
Twitter Thread by Jane Black ❤



Jane Black ❤
@imatargetoo

We are enduring covert, multinational COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN) operations: "People are not mobilized individually by cold consideration of rational facts. Rather, they are mobilized in groups, by influences and opinion leaders, through cultural narratives"
https://t.co/VELoUfjMK4

In COIN campaigns, counter-insurgent messages are often formulated with the help of indigenous counter-insurgent forces and conveyed through local media, whereas practical deeds can be performed unilaterally or multilaterally in concert with other counter-insurgent forces and entails an array of restorative governance, law and order, and socio-economic development programmes. Within a counter-insurgency theatre, these programmes are often conducted region-by-region over a long period of time. They are usually undertaken by small teams deployed to specific localities of concern, often referred to as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which comprise a mix of both military and civilian personnel to conduct non-traditional military tasks.



The Fight for Control: Kilcullen's 4 Stages of 'Competitive Control' over the majority population between insurgents and counter-insurgents, from the beginning to the end of the war.[26]

The object of these efforts is not however, contrary to popular belief, to make the population grateful or affectionate towards the counter-insurgent force. Emotive and temporary gratefulness will not secure the loyalty of the population to the counter-

Guess which groups have been identified as "insurgents", the "active minority against the cause"?






Figure 1-2. Support for an insurgency

https://t.co/aK8q5KONeL



IO - information operations.



"...capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.' Information Operations (IO) are actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own".

12:02 41%

- **PSYOP as an IO Core Capability.** PSYOP has a central role in the achievement of IO objectives in support of the JFC. In today's information environment even PSYOP conducted at the tactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval process that must be understood and the necessity for timely decisions is fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This is particularly important in the early stages of an operation given the time it takes to develop, design, produce, distribute, disseminate, and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. All PSYOP are conducted under the authority of interagency-coordinated and OSD approved PSYOP programs. The PSYOP program approval process at the national level requires time for sufficient coordination and resolution of issues; hence, JFCs should begin PSYOP planning as early as possible to ensure the execution of PSYOP in support of operations. A JFC must have an approved PSYOP program, execution authority, and delegation of product approval authority before PSYOP execution can begin. JFCs should request PSYOP planners immediately during the initial crisis stages to ensure the JFC has plenty of lead time to obtain the proper authority to execute PSYOP. PSYOP assets may be of particular value to the JFC in pre-/post-combat operations when other means of influence are restrained or not authorized. PSYOP must be coordinated with CI, MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure deconfliction and control, CI operations are not compromised, and that all capabilities within IO are coordinated to achieve the objectives established in planning. There must be close cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PA staffs in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences, which is the purpose of the IO cell. PSYOP efforts are most effective when personnel with a thorough understanding of the language and culture of the TA are included in the review of PSYOP materials and messages. As the information environment evolves, the dissemination of PSYOP products is expanding from traditional print and broadcast to more sophisticated use of the Internet, facsimile messaging, text messaging, and other emerging media. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination of the core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly public affairs (PA), MILDEC, CNO, civil-military operations (CMO), and EW.[3]



Soldiers from the U.S. Army's 350th Tactical Psychological Operations, 10th Mountain Division, drop leaflets over a village near Hawijah in Kirkuk province, Iraq, on March 6, 2008.



U.S. Army PSYOP Force structure



NATO leaflet in Libya

- Psychological operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.
- 4th Psychological Operations Group

Military Deception (MILDEC)

Main article: Military deception

See also: Category:World War II deception operations

https://t.co/rkzy1FtJSd

What GAO Found

At its core, information operations (IO) are the *integration* of information-related capabilities during military operations to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. (See figure.) For example, in seeking to facilitate safe and orderly humanitarian assistance, the Department of Defense (DOD) would conduct IO by influencing host nation and regional cooperation through the *integration* of public affairs activities and military information support operations.

