisdictions.” 5/

10:49

congress.gov

ng Accuracy, Integrity, and Security Through Voter-
Verified Permanent Paper Ballot

LE.

y be cited as the ``Voter Confidence and Increased
 2019''.

LOT AND MANUAL COUNTING REQUIREMENTS.

-Section 301(a)(2) of the Help America Vote Act of
1(a)(2)) is amended to read as follows:
per ballot requirement.--
``(A) Voter-verified paper ballots.--
        ``(i) Paper ballot requirement.--(I) The voting system shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voter's vote that shall be marked and made available for inspection and verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted, and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character recognition device or other counting device. For purposes of this subclause, the term `individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot' means a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked through the use of a nontabulating ballot marking device or system, so long as the voter shall have the option to mark his or her ballot by hand.
        ``(II) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to correct any error on the paper ballot before the permanent voter-verified paper ballot is preserved in accordance with clause (ii).
        ``(III) The voting system shall not preserve the voter-verified paper ballots in any manner that makes it possible, at any time after the ballot has been cast, to associate a voter with the record of the voter's vote without the voter's consent.
        ``(ii) Preservation as official record.--The individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot used in accordance with clause (i) shall constitute the official ballot and shall be preserved and used as the official ballot for purposes of any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office in which the voting system is used.
        ``(iii) Manual counting requirements for recounts and audits.--(I) Each paper ballot used pursuant to clause (i) shall be suitable for a manual audit, and shall be counted by hand in any recount or audit conducted with respect to any election for Federal office.
        ``(II) In the event of any inconsistencies or irregularities between any electronic vote tallies and the vote tallies determined by counting by hand the individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballots used pursuant to clause (i), and subject to subparagraph (B),

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Link to HR1. 6/ https://t.co/UnCf5G0vC5

Ideally, there wld be additional constraints on touchscreen voting machines (the new ones are called ballot marking devices). #HandMarkedPaperBallots should be the primary in person voting system. Thus my proposed edits don't actually go far enough. But they'd be a good start. 7/

8/ Expert paper. https://t.co/tyQcsu45Fz

9/ Link to the #SAFEAct, which also passed the House. https://t.co/DXiwOng1nV

10/ A recent study shows that 93% of inaccuracies in the text portion of machine-marked paper records from new touchscreen voting machines (BMDs) go unnoticed by voters. That's a problem that invites fraud for down ballot races. https://t.co/R3aVXpCOGZ

11/ A post-mortem exam of the new voting machines (BMDs) found that "dozens... 'weren't properly calibrated,' even though...ES&S...had...claimed during a sales pitch...that 'you don't have to worry about calibration...Scout's honor.'" by @jennycohn1 https://t.co/dJv99FEq0f

12/ #HandMarkedPaperBallots don't break down, freeze, miscalibrate, or require power. They don't have to be "activated" by glitchy WiFi or Bluetooth-connected electronic pollbooks either. New touchscreens have all these problems. https://t.co/cRpGoqbPyG

> \u201cPoll workers weren\u2019t able to create voter access cards on new voting check-in computers manufactured by KnowInk. Those cards activate touchscreen voting machines...\u201d
>
> Know what doesn\u2019t have this problem? #HandMarkedPaperBallots #gapol https://t.co/wsmaJrb81A
>
> — Sarah Riggs Amico (@SarahRiggsAmico) November 6, 2019