

Twitter Thread by [R.■■■■■■■■](#)



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Yes-- the initial revolution, like in Russia, was plotted by Western powers-- but they lost control of them in time-- Stalin's purges & shift toward a Nationalist platform is similar to Mao's-- both rediscovered "national sovereignty" & represent Napoleonic counter-revolution.

Wait until he finds out who put the Chinese Communist Party into power <https://t.co/WsMiLNZ4Yp>
pic.twitter.com/gCWikvBdhO

— Jaysh al Kulakistan (@AlbaranAskeri) [January 3, 2021](#)

I don't support "Revolutionaries"-- I support Counter-Revolutionaries who complete the Dialectic by synthesizing the Revolutionary with the Traditional-- this is what makes Kojève more interesting than Marx.

China has undergone massive changes-- Xi represents a "new Mao" in this sense-- & he came to power by purging the "Globalist Liberal" factions of the CCP (most often paid off by the CIA)-- Xi's unlike any other Communist Dictator from the CCP-- he's a Revolutionary Traditionalist

Xi's inspiration comes, simultaneously, from laboring with the rural peasantry & from studying Lee Kuan Yew & Deng Xiaoping-- along with the "Return to Tradition" / "Trust the Classics" revitalization of pre-cultural revolution texts-- such as Han Fei, Confucius, etc.

He's a Chinese Nationalist-- which is to say-- he's building a New Chinese Empire-- following the same tactics the US & British used in earlier time periods-- specifically, pivoting to "Free Trade" after achieving absolute industrial supremacy-- standard British Policy.

Sorry that the Anglo-Empire is incapable of building continent-spanning high speed rail networks anymore-- we used to be capable of this-- but we're just decadent & our priorities are psychotic.

also

<https://t.co/M3UaHcloY9>

Imagine western leaders admitting to reading Schmitt lol

China's fascination with Schmitt took off in the early 2000s when the philosopher Liu Xiaofeng translated the German thinker's major works into Chinese. Dubbed "Schmitt fever," his ideas energized the political science, philosophy, and law departments of China's universities. Chen Duanhong, a law professor at Peking University, called Schmitt "the most successful theorist" to have brought political concepts into his discipline. "His constitutional doctrine is what we revere," Chen wrote in 2012, before adding, of his Nazi membership, "That's his personal choice." An alum of Peking University's philosophy program, who asked not to be identified speaking on sensitive issues, told me that Schmitt's work was among "the common language, a part of the academic establishment" at the university.

"Anti-liberal"!!! Oh No!!!

One lesson from Chiang's rule is that threats from abroad can stoke authoritarianism at home. And for almost a century, even as power transferred from Chiang's Nationalists to Mao Zedong's Communists, fear of "enemy" infiltration—the seedbed for fascism—lingered in China's national psyche. "Who are our enemies? Who are our friends?" Mao asked in the very first line of his *Selected Works*. Later, from 1989 to 1991, 500 articles in the *People's Daily*, the state-controlled paper, contained the phrase "hostile forces." The perceived threat of invasion, or at minimum suspicion of outsiders, continues to inform contemporary politics. Such anxiety lends credence to the anti-liberal theories of Carl Schmitt, who once proclaimed that all "political actions and motives can be reduced [to that distinction] between friends and enemies."

The pandemic has further ensconced statist's views. That China has gotten rid of the virus, which President Donald Trump called "the invisible enemy," while the United States remains hobbled by it, is portrayed among Chinese statist as a triumph for the Schmittian worldview.

"Since Xi Jinping became China's top leader," Flora Sapio, a sinologist at the University of Naples, wrote, "Carl Schmitt's philosophy has found even wider applications in China, in both 'Party theory' and academic life." This shift is significant: It marks a move from what had been an *illiberal* government in Beijing—one that flouts liberal norms as a matter of convenience—to an *anti-liberal* government—one that repudiates liberal norms as a matter of principle.