Information Operations and Selected Information-Related Capabilities




Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense (DOD) information. | GAO 21-525T

GAO found, in 2019, that DOD had made limited progress in implementing the 2016 DOD IO strategy and faced a number of challenges in overseeing the IO enterprise and integrating its IO capabilities. Specifically:

- In seeking to implement the strategy, DOD had not developed an implementation plan or an investment framework to identify planning priorities to address IO gaps.
- DOD has established department-wide IO roles and responsibilities and assigned most oversight responsibilities to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The Under Secretary had exercised some responsibilities, such as establishing an executive steering group. However, the Under Secretary had not fulfilled other IO oversight responsibilities, such as conducting an assessment of needed tasks, workload, and resources. Instead, the Under Secretary delegated these responsibilities to an official whose primary responsibilities are focused on special operations and combatting terrorism.
- DOD had integrated information-related capabilities in some military operations, but had not conducted a posture review to assess IO challenges. Conducting a comprehensive posture review to fully assess challenges would assist DOD in effectively operating while using information-related capabilities.

We are being subject to full spectrum, high-tech, public-private, civil-military, multi-domain operations (MDO) based on an evolving military model w roots in colonial imperialist strategy, that since 9/11 has been acutely implemented worldwide.



Kilcullen: 3 Pillars of Counter-Insurgency.[32]

In terms of COIN campaigns, no amount of political progress in the psycho-political sphere can be assured without hard-line military protection in the security sphere. The overall political structure and the political action taking place for and within the population, as part of the counter-insurgency campaign, must also be both *defended* and *enforced*.

The counter-insurgent's fundamental security role is therefore to safeguard this political activity and progress by:


(1) *protecting the local population*, especially those who are already persuaded and those in areas of high political importance;

(2) *protecting all those military and civilian personnel involved in the 'hearts and minds' campaign*, who are performing the political non-military functions; and

https://t.co/VdHgZfVRms

This division of labour in a COIN campaign is sometimes referred to as Galula's 80/20 rule, being '20 percent military action and 80 per cent political'. [19] As Galula states:

> 'Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population. The armed forces are but one of many instruments of the counterinsurgent, and what is better than the political power to harness the non-military instruments, to see that appropriations come at the right time to consolidate the military work, that political and social reforms follow through?' [20]



The 80/20 COIN Rule: The political and security dimensions of a COIN war campaign, involving a majority of non-kinetic political operations (comprising 80 per cent of all activity) in combination with a minority of kinetic security operations (comprising only 20 per cent of all activity), the latter nevertheless comprising an essential component of COIN work to 'protect the population' through the elimination of hard-line insurgents.

In terms of the 80% political COIN role, the military's task is to engage in the psycho-

https://t.co/wEoUGFZehU

The object of these efforts is not however, contrary to popular belief, to make the population grateful or affectionate towards the counter-insurgent force. Emotive and temporary gratefulness will not secure the loyalty of the population to the counter-insurgency effort when subjected to insurgent pressure or intimidation.[27] Consequently any counter-insurgency effort in which success is calibrated on winning popular 'gratefulness' or 'affection' is unfortunately destined to fail. Instead the true objective is through these political measures *to prompt, invite or persuade the population into making an irrevocable choice to support the counter-insurgency instead of the insurgency*.[28] As Kilcullen states:

> 'This is about perceived self-interest, not about whether the population likes us. The principal emotive content is respect, not affection. Support based on liking does not survive when the enemy applies fear: intimidation trumps affection. Disappointment, unreliability, failure and defeat are deadly – preserving prestige and popular respect through proven reliability, honouring promises and following through [on those promises], is key.' [29]

If the 'empty' passive majority within the population will stop remaining neutral and make such an irreversible choice to support the counter-insurgency, then the counter-insurgency is well on its way to success. Popular support will lead to popular consent and approval of the governing authorities, thereby creating legitimacy for the government while at the same time eroding the political foundations and claims of the insurgency. If the practical development programmes are effective, moreover, a sense of order and stability will be created that will discourage support and recruits to the insurgency.

In sum the military's political role in COIN is essentially, to paraphrase Mao, through good works and goodwill to slowly drain away the 'sea' of people in which the insurgent 'fish' swim, hide and thrive.

https://t.co/80L0bscnAE

In terms of COIN campaigns, no amount of political progress in the psycho-political sphere can be assured without hard-line military protection in the security sphere. The overall political structure and the political action taking place for and within the population, as part of the counter-insurgency campaign, must also be both *defended* and *enforced*.

The counter-insurgent's fundamental security role is therefore to safeguard this political activity and progress by:

(1) *protecting the local population*, especially those who are already persuaded and those in areas of high political importance;

(2) *protecting all those military and civilian personnel involved in the 'hearts and minds' campaign*, who are performing the political non-military functions; and

(3) eliminating all hostile insurgent elements. [33]

While all of these functions take the form of physical security action, the former two comprise *non-kinetic* activities while the latter comprises *kinetic* physical activity (see diagram below).

It is important to underscore here again, however, that unlike in conventional war, physical security operations are secondary to the political influence operations occurring within the political dimension of any COIN campaign. As Kilcullen argues, while in conventional war operations 'influence operations' are used to support and enact the physical campaign in order to help explain what is being done, within a COIN campaign 'physical operations' are used to support and enact the influence campaign The emphasis is thus entirely reversed between the two conventional and COIN campaigns.

These are the forces within our cities who have been recruited, trained & indoctrinated into performing ongoing community organized stalking & harassment campaigns against innocent Targeted Individuals (TI), who are deemed the "insurgents" in this covert COIN wargame.

The 3 Main Tasks of COIN Security Forces in a COIN Campaign.[34]

The three tasks involved in this security dimension of a counter-insurgency campaign are usually performed by a range of security forces acting in cooperation and coordination with each other – an 'inter-agency' approach. These security forces comprise:


- *military forces* (including local territorial forces, regional 'framework' forces, strike forces, border protection forces, and theatre reserve forces);
- *police forces* (including community police, paramilitary constabulary police, and the police intelligence special branch);
- *human security forces* (including all personnel working in the fields of economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security);
- *public safety forces* (including emergency services and public prosecutors within the justice system); and finally
- *resource and population control forces* (including access controls, reporting systems, and collective responsibility units such as neighbourhood watch organisations). [35]

All of these forces together work in conjunction to provide protection for the local population and counter-insurgency personnel, thereby performing the first two security functions within the security dimension of a COIN campaign. Most of this protection work, performed by these various security agencies towards attaining the first two security tasks, actually falls into the category of non-traditional military activity, meaning that it is these activities – when combined with other political activities involved in the political dimension of a COIN campaign – which comprise the 80% component of non-military tasks involved in a counter-insurgency.

Meanwhile, military forces (sometimes aided by paramilitary police forces) undertake the 'Seek & Destroy' targeted kinetic activity to eliminate insurgents, comprising the third and last security function within the COIN security dimension. In accomplishing this crucial task, these military forces differ from the other security forces mentioned

A "whole-of-community" approach used to "neutralise" activists, journalists, whistleblowers, dissidents, "subversives", or anyone else they decide thru covert, crowdsourced, organized stalking & harassment campaigns (COINTELPRO, " Zersetzung"/decomposition).

11:45 42%




The 3 Main Tasks of COIN Security Forces in a COIN Campaign.[34]

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- *public safety forces* (including emergency services and public prosecutors within the justice system); and finally
- *resource and population control forces* (including access controls, reporting

https://t.co/skoYbJOh1r

Kilcullen states: 'In a counter-insurgency environment, effective military security operations are fundamental: they underpin all other forms of security.' [36]




The various security components involved in the U.S.-led Coalition's COIN campaign in Iraq, 2007, with each strata of the pyramid being led respectively by Intelligence (Counter-Terrorism), the Military (Counter-Insurgency), the Police (Communal Peace-keeping/Peace-enforcement), and the Civilian Government (Development & Nation-Building).[37]

So what exactly do these traditional military tasks entail? Namely, *'eliminating as many causes of the insurgency as feasible'*, in particular by *'eliminating extremists whose beliefs prevent them from ever reconciling with the government'*.[38] Indeed, the U.S. COIN Manual asserts that *the killing of insurgents unwilling to cooperate with the government is a vital condition to long-term success*, since it enables and encourages the local population to consent to government rule and take charge of their own

"...the permanent isolation of the insurgent population, isolation not enforced UPON the population, but maintained BY and WITH the population."


In terms of measuring COIN success in the *security* domain (the 20% COIN effort), secondly, Kilcullen advocates the Galula framework emanating from Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare* book, written in 1964. According to Galula, attaining success within the security dimension of a COIN campaign entails not just 'the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization', but also 'the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation *not enforced* upon the population but *maintained by and with the population* [emphasis added]'.[78]



Galula's definition of "Victory" in COIN Wars.[79]

Towards such success on the security front, Galula advocated 'Eight Steps' for counter-insurgent military forces, to be followed in any locality under siege by insurgent forces. They are as follows:

https://t.co/IijaBIsjkA



Galula's 'Eight Steps'. [82]

However, according to Kilcullen, Galula's framework can be used not just as a security roadmap, but rather *as a means of measuring how successful the security dimension of a COIN campaign is at any one moment of time*. This can be done simply by contrasting the security realities of any one locality within the theatre of operations against the eights steps outlined above, to assess just how effective the security campaign is in that locality.

In this way Galula's Eight Step framework can be used to give an assessment of how far along the security roadmap the COIN campaign is, and which steps must still be completed in any given insurgent-challenged locality.

(8) "Victory" vs. "End"?

https://t.co/kSQEmTozR2

Nevertheless, with counter-insurgency there is simply no 'quick fix'. Instead, each counter-insurgency campaign will have its own rhythm, duration, and end point in response to the waning insurgent life cycle – and a 'final end' can not be predicted, determined or procured merely by desiring it. [For more information on the 'life cycle' of insurgencies, see '**ISAF APPENDIX 1 – Insurgency: History, Definitions, Characteristics, Psychological Nature, Warfare & Life Cycle**'.]

Indeed, the only way to curtail the length of a COIN campaign is by either *recognising the insurgency in its earliest stages and overpowering it while it is still in its infancy*, or alternatively and more frequently, through *developing a well-defined strategy to keep the COIN war from becoming aimless, haphazard and unmethodical*.[89] According to

BTW, David J Kilcullen is Australian. Check his stats.
https://t.co/U8JFx7SBcP

David John Kilcullen FRGS (born 1967) is an Australian author, strategist, and counterinsurgency expert who is currently the non-executive chairman of Caerus Associates, a strategy and design consulting firm that he founded.[2] He is a professor at Arizona State University and at University of New South Wales, Canberra.[3]

From 2005 to 2006, he was Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. State Department.[4] Kilcullen was a senior counter-insurgency advisor to General David Petraeus in 2007 and 2008, where he helped design and monitor the Iraq War troop surge.[5] He was then a special advisor for counter-insurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.[6] Kilcullen has been a Senior Fellow of the Center for a New American Security[7] and an Adjunct Professor at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University.[8] Highly critical of the decision to invade Iraq, he is on record as saying "There undeniably would be no ISIS if we had not invaded Iraq."[9] Kilcullen has written five books: *The Accidental Guerrilla*, *Counterinsurgency*, *Out of the Mountains*, *Blood Year*, and *The Dragons and the Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West*.[9][10][11][12]

Lt. Col. (res.)
David John Kilcullen



Born	1967 (age 53–54)
Nationality	Australian
Education	PhD, Politics, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, 2000
Alma mater	Royal Military College, Duntroon
Known for	Theory and practice of counter-insurgency and conflict ethnography
Awards	United States Army Superior Civilian Service Medal[1]

Contents

Education

Kilcullen graduated from St Pius X College in 1984. He then attended the Australian Defence Force Academy and completed a Bachelor of Arts with honours in military art and science through the University of New South Wales and graduated as a distinguished graduate and was awarded the Chief of Defence Force Army Prize in 1989.[*citation needed*] He took his army officer training at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. After twelve months of training in Indonesia, Kilcullen graduated from the Australian Defence Force School of Languages[13] in 1993 with an advanced diploma in applied linguistics. He is fluent in Indonesian and speaks some Arabic and French.[1]

Kilcullen received a Ph.D. in politics from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2000. His thesis, entitled "The Political Consequences of Military Operations in Indonesia 1945-99: A Fieldwork Analysis of the Political Power-Diffusion Effects